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Main rEsULTs
•	 Current Eastern European migrant stock in the EU may be assessed at 
around 1 million individuals in the case of Ukrainian nationals, 100,000-
150,000 individuals in the case of Belarusian nationals and around 
200,000-300,000 in the case of Moldovan nationals. The estimated num-
bers in Visegrad states are smaller: around 250,000-300,000 individuals in 
total including Ukrainian, Belarusian and Moldovan nationals.
•	 Although the migration situation in Russia was not our main research aim, 
it can be concluded that Russia still remains the primary destination for 
Ukrainian, Belarusian (over 90%) and Moldovan migrants. The total num-
ber of migrants from those three states in Russia (around 2.0-2.5 million in-
dividuals) is higher than in the EU as a whole. What is surprising, however, 
is the fact that Russia probably has higher proportion of irregular migrants 
from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in the overall stock of migrants from 
those states than does the EU. 
•	 In the case of Ukrainian, Belarusian and Moldovan nationals in the Viseg-
rad states, it can be estimated, however very roughly, that irregular mi-
grants account for between 20% and 40% of the overall number of migrants 
from those states. 
•	 Two out of four V4 states are key destination countries for Eastern European 
migrants, namely Poland and Czechia. Poland appears to be the most impor-
tant destination state in the EU for both Ukrainian and Belarusian migrants. 
The role of Czechia in the case of Ukrainian nationals is also of the highest sig-
nificance, though it has lost its previous major position due to the global eco-
nomic crisis. Hungary attracts only Ukrainian nationals of Hungarian origin, 
while Slovakia receives insignificant numbers of Eastern European migrants. 
•	 While the role of V4 states in the case of Ukrainian and Belarusian migrants 
is significant, Moldovans are marginally present in the region (the main 
EU destination for them remains Italy). Although the size of the EaP popu-
lation varied significantly among V4 countries, its features are similar in 
all cases. Migrants from Eastern European countries are particularly vis-
ible in secondary sectors of the labour market (i.e. agriculture, construc-
tion, household services), they serve as a complementary (not competing) 
labour force to nationals, and they are concentrated mostly in big cities, 
regions around capital cities and border areas. 
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•	 No massive inflow of labour migrants from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova 
to the EU should be expected after the visa regime for short-term travel 
for up to 90 days is abolished. Firstly, the Delphi survey results indicate 
the following consequences: moderate growth in inflow of labour migrants 
to V4 and the EU, more long-term settlement migration, regularisation of 
already present migrants, family reunification, and possible growth in 
undeclared employment. Secondly, projections based on the econometric 
model point to a circa 50,000 increase in the number of Belarusians and 
Moldovans (counted separately) and around a 200,000-300,000 increase 
in the number of Ukrainian residents in the EU in a year perspective fol-
lowing the introduction of free movement of people1. Thirdly, a conclusion 
from the analysis of the Western Balkan countries is that visa liberalisa-
tion has had little or no effect on the number of first-time residence per-
mits, or on immigration flows to EU MS. As visa liberalisation did not have 
any measurable effect on longer-term migration trends regarding such di-
verse examples as Poland, the Baltic countries, Romania and Bulgaria, and 
later Serbia, Montenegro, the FYROM, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina, it 
would be extremely surprising if a completely different pattern emerged in 
the cases of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus.
•	 Our results showed that in the medium-term perspective, even if EU MS 
decide to lift the restrictions on access to their labour market, a rather 
moderate rise in the number of Eastern European migrants in the V4 and 
EU may occur. Only in the case of Ukraine, particularly if it is accompa-
nied by severe economic crisis in the country, may a higher increase be 
expected (as many as 2.5 million Ukrainians residents in the EU in 2050 
in the worst-case scenario). These rather moderate anticipated increases 
may be explained by: the already significant number of Eastern European 
migrants at the EU labour markets, growing numbers of Eastern European 
migrants who obtain EU citizenship, depletion of demographic potential 
(particularly in the case of Moldova), and increasing interdependence with 
Russia in the case of Belarus. 
•	 It appears that the expected higher wages and general economic perfor-
mance in destination countries are the strongest incentives for Eastern Eu-
ropean nationals to migrate. The migration policy of respective destination 
1 Due to the lack of comprehensive statistical data related to earlier cases of visa liberalisa-
tion in Europe, introduction of free movement of people was taken as a dummy for visa ab-
olition. 
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states, particularly the possibilities of obtaining residence and labour per-
mits alongside language and cultural similarities are also essential pull fac-
tors. Push factors, such as low wages, poverty, and political unrest in the 
countries of origin, appear to have lesser significance in the case of Eastern 
European migration. It may explain why no major outflow from Ukraine can 
be observed in spite of serious political and security destabilisation. 
•	 If the political unrest in Ukraine continues and is accompanied by eco-
nomic crisis, growth in migration flows from Ukraine may be expected. In 
particular, circular migration may increase, but also more Ukrainians may 
decide on settlement migration (family reunification, more migration for 
educational purposes). 
•	 With regard to the qualitative characteristics of future migration from 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, most probably it will become more diver-
sified. Current circular migration, often related to seasonal low-skilled 
work, will remain. Concurrently, permanent settlement migration may 
become more significant, including family reunification and migration for 
educational purposes. Therefore, the irregular migration often related to 
circularity and low-paid jobs in the migrants niches, may decrease. 
•	 The migration policies of individual Visegrad states, as well as their migra-
tion status, significantly vary among each other. Czechia, which experi-
enced a mass inflow of Ukrainian migrants, has undergone a kind of hiatus 
in its migration policy. In contrast, Poland is in the process of liberalising 
its migration policy, although it is still one of the most homogeneous coun-
tries in the EU. Hungary directs its interest solely towards migrants of 
Hungarian origin. Slovakia, where the perception of migration as a threat 
still persists, is occupied with the question of whether (or not) to open the 
country towards Eastern European migrants.
•	 Where it comes to the migration policies of the countries of migrants’ origin, 
they are diversified as well. Moldova conducts the most mature emigration 
policy, though it is still looking for effective measures to attract migrants’ 
investments and possibly return migration. Ukraine’s policy on emigration 
is of more of a declarative character, while Belarus attempts to counteract 
the emigration of its population, often by administrative means. 
•	 It appears that, with small exceptions, neither public opinion nor the pol-
iticians in both the Visegrad states and Eastern Europe, are in favour of 
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continuous migration from Eastern Europe to V4/EU. While V4 states do 
not want to face any non-EU migration or any changes within their rather 
homogenous societies, Eastern European states are preoccupied with the 
perception of their fellow labour migrants as victims of exploitation and 
trafficking. Nevertheless, the majority of interviewed Delphi experts from 
all seven researched states called for greater liberalisation of V4/EU migra-
tion and visa polices, and improvements in migrants rights and job oppor-
tunities in the V4 labour markets. 
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inTroDUCTorY rEMarKs 
This book is the result of one year of solid work among a multinational re-
search team assembled from seven states (Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova). It aims at a detailed analysis of migration pat-
terns and migration forecasts from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova to the EU/
V4. In particular, the nexus between EU visa policy and migration dynamics 
as well as the impact of economic, political and institutional factors on migra-
tion from Eastern Europe have been investigated. The importance of migra-
tion policy must be stressed here. Together with demand for the foreign labour 
force (labour market needs, level of wages, existing work opportunities) and 
migration networks (including ethnic links), migration policy has a powerful 
influence on the scale, directions and characteristics of human flows.
Migration patterns in V4 and EaP states
The Visegrad states together with the neighbouring countries (Ukraine, Bela-
rus and Moldova), constitute an interesting and important case for analysing 
the dynamics of human flows, and the impact of different factors on migration 
patterns. On the one hand, the attractiveness of V4 as a destination location is 
slowly but steadily increasing, which is reflected in the growing stock of for-
eigners pursuing employment in V4 countries. On the other, despite dynamic 
modernisation, the V4 countries are still defeated by the ‘old’ EU countries 
in the competition for attracting labour from third countries, offering better 
wages, social benefits, and working and living conditions. The obvious advan-
tages of V4 countries for Eastern European migrants are their geographical 
and cultural proximity, as well as the migration networks developed over re-
cent decades. In addition, the intra-state political, social and cultural relations 
between V4 countries and their Eastern neighbours remain strong. In all V4 
countries, nationals from Eastern Europe (Ukrainians in particular) consti-
tute a major migrant group; most of the EU visas in Ukraine and Belarus are 
issued by Polish and Czech consulates. It is a different situation in Moldova, 
where the main destination remains the countries of Southern Europe. The 
ethnic component cannot be omitted neither. Its importance is especially no-
ticeable in the case of Poland (in relation to compatriots settled in Belarus and 
Ukraine), and Hungary (in regard to compatriots staying in Ukraine). 
The given Eastern European countries (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) share 
a common feature – its former Soviet past and, as a consequence, specific re-
lations to Russia. Russian Federation still remains a primary destination for 
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nationals from these countries (it is a destination for more than 90% of Bela-
rusian, and more than a half of Ukrainian and Moldovan migrants). Moreover, 
there are large populations of ethnic Russians or Russian speaking individuals 
in these countries which serves as human capital and – especially at present – 
as a political resource used a tool of Russia’s foreign policy. Another important 
advantage of Russia in comparison to the EU is the lack of formal barriers such 
as visas for potential labour migrants. Moreover, Russia has commenced crea-
tion of a common migration space based on freedom of movement with some 
of the former Soviet states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and in the future also with 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan). What distinguish Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova 
between each other are their relations with the EU and possible EU integra-
tion plans. Moldova is the most advanced in this regard, while Ukraine, after 
a pause of several years, went on the pro-European path recently by signing 
the Association Agreement with the EU. Belarus declared it has no EU integra-
tion aspirations.
research methods and assumptions
To receive the most reliable results, several research methods have been applied. 
Firstly, expert panel research (so-called Delphi survey2) was conducted. Under 
the Delphi survey, we conducted two-round in-depth anonymous question-
naires in all V4 and Eastern European states among around 120 migration ex-
perts with different professional backgrounds (governmental representatives, 
researchers, NGO workers, and representatives of international organisations). 
Secondly, an econometric model based on demographic and economic data was 
constructed to obtain projections for the future development of migrant stocks 
from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in the EU. Thirdly, a study that carefully 
examined the previous waves of visa liberalisation between the EU MS and their 
neighbours and then attempted to extrapolate these results for Eastern Europe 
was conducted. Fourthly, a detailed investigation of the role of Eastern Europe 
in the immigration profile of each V4 country, and of the role of EU/V4 in the 
emigration profile of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, was performed. Finally, all 
previous deliberations were assessed through the prism of current public debate 
on migration in the EU and EU policy towards its eastern neighbourhood.
Several important definition caveats should be made. In the research we fo-
cus on a Visegrad versus Eastern European perspective. However, since all V4 
2 For details see Part I, Chapter 1. 
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states are EU MS and Schengen members at the same time, and no barriers 
to mobility exist inside the Schengen area, it was therefore impossible to dis-
tinguish migration inflows inside the V4 from those inside the EU. Moreover, 
Eastern European statistical data and migration investigations do not regard 
the V4 region as a separate migration destination (usually Russia and the EU as 
a whole are distinguished). Hence, in particular, the Eastern European chap-
ters adopt a rather EU-wide, not V4, perspective. The second caveat regards the 
definition of Eastern Europe. Without going into details, for the purposes of 
our research we understand Eastern Europe as Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova 
(without Russia). In some cases, those three states may be referred to in the 
text as EaP (Eastern Partnership) states, in the understanding that this term 
does not encompass the Southern Caucasus. 
Forecasts specify what may happen but they do not necessarily have to come 
true. In the research, we present the most reliable qualitative and quantitative 
forecasts of future migration developments between V4/EU and Eastern Euro-
pean countries based on present knowledge and some demographic, economic 
and institutional projections for the future. Hoverer, forecasts as a research 
method are not capable of predicting catastrophes, wars or economic shocks. 
The impact of protracted political crises on migration patterns is in particular 
difficult to forecast. 
The Ukrainian internal unrest (December 2013) and subsequent Russian an-
nexation of Crimea (March 2014), and the ongoing military clashes in East-
ern Ukraine, broke out in the course of the project’s implementation. Hence, 
in the second round of the Delphi survey we asked the interviewed experts 
to take into account Ukraine’s crisis, but only insofar as it impacts on long-
er-term trends. As a result, we obtained the response that current migration 
patterns and dynamics may abruptly change only in the case of much more 
severe unrest. If instability is limited to Eastern Ukraine, which in migratory 
terms is closely interlinked with Russia, no major changes in current migra-
tion dynamics to the EU may be expected however the growth in the number 
of asylum applications from Ukrainian nationals will surely happen. As for the 
empirical evidence, so far Ukraine’s crisis has resulted mainly in increased in-
ternal migration. Also, during the project’s implementation, EU visa restric-
tions on short-term travel for Moldovans were lifted. Again, it appears that our 
results for Moldova may support the current empirical evidence. The dynam-
ics of cross-border movements in Moldova increased after visa abolition, in 
particular for family visits, which, in the longer term, may lead to an increase 
in family reunifications. 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
17
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
14
The report comprises three main parts. Three chapters presenting the general 
results of applied research methods (Delphi survey, econometric model, trends 
extrapolation) comprise the first part. Country chapters that discuss the Del-
phi results for each individual V4 and Eastern European state and contrast 
them with other empirical data constitute the second part of the publication. 
And finally, critical observations and policy analysis of the results obtained 
are presented in the third concluding part. 
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1. THE ProbabLE FUTUrE DEVELoPMEnT  
oF inTErnaTionaL MigraTion FroM UKrainE, 
MoLDoVa anD bELarUs To VisEgraD CoUnTriEs  
anD THE EUroPEan Union – THE DELPHi METHoD  
(THE sEarCH For “sUbJECTiVE obJECTiViTY”) 
Dušan Drbohlav, Faculty of Science, Charles University in Prague, Depart-
ment of Social Geography and Regional Development, Geographic Migration 
Centre – GEOMIGRACE, Czechia 
Marta Jaroszewicz, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Poland
introduction
Research goals, questions and design
The aim of this chapter is to present the general results of the Delphi survey on 
migration trends between EU/V4 and Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Belarus, Mol-
dova) conducted for the needs of the IVF, OSW-financed project “Forecasting mi-
gration between the EU, V4 and Eastern Europe: the impact of visa abolition”. 
As a result of applying two-round in-depth questionnaires, the expert consen-
sus of opinions on current and future migration trends between the EU/V4 and 
Eastern Europe, their determinants, and the links between short-term visa abo-
lition and migration have been obtained. The main research subjects included: 
•	 qualitative and quantitative assessment of Ukrainian, Moldovan and Bela-
rusian migrant stock3 in V4/EU, 
•	 evolution of migration trends of Eastern Europeans within the next 
10 years, main demographic and economic characteristics of Ukrainian, 
Belarusian and Moldovan migrants in the EU,
•	 impact of visa-regime abolition (for short-term stays) for future emigration 
to the EU, and hypothetical impact of lifting labour market restrictions by 
the EU MS towards Ukrainian, Moldovan and Belarusian nationals, 
3 The number of people residing in a particular destination country at a given moment. 
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•	 strategic policy measures which should be applied by the EU, V4 states and 
Eastern European partners to make migration more beneficial for all the 
actors involved. 
Between October 2013 and March 2014 under the Delphi expert panel we surveyed 
118 migration experts from seven states (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Bela-
rus, Ukraine, and Moldova). The first round was performed in November-January 
2013 and the second one in January-March 2014. Altogether 192 migration experts 
with different professional backgrounds but with high migration expertise were 
approached, out of which 118 took part in the first round (66 in V4 states and 52 in 
EaP states) and 106 in the second round (59 in V4 states and 47 in EaP states). They 
represented four categories: the governmental sector, scientific/research insti-
tutes, NGOs and international organizations in more or less similar proportions. 
However, the representatives of international organisations together with NGO 
workers dealing with migrants were the least numerous. 
Within the first round at least 15 respondents in each country participated as 
a minimum. The overall number declined in the second round. Although this 
decline was not dramatic, in some cases and concerning particular questions the 
number of respondents fell below 10. In any case, it is still sufficient in our opin-
ion since the Delphi panel should optimally comprise between 5 and 20 experts4. 
In both rounds two questionnaires were prepared: one for Visegrad states and 
one for Eastern Partnership states. The questionnaires were constructed so as 
to be complementary to each other and to show immigration trends in the case 
of V4 states and emigration ones in the case of EaP states. However, due to meth-
odological concerns, the results obtained cannot be compared with each other. It 
can be done only in the case of several questions which were identical. The ques-
tionnaires contained features characterising both the so-called conventional Del-
phi (results on migration trends showed in statistical form) and the policy Delphi 
(results on the desirability and feasibility of certain policy measures).
Due to space limitations within this chapter, we provide only the basic re-
sults that indicate the broader regional context. However, more detailed 
4 J. Bijak, A. Wiśniowski, Forecasting of immigration flows until 2025 for selected European coun-
tries using expert information, Idea Working Paper, No. 7, May 2009; G. Rowe, G. Wright, Ex-
perts Opinions in Forecasting: The Role of the Delphi Technique, (in:) J.S. Armstrong (ed.), Prin-
ciples of Forecasting: A Handbook of Researchers and Practitioners, Boston 2001: Kluwer 
Academic Publications, pp. 125-144.
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interpretation can be found in the subsequent country chapters. Our research 
is of a qualitative character. We asked the respondents for some quantitative 
assessment but with the full consciousness that the results obtained may only 
indicate certain trends, not detailed estimates. 
The research was carried out at a time when a serious conflict between Russia 
and Ukraine over Crimea and the eastern part of Ukraine took place. This fact, 
despite having so far a rather limited effect upon the migratory movements 
studied in our survey, did disrupt the research as such, especially in Ukraine. 
Secondly, in April 2014, in the course of project’s implementation EU lifted 
short-term visas for Moldovan citizens. Therefore the visa related results ob-
tained for Moldova should be treated as possible outcomes of real, not hypo-
thetical, occurrences. Moreover, in May 2014, the EU Commission decided that 
Ukraine fulfilled the benchmarks of the first phase of the Visa Liberalisation 
Action Plan (VLAP) and suggested that Ukraine moves to the second chase of 
VLAP implementation. 
In this chapter we use basic statistical terms, namely, AM – arithmetic mean 
(average results) and SD – standard deviation (how much variation from the 
average exists); N – reflects the number of respondents.
Methodology
The Delphi method can be described as a technique for collecting expert opin-
ions through a series of distributed questionnaires interspersed with con-
trolled opinion feedback for individual rounds of the study5. The method was 
developed from brain-storming and belongs to interactive research techniques, 
also called “research as a public dialogue”. In contrast to brain-storming, how-
ever, Delphi attempts to reduce some of the disadvantages and shortcomings 
from which the brain-storming process might suffer6. It seems that the method 
is appropriate to use if the complexity of a research problem comes into play, 
when there is a lack of adequate data and where design of common future sce-
narios is required. 
5 H. Linstone, M. Turoff (eds.), The Delphi Method - Techniques and Applications, Reading 1975: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company; J.P. Martino, Technological Forecasting for Decision-
making, New York 1972: American Elsevier Publishing Company. 
6 D. Drbohlav, Migration Policy Objectives for European East-West International Migration, Inter-
national Migration 1997, 35, pp. 85-108.
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The main characteristic feature of the Delphi method is establishing a panel 
of experts with a broad range of experience who are able and willing to par-
ticipate in the survey. Second, it includes multiple rounds of the questionnaire 
with feedback from the preceding rounds, which allows the panellists to con-
front any dissenting opinions and also to change their opinion. Third, the ano-
nymity of the experts, and absence of direct contacts among the Delphi group 
is expected. 
What also has to be mentioned, however, is that the Delphi method must not 
be considered as a completely defined and described instrument with a certain 
technical mode of execution. The various Delphi studies can differ consider-
ably and may have little in common. The Delphi method originated in the USA 
at the beginning of the 1950s and at the beggining chiefly found application in 
the military sphere. Now, one can find Delphi applied to research into such 
complex societal problems as, for example, health, transportation, education, 
housing, or the environment. 
Though international migration issues seem to be a suitable topic to be ana-
lysed via the Delphi method (an innovative cognitive tool for international mi-
gration research), it has so far rarely been used within the field of migration. 
Nevertheless, there are some studies that apply Delphi to international migra-
tion issues7. However, to our best knowledge, such an approach has never been 
applied in the investigation of migration issues in former post-Soviet countries. 
Main results for Visegrad states
What are your current estimates for the number of migrants from Ukraine, Belarus 
and Moldova in your country, separately for each nationality mentioned (including 
irregularly staying ones)? Given that you now know the opinions of other experts, 
please place your estimates once more in each respective row. If you feel it is impor-
tant – particularly if your opinion significantly deviates from the average – please 
provide arguments to justify your view.
7 S. Lovelless et al, Immigration and Its Impact on American Cities, Wesport 1996: Praeger Pub-
lisher; D. Drbohlav, Migration policy..., 1997, op. cit.; L. Lachmanová, D. Drbohlav, The Probable 
Future Development of European East-West Migration (Delphi Method Revived), European Spa-
tial Research and Policy 2004, vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 135-155; M. Jandl, Ch. Hollomey, A. Stepien, Mi-
gration and Irregular Work in Austria: Results of a Delphi-Study, International Migration Paper 
90, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2007 Geneva; J. Bijak, 
A. Wiśniowski, Forecasting..., op. cit. 
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Table 1. Number of migrants from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in V4 states
cZechia hUngarY sLoVaKia poLand
aM sd n aM sd n aM sd n aM sd n
nationals
first round first round first round first round
Ukrainians 135,000 51,000 13 19,000 13,000 11 19,000 23,000 15 252,500 165,000 10
belarusians 6,000 4,000 14 1,000 1,000 12 1,000 1,000 12 75,667 160,000 9
moldovans 7,000 4,000 13 1 000 1 000 12 3,000 5,000 12 4,844 4,000 8
seCond round seCond round seCond round seCond round
Ukrainians 118,000 28,000 14 18,000 6,000 11 16,000 10,000 14 242,000 67,000 15
belarusians 5,000 2,000 15 1,000 0 (300) 11 1,000 2,000 13 58,182 31,000 11
moldovans 6,000 2,000 14 1 000 0 (200) 11 2,000 1,000 13 4,388 1,000 13
Respondents in all the respective Visegrad countries stated that Ukrainian 
migrants predominate over Belarusians and Moldovans. Whereas in Poland 
the experts indicated around 240,000 Ukrainian migrants, Czech respond-
ents estimated about 112,000 Ukrainians. In Hungary and Slovakia the num-
ber of Ukrainians is much lower. The number of Belarusians and Moldovans 
was, with the exception of Poland, estimated equal to or less than 6,000 in 
all the countries. It should be borne in mind that if Poland is the main EU 
destination for Belarusians, none of the V4 states constitute the main des-
tination for Moldovan migrants. The question did not differentiate between 
temporary, short-term and, on the other hand, long-term or permanent mi-
grants. When estimating the given numbers, respondents revealed that they 
mainly relied on existing statistics and estimates of irregular migrants. This 
information was often accompanied with respondents’ own expert views and 
experience. 
What, in your opinion, is the current proportion of irregular immigrants (either ille-
gally staying or performing undeclared work) in the stock of migrants from Ukraine, 
Belarus and Moldova in your country? Put your estimate in percentages (one figure) 
separately for each nationality. Given that you now know the opinions of other ex-
perts, please place your estimates once more in each respective row. If you feel it is im-
portant – particularly if your opinion significantly deviates from the average – please 
provide arguments to justify your view.
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Table 2. Proportion of irregular immigrants in the stock of migrants from 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in V4 states
cZechia (%) hUngarY (%) sLoVaKia (%) poLand (%)
aM sd n aM sd n aM sd n aM sd n
nationals
first round first round first round first round
Ukrainians 35 35 13 24 22 9 33 19 14 43 24 9
belarusians 14 12 14 11 6 8 19 27 11 27 23 9
moldovans 26 37 13 20 16 8 30 29 12 31 26 7
seCond round seCond round seCond round seCond round
Ukrainians 24 12 12 17 7 10 33 12 14 45 17 15
belarusians 12 6 13 12 5 10 15 13 13 26 10 12
moldovans 19 1 12 14 7 10 28 23 13 29 11 13
Once again in this case, Ukrainians are the migrant group which typically 
constituted the highest shares of estimated irregular migrants in all the re-
spective V4 countries. Their highest share was observed in Poland (45%), in 
Slovakia (33%), in Czechia (24%), while the lowest was in Hungary (17%). The 
overall magnitude of the estimates given by the respondents in all countries 
is rather low. This may be due to several factors. Firstly, it may be due to the 
relatively liberal EU visa policy which in the majority of cases allows Eastern 
European migrants to easily enter V4 states. Moreover, certain legal means by 
which Ukrainian, Moldovan and Belarusian nationals legalise their stay in all 
V4 states do exist, even though the migration policy of V4 states significantly 
varies among each other. At the same time, those countries with a stricter mi-
gration policy, like Czechia, conducted broad-based return campaigns aimed at 
irregular migrants. Therefore, a trend towards reducing the share of irregular 
migrants in the overall stock of migrants from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldovan 
in V4 can be observed. 
Respondents mentioned that their assessment was often based on existing es-
timates combined with their expert opinions. One thing worth mentioning is 
the opinion (several times stated) that “irregularity” is mainly connected to 
irregular employment. This may indicate that labour market regulations for 
employment of foreigners is the main area in all V4 states that requires further 
improvements. 
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How do you think the phenomenon of migration from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova 
to your country may evolve in the next ten years? Please specify what kind of patterns 
and in what direction it may change? Given that you now know the opinions of other 
experts, please give your opinions once more in each respective box. Here, please ac-
company your opinion with the most important arguments. 
We demonstrate here respondents’ opinions on three different migratory 
patterns that have been measured in the Delphi survey – migration flows, 
migrants’ economic performance and the migration policy of the respective 
respondent’s state. There was more or less consensus among almost all re-
spondents that the migration policy of their states will probably change over 
the next ten years. While the Polish and Hungarian8 experts indicated that it 
will become more liberal, Czechs forecast that it will be more selective, while 
the experts in Slovakia were divided over whether it will be more liberal or 
stricter. Migration flows to particular countries and their probable future 
development was perceived differently. Whereas in Czechia the respondents’ 
share of those who expect changes versus those who foresee stable develop-
ment (of immigration from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) were more or less 
balanced, in Slovakia respondents tended to prefer changes (increase) over 
other possible scenarios. Similar opinions are typical of Polish respondents 
regarding Ukraine and Belarus, whereas in relation to Moldovans opinions 
are balanced (“increase” as well as “stable” development). In Hungary, re-
spondents predict a future increase in Ukrainian nationals. Migrants’ eco-
nomic performance will probably transform over the given horizon of ten 
years in Slovakia and Poland (occupation sectors changes towards more 
qualified positions, more students, higher wages, and more permanent mi-
gration). On the other hand, the situation is expected to be more stable in 
Czechia and much more stable in Hungary.
What do you expect to happen (in a short-term horizon of three years) in your coun-
try if visas for short-term travels for up to 90 days for Ukrainian, Belarusian and 
Moldovan nationals to the Schengen area are abolished. Given that you now know 
the opinions of other experts, please mark (with X) once more the three most likely 
occurrences for each nationality in the table. If you feel it is important – particularly 
if your opinion significantly deviates from the average – please provide arguments to 
justify your view.
8 Particularly for ethnic Hungarians. 
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Table 3. Possible future development of migration trends in V4 states  
in the case of visa abolition for Eastern European nationals 
cZechia
Ukrainians belarusians moldovans
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
Mass inflow of labour 
migrants 3 1 1 0 3 2
Moderate inflow of 
labour migrants 6 8 6 9 5 5
no changes in number 
of labour migrants 4 3 4 2 3 2
decrease in number of 
labour migrants 0 1 0 1 0 1
regularisation of 
already present labour 
migrants
6 3 6 2 6 4
growth in irregular 
employment 8 9 9 8 9 9
More long-term 
settlement migration 11 10 10 11 10 10
More asylum claims 2 1 8 4 1 1
other, please specify 0 0 0 0 0 0
number of 
respondents (n) 15 14 16 15 16 14 
poLand
Ukrainians belarusians moldovans
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
Mass inflow of labour 
migrants 2 1 0 1 2 0
Moderate inflow of 
labour migrants 9 13 10 9 5 7
no changes in number 
of labour migrants 4 0 3 1 6 4
decrease in number of 
labour migrants 0 0 0 1 0 0
regularisation of 
already present labour 
migrants
7 7 5 4 7 5
growth in irregular 
employment 8 8 5 3 5 7
More long-term 
settlement migration 4 6 5 8 5 5
More asylum claims 0 2 2 1 0 0
other, please specify 2 0 2 1 1 1
number of 
respondents (n) 15 16 14 13 13 14
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sLoVaKia
Ukrainians belarusians moldovans
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
Mass inflow of labour 
migrants 4 2 2 1
Moderate inflow of 
labour migrants 11 12 8 9 9 9
no changes in number 
of labour migrants 3 0 7 6 7 7
decrease in number of 
labour migrants 0 0 1 0 1 0
regularisation of 
already present labour 
migrants
11 11 11 10 12 11
growth in irregular 
employment 9 5 3 7 4
More long-term 
settlement migration 10 12 7 8 7 6
More asylum claims 2 2 8 4 4 4
other, please specify 0 0 0 0 0 1
number of 
respondents (n) 16 14 16 14 16 14
hUngarY
Ukrainians belarusians moldovans
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
Mass inflow of labour 
migrants 5 3 0 1 0 3
Moderate inflow of 
labour migrants 7 4 5 4 8 4
no changes in number 
of labour migrants 2 3 8 6 6 3
decrease in number of 
labour migrants 1 1 1 2 2
regularisation of 
already present labour 
migrants
8 4 4 4 7 4
growth in irregular 
employment 6 5 4 4 3 5
More long-term 
settlement migration 8 6 6 5 5 5
More asylum claims 0 0 2 1 2 1
other, please specify 3 0 2 0 1 0
number of 
respondents (n) 14 11 14 11 14 11
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This is one of the most important questions asked in the survey in order to in-
vestigate the link between abolition of the EU visa-regime for short-term stays 
and migration flows. The EU abolished the visa regime for Moldovans travel-
ling to the EU for short-term stays soon after the Delphi survey was completed. 
Therefore, results for Moldova can in fact serve as an indicator of what may 
happen in the current situation when no major barriers to mobility of Moldo-
van citizens in the EU exist.
In general, respondents in all V4 states see the link between introduction by 
the EU of a visa-free regime for short-term stays for Ukrainian, Moldovan and 
Belarusian nationals and the changes in migration inflows to their respective 
countries. They expect a small increase in migration flows but also regulari-
sation of already present migrants. Czech respondents see the short-term fu-
ture migratory picture as rather “homogeneous”, regardless of the migrants’ 
country of origin (more long-term settlement migration, growth in irregular 
employment and moderate inflow of labour migrants). Polish respondents 
expect a moderate increase in migration inflows (particularly in the case of 
Ukrainians) but also possible growth in irregular employment. In the case of 
Belarusians, more settlement emigration has been also predicted. Slovak and 
Hungarian experts shared similar views on all three EaP nationalities, though 
they also think that more Ukrainian nationals may regularise their stay and 
decide to settle down in their respective states due to the introduction of a visa-
free regime.
How big an inflow of migrants from Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova may be if your coun-
try lifts restrictions in access to labour market for those foreigners (in a short-term 
horizon of three years after restrictions are abolished) in comparison with present 
inflow? Please, while now knowing opinions of other experts, put again your opinion 
in each respective row – one answer for each nationality. If you feel, it is important – 
especially, if your opinion significantly deviates from the average, put arguments to 
justify your view.
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Table 4. Possible future developments of migration trends in V4 states in the case 
of elimination of labour market restrictions for Eastern European nationals 
cZechia Ukrainians belarusians moldovans
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
Much higher 1 1 2 0 0 0
higher 4 4 6 4 6 4
no changes 7 6 6 8 5 7
Lower 3 1 3 1 4 1
Much lower 0 0 0 0 0 0
number of 
respondents (n) 15 12 17 13 15 12
poLand Ukrainians belarusians moldovans
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
Much higher 5 5 1 1 3 2
higher 10 11 12 11 7 9
no changes 1 0 2 1 5 3
Lower 0 0 0 0 0 0
Much lower 0 0 0 0 0 0
number of 
respondents (n) 16 16 15 13 16 14
sLoVaKia
Ukrainians belarusians moldovans
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
Much higher 5 4 1 1 3
higher 10 10 12 7 7 8
no changes 1 2 6 5 5
Lower 0 0 0 1
Much lower 0 0 0
number of 
respondents (n) 16 14 15 14 15 14
hUngarY
Ukrainians belarusians moldovans
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
Much higher 7 8 0 0 1 1
higher 3 2 8 8 8 10
no changes 5 2 6 3 5 0
Lower 0 0 0 0 0 0
Much lower 0 0 0 0 0 0
number of 
respondents (n) 15 12 14 11 14 11
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This question should be regarded as a “test” one. It was asked in order to check 
whether the respondents see a difference between the impact of visa abolition 
and the elimination of labour market restrictions. A genuine lifting of the bar-
riers to foreigners’ access to labour markets will probably not happen soon, 
taking into consideration current economic problems and high unemployment 
rates in the EU.
Polish and Slovak respondents evaluated that in this case, potentially a higher 
influx of Ukrainian, Belarusian and Moldovan migrants can be expected. With 
regard to Ukrainians, they did not also exclude much higher inflows. Hungar-
ian experts clearly differentiated between the probable future of inflows from 
Ukraine – here they voted for much higher numbers. The picture drawn by 
Czech experts is different. They mostly spread out their opinions between the 
categories ‘no changes’ and higher. This perspective probably reflects a situ-
ation on the Czech labour market where the numbers of Ukrainians have al-
ready been, to large extent, saturated (at least currently, during the global eco-
nomic crisis). 
The results obtained clearly indicate that labour market restrictions (not en-
try/stay rules) are the main obstacles for higher migration from Eastern Eu-
rope to the EU. 
Can you see positive impacts related to future migration from Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova to your country? Please rank below the indicated impacts with 5 – most im-
portant, 4 – important, 3 – neither important, nor unimportant, 2 – unimportant, 
1 – least important. 
Filling in shortages on the labour market was declared by respondents as a pos-
itive impact of Ukrainian migrants in all the respective countries. Moreover, 
for the same reason, Belarusians in Poland and Belarusians and Moldovans in 
Czechia were also highly valued.
More precisely, providing new students for the educational system and a la-
bour force with the requisite vocational skills is positively evaluated in rela-
tion to Ukrainians and Belarusians in Poland. Bringing ethnic Poles from Be-
larus has been also highlighted. Stimulating an inflow of the required labour 
force with vocational skills and high-skilled migrants were mentioned often by 
Slovak respondents vis-à-vis Ukrainian migrants (regarding the latter factor, 
Belarusians also). Also, Czech respondents stressed the importance of student 
inflows to the educational system in the case of Ukrainians and Belarusians. 
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It seems that Hungarian respondents especially appreciate the possible inflow 
of Ukrainians for many reasons, namely, mitigating the consequences of de-
mographic crisis, bringing new students into the educational system, together 
with a labour force with the necessary vocational skills, and finally bringing 
their ethnic compatriots home. The last reason alone shows us what is behind 
the sort of “preferential treatment” shown to those Ukrainians who are often 
of Hungarian origin.
Can you see negative impacts related to future migration from Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova to your country? Please rank below the indicated impacts with 5 – most im-
portant, 4 – important, 3 – neither important, nor unimportant, 2 – unimportant, 
1 – least important. 
Respondents in all respective countries do not see negative impacts related 
to future migration from the given EaP countries as something that is worth 
pinpointing too much. Within all the V4 countries the statement: “I do not see 
any negative impacts” dominates over all the other possible negative impacts 
offered. Hungarian respondents are the sole exception when their perception 
of the impact of future Belarusian and Moldovan migration to their country is 
perceived rather negatively as compared to Ukrainian migrants, though most-
ly of Hungarian origin. If we are to specify the most important negative factor 
related to migration from Eastern Europe, it would be “driving down wages 
and unfair competition for local workers”.
Do you agree with the statement that abolition of visas for Ukrainians, Belarusians 
and Moldovans is desirable from the point of view of your country’s interests? Given 
that you now know the opinions of other experts, please state your opinion once more 
(with X) in the respective box – one answer for each nationality. Please provide argu-
ments to justify your view, where important.
Table 5. Agreement/disagreement in V4 states with visa abolition for nation-
als of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova 
poLand
First round
Ukrain-
ians
second 
round
Ukrain-
ians
First round 
belaru-
sians
second 
round
belaru-
sians
First round
moldo-
vans
second 
round
moldo-
vans
yes 13 15 13 12 11 12
no 1 1 1 1 1 1
n 15 16 14 13 14 14
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cZechia
First round
Ukrain-
ians
second 
round
Ukrain-
ians
First round
belaru-
sians
second 
round
belaru-
sians
First round 
moldo-
vans
second 
round
moldo-
vans
yes 9 10 8 10 10 11
no 4 4 6 4 4 3
n 13 14 14 14 14 14
hUngarY
First round
Ukrain-
ians
second 
round
Ukrain-
ians
First round
belaru-
sians
second 
round be-
larusians
First round
moldo-
vans
second 
round
moldo-
vans
yes 15 12 8 8 8 9
no 0 0 5 4 5 3
n 15 12 13 12 13 12
sLoVaKia
First round
Ukrain-
ians
second 
round
Ukrain-
ians
First round
belaru-
sians
second 
round
belaru-
sians
First round
moldo-
vans
second 
round
moldo-
vans
yes 13 12 12 12 11 13
no 2 2 3 2 4 1
n 15 14 15 14 15 14
When interpreting the results of the second round, two different groups of re-
spondents appeared. Polish and Slovakian respondents clearly support the state-
ment that visa abolition is desirable (only 2 as a maximum – out of between 14 
and 16 respondents respectively – do not agree with the given statement). On the 
other hand, Czech and Hungarian respondents are more “cautious”. Despite the 
majority of these respondents voting for “yes”, a not insignificant number also 
regards the given abolition of visas as undesirable for their countries. There is, 
however, one important exception. All the Hungarian experts agree with the de-
sirability of Ukrainian immigration to Hungary. (One can only deduce that the 
mainly Hungarian origin of these migrants lies behind this sympathy). 
If we analyse how the opinions changed between the first and second rounds, 
we may notice that they were more or less stable. A small increase in the desir-
ability of short-term visa abolition for Moldovans could be observed – possibly 
due to the fact that at the time of the second round it was certain that the EU 
would soon lift the visa regime. 
In which time perspective do you expect that visas for short-term travel to EU for 
Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans may be abolished? Underline one of the 
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possibilities for each nationality. Given that you now know the opinions of other ex-
perts, please state your opinion once more in each respective row – one possibility for 
each nationality. Please feel free to comment on your choice. 
Table 6. Anticipated time perspective for visa abolition for Ukrainian,  
Belarusian and Moldovan nationals 
cZ, pL, 
sK, hU ukrainians belarusians Moldovans n
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
First 
round
second 
round
in 2–3 
years 19 21 4 0 23 20 46 41
in 4–6 
years 26 22 14 16 11 16 51 54
in 7–10 
years 12 11 36 33 15 13 63 57
n 57 54 54 49 49 49
Respondents from the all respective V4 countries (66 in the first round and 
59 in the second one) were asked this question, which tackles a more general 
policy relevant issue. It assesses experts’ insights into EU visa liberalisation 
policy, the migration and security situation in Eastern Europe, as well as ex-
perts’ individual beliefs towards visa abolition. The results obtained indicate 
that, for obvious reasons, visas for short-term travel to the EU might be abol-
ished a little bit sooner for Moldovans than for the other two countries. (In fact 
this has already happened). In the case of Ukraine, the majority of respondents 
were divided over whether visas would be lifted in the short-term perspec-
tive (2-3 years) or the medium-term one (4-6 years). However, some experts be-
lieved that it may happen only in the long-term perspective (7-10 years). In the 
case of Belarus, no respondents considered the shortest period (in the second 
round), one third stick to the 4-6 year interval and two thirds to the 7-10 year 
interval. It is important to point out that when comparing the given assess-
ment by individual V4 countries the picture seems to be quite similar.
How do you assess current political debate in your country around the issue of visa 
abolition for Eastern Partnership states? Please answer yes or no.
For any row put numbers for “yes” and “no” in absolute terms and N/number of re-
spondents for each item/topic. 
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Table 7. Public debate in V4 states over visa liberalisation for Eastern Euro-
pean nationals 
poLand
Yes no n
this is an important topic for the general public 2 15 17
this is an important topic in political debate 8 9 17
the general public is favourable towards visa abolition 9 7 16
politicians are favourable towards visa abolition 11 5 16
state officials/administration are favourable towards visa 
abolition 10 5 15
business circles are favourable towards visa abolition 16 0 16
 hUngarY
Yes no n
this is an important topic for the general public 2 11 12
this is an important topic in political debate 2 9 11
the general public is favourable towards visa abolition 2 11 13
politicians are favourable towards visa abolition 6 6 12
state officials/administration are favourable towards visa 
abolition 5 6 11
business circles are favourable towards visa abolition 10 2 12
 cZechia
Yes no n
this is an important topic for the general public 5 12 17
this is an important topic in political debate 9 8 17
the general public is favourable towards visa abolition 0 16 16
politicians are favourable towards visa abolition 3 12 15
state officials/administration are favourable towards visa 
abolition 4 13 17
business circles are favourable towards visa abolition 15 1 16
 sLoVaKia
Yes no n
this is an important topic for the general public 5 11 16
this is an important topic in political debate 9 7 16
the general public is favourable towards visa abolition 4 12 16
politicians are favourable towards visa abolition 5 11 16
state officials/administration are favourable towards visa abolition 4 11 15
business circles are favourable towards visa abolition 15 0 15
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Answers to this question (measuring the importance of the visa liberalisation 
topic in public debate in the V4 states and the main proponents and opponents 
of that process) gave a rather heterogeneous picture. On the other hand, what 
was very clearly indicated by experts in all four countries is that “business cir-
cles are favourable towards visa abolition” in the respective countries. Fairly 
strong opinion also prevailed in Poland and Hungary, where respondents very 
much supported the statement that visa abolition for EaP countries is not an 
important topic for the general public. Moreover, respondents in Hungary, 
Czechia and Slovakia were in agreement in supporting the statement that the 
general public is not favourable towards visa abolition. Czech and Slovak re-
spondents agreed in feeling that their politicians, as well as state officials, are 
not in favour of visa abolition for Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, while Polish 
experts were of the opposite opinion (Hungarian experts’ opinion was located 
somewhere in between). 
Main results for Ukraine, belarus and Moldova
In your opinion, how many migrants from your country currently reside in the Viseg-
rad states, EU states, and in Russia? Both legally (with long-term national visa, 
temporary and permanent residence permits etc.) and in irregular manner (mainly 
working irregularly while being on tourist visas)? Given that you now know the opin-
ions of other experts, please place your estimates once more in each respective row. 
If you feel it is important – particularly if your opinion significantly deviates from the 
average – please provide arguments to justify your view.
Table 8. Estimated number of migrants from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova 
abroad (V4, EU, Russia)
Ukrainians
abroad 
 First round
am sd n
Ukrainians
abroad
second round
am sd n
 visegrad states 443,000 356,000 13 visegrad states 387,000 148,000 16
eu 1, 032 000 789,000 11 eu 1, 123 000 325, 000 15
russia 1, 596 000 1, 049 000 13 russia 1, 467 000 671, 000 15
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belarusians 
abroad
First round
am sd n
belarusians 
abroad
second round
am sd n
visegrad states 60,000 66,000 9 visegrad states 70,000 37,000 14
eu in general 127,000 136,000 9 eu in general 150,000 71,000 13
russia 582,000 326,000 14 russia 542,000 167,000 16
 moldovans 
abroad
First round
am sd n
moldovans 
abroad
second round
am sd n
visegrad states 14,000 10,000 10 visegrad states 11,000 5,000 12
eu in general 244,000 104,000 16 eu in general 239,000 97,000 14
russia 309,000 94,000 16 russia 315,000 70,000 14
The assessments provided clearly show how important Russia is in terms of 
migratory contacts between the given EaP countries and Russia. According to 
the respondents, the most numerous migratory stock from all the countries 
stays not in the V4 or the EU, but in Russia – and the size is very robust: with 
1.5 million Ukrainians in Russia, more than 0.5 million Belarusians and over 
300,000 Moldovans there. Whereas in the case of Ukrainians and Moldovans 
the results obtained are comparable to the existing EU residence permits data 
and labour force surveys results, the number of Belarusians in the EU turned 
out to be much higher than that officially confirmed. Logically, the numbers of 
Ukrainian, Moldovan and Belarusian migrants in V4 countries are the lowest. 
One challenging comparison springs from juxtaposing the estimates related to 
EaP migrants based in V4 countries by EaP respondents on the one hand (some 
390,000), to those indicated by V4 experts (around 470,000). All in all, when 
taking into account the overall complexity of the assessments as such, the dif-
ference is not so large.
What, in your opinion, is the current proportion of irregular migrants (illegally stay-
ing and performing undeclared work) in the overall stock of “labour migrants” from 
your country in Visegrad states, the EU in general and in Russia? Put your estimate 
in percentages (one number) for each destination. 
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Table 9. Proportion of irregular immigrants in the overall stock of labour 
migrants from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova abroad (V4, EU, Russia) 
 First round
Ukrainians
am
%
sd
%
n second round
Ukrainians
am
%
sd
%
n
visegrad states 25 11 13 visegrad states 23 10 15
eu in general 38 15 12 eu in general 38 15 15
russia 42 20 12 russia 44 22 15
 First round
belarusians
am
%
sd
%
n second round
belarusians
am
%
sd
%
n
visegrad states 12 7 9 visegrad states 14 11 15
eu in general 11 6 9 eu in general 13 11 15
russia 44 21 10 russia 34 22 15
 First round
moldovans
am
%
sd
%
n second round
moldovans 
am
%
sd
%
n
visegrad states 12 11 8 visegrad states 11 4 11
eu in general 25 19 14 eu in general 22 11 14
russia 49 26 14 russia 47 21 14
Some experts who answered this question drew attention to the insufficiently 
precise definition of irregular migration applied in the questionnaire (alto-
gether irregular stay and undeclared employment). However, this inaccuracy 
was “intentional” since our aim was to grasp some basic trends, not so much 
detailed parameters. The given proportion of irregular migrants from the re-
spective EaP countries in the overall stock of labour migrants is estimated to be 
highest in Russia – ranging between 47% (Moldovans) and 34% (Belarusians). 
This result is surprising, taking into consideration the liberal admission rules 
of the Russian Federation (visa-free regime, possibility of entering its territory 
on so-called ‘internal’ passport, declarative character of work permits) direct-
ed towards CIS states’ citizens. The main explanation may be the prevalence 
of irregular employment in Russia as such, together with distribution of the 
migration phenomenon in the “grey zone” of the Russian economy. In the EU in 
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general, the given shares are lower, probably due to the previously mentioned 
attempts of Ukrainian, Moldovan and Belarusian labour migrants to legalise 
themselves. The lowest shares observed in V4 states may be explained by the 
liberal Polish migration policy directed towards short-term migrants, the in-
creasing share of students in the general number of migrants in V4 states, and 
the tendency to strengthen legal permanent/settlement migration observed in 
Czechia. However, it should be emphasised that assessment by V4 experts of 
the share of irregular migrants was much higher, with the highest estimated 
proportion at 45% in Poland in the second round questionnaire.
What are the main destination states for migrants from your country? Try to rank 
the five most important destinations (including irregular migrants) – from the most 
important (No. 1) to the least important (No. 5). Given that you now know the opinions 
of other experts, please try to assess regular (A) versus irregular (B) in percentages 
where A + B = 100.
The results confirm earlier statements as well as empirical evidence. Russia 
appears at the top as the main destination country of all the EaP countries. 
Then, Poland, Italy and Spain were mentioned at least twice among the top five 
most popular destinations within the respective three EaP countries. Other 
countries were presented only once – Czechia as an important destination for 
Ukrainians; the USA, Germany and Ukraine – as an important destination for 
Belarusians; and Turkey and France – as a very attractive destination country 
for Moldovan migrants. 
What are the main push and pull factors of emigration pushing from Belarus and at-
tracting to the EU? Please rank each of the following factors with 5 – most important, 
4 – important, 3 – neither important, nor unimportant, 2 – unimportant, 1 – least 
important.
Almost unanimously high wages, high living standards in destination coun-
tries accompanied with “already staying and working relatives or close friends 
(migration networks)” belong, according to respondents in all the respective 
countries, to factors that pull their migrants outside their mother countries of 
origin (especially as for the two former factors, SD figures are very low indicat-
ing that respondents’ estimates were very similar to each other). In addition, 
poverty and social tensions in the sending country were also perceived as very 
important push factors in Ukraine and Moldova.
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Are there any specific factors in Visegrad states that attract/repel migrants from you 
country? Please rank each of the following factors with 5 – most important, 4 – impor-
tant, 3 – neither important, nor unimportant, 2 – unimportant, 1 – least important.
What has been confirmed at a more general level above (the dominance of an 
economically-based motivation), it is also evident in the specific example of 
the migratory relationship between EaP countries and Visegrad countries. 
Obviously, what mainly drives migrants from EaP to Visegrad countries are 
“high wages” (indicated in all three examined countries). Ukrainian respond-
ents pointed out the fact that in Visegrad countries “it is easy to find work” 
too. On the other hand, “low wages” and “difficulty in finding work are among 
important push factors” (in Ukraine and Moldova). What, however, distin-
guishes Visegrad states from other EU countries is their geographic proxim-
ity, language and cultural similarities and low travel costs. It also has to do 
with psychological factors – there is always the possibility of return at any mo-
ment. Rather ambiguous results were obtained with regard to the assessment 
of Visegrad states visa and migration policies – generally, they were assessed as 
friendly and harsh at the same time. 
Can you see any specific behavioural patterns of citizens of your country residing in 
the EU at this moment? Please, besides legal stays, also take into account those who 
are in an irregular position. Please rank the given possibilities from 5 to 1: 5 – defi-
nitely yes, 4 – perhaps yes, 3 – maybe yes, maybe no, 2 – perhaps no, 1 – definitely no. 
Given that you now know the opinions of other experts, please place your estimates 
once more in each respective box – choose from 5 to 1.
There are some rather similar features that characterise the main current pat-
terns of migration and integration of EaP citizens in the EU. As for the sec-
tors which EaP migrants are mostly involved in, in particular the construction 
sector (according to respondents, typical of migrants from all the respective 
countries), the household sector (in relation to Ukrainians and Moldovans) and 
services (in relation to Belarusians) were mentioned. In any case, the issue of 
manually demanding jobs in which Ukrainians in particular are involved in 
was raised too. Ukrainian respondents also emphasized that their compatri-
ots are employed as highly skilled specialists, particularly as teachers or doc-
tors. Whereas for Ukrainians and Moldovans, respondents tended to charac-
terise migrants as those who are in their middle age, for Belarusians a young 
age was identified and stated as the most important. As far as migratory type 
is concerned, whereas respondents attributed a preference for settlement mi-
gration to Belarusians, they indicated that Moldovans tend towards circular 
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migration. In this respect, Ukrainians were closer to Moldovans, though re-
spondents’ preferences were not so sharply crystallized here. The ability for 
“communication in destination countries languages” was mentioned as a rather 
typical feature of Belarusian and Moldovan migrants. Nevertheless, was also 
considered important in the case of Ukrainian migration. Last but not least, 
female migration was found important for Moldovan migrants in the EU, too.
What do you expect to happen (in a short-term horizon of three years) if visas for 
short-term travel for up to 90 days to the Schengen zone for your country nationals 
are abolished? Given that you now know the opinions of other experts, please mark 
(with X) once more the three most likely occurrences for each nationality in the table 
below. If you feel it is important – particularly if your opinion significantly deviates 
from the average – please provide arguments to justify your view.
Table 10. Possible future development of migration trends in Eastern Europe 
in the case of EU visa abolition 
Ukraine
first 
round
Ukraine 
second 
round
belarus
first 
round
belarus 
second 
round
mol-
dova 
first 
round
mol-
dova 
second 
round 
Mass outflow of labour 
migrants 1 1 1 1 0 0
Moderate outflow of 
labour migrants 13 11 12 14 11 13
no changes in number 
of labour migrants 7 6 2 0 6 4
decrease in number of 
labour migrants 3 0 0 0 0 0
regularisation of already 
present labour migrants 9 8 11 13 12 15
growth in irregular 
employment 6 4  3  2 0 1
More long-term settle-
ment migration 6 5 12 12 5 8
More asylum claims 2 1  3  1 2 0
other
5 (more 
young 
people, 
more 
circular 
migration)
14 (more 
young 
people, 
more cir-
cular and 
seasonal 
migration)
3
(increase 
in tour-
ism and 
business 
contacts)
5
(increase 
in tour-
ism and 
business 
contacts)
0 4
number of respondents 
(n) 19 16 16 16 16 16
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Comparable to the results for the similar question asked in V4 states, the out-
comes for EaP countries confirmed that, in general, respondents see the link 
between introduction by the EU of a visa-free regime for short-term stay for 
Ukrainian, Moldovan and Belarusian nationals and the changes in migration 
outflows towards the EU. A rather homogeneous picture was drawn by the 
respondents for all the respective EaP countries. First of all, no massive out-
flow of labour migrants from these countries should be expected. Most of the 
respondents foresee a moderate outflow of labour migrants from their coun-
tries to the EU. Experts in all three countries think that after the abolition of 
the short-term visa requirement one can expect more long-term and settle-
ment migration. Moreover, some Ukrainian respondents pointed out a possi-
ble increase of circular and seasonal migration movements. In addition, some 
Ukrainians experts expect growth in irregular employment of their migrants 
in the EU also. What seems to be common to respondents from the all countries 
is that they rely on regularisation of their already present labour migrants in 
EU countries. And finally, what should be emphasised is that the results ob-
tained in V4 states were very similar. 
How big an outflow of migrants from you country will there be if the European Union 
lifts restrictions on access to the labour market for your country nationals (in a short-
term horizon of three years after restrictions are abolished) in comparison with the 
present inflow? Given that you now know the opinions of other experts, please mark 
(with X) one of the following possibilities. If you feel it is important – particularly if 
your opinion significantly deviates from the average – please provide arguments to 
justify your view.
Table 11. Possible future development of migration trends in Eastern Europe 
in the case of elimination of restrictions in access to EU labour markets 
Ukraine
first 
round
Ukraine 
second 
round
belarus
first 
round
belarus 
second 
round
moldova 
first round
moldova 
second 
round 
Much 
higher 3 1 4 5 0 0
higher 10 10 11 11 14 12
no changes 6 5 1 0  3 2
Lower 0 0 0 0 0 0
Much lower 0 0 0 0 0 0
n 19 16  16  16 15 15 
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As in a similar question directed towards V4 experts, the aim of this inquiry 
was to assess the role of lifting labour market restrictions in comparison with 
easing the restrictions on mobility (visa-free regime). What was indicated in 
the V4 results is confirmed here. One probably cannot expect a massive inva-
sion of EaP migrants flooding EU countries, but on the other hand, no decrease 
is very likely to be seen in this regard as well. Thus, higher migration flows 
with some additional “structural changes” might probably occur – as Ukrain-
ian experts in particular stated. 
Can you see any positive impacts springing from future migration from your coun-
try to the EU? Please rank below the indicated impacts with 5 – most important, 
4 – important, 3 – neither important, nor unimportant, 2 – unimportant, 1 – least 
important.
Among the possible positive impacts springing from future migration from the 
respective EaP countries to EU, “delivery of remittances” clearly dominates (in 
addition, its importance is strengthen by the very low SD figure that signifies 
very uniform opinion among respondents). “Reducing poverty and unemploy-
ment” is the second important positive impact mentioned by respondents from 
Ukraine and Moldova. On the other hand, respondents from Belarus rely very 
much on future “returns of experienced migrants and growth in entrepre-
neurship”. All in all, all the above mentioned factors plus “mitigating social and 
economic tensions” play a very positive role according to the experts in all the 
EaP countries when assessing the future development of their international 
migration vis-à-vis the EU.
Can you see any negative impacts springing from future migration from your coun-
try to the EU? Please rank below the indicated impacts with 5 – most important, 
4 – important, 3 – neither important, nor unimportant, 2 – unimportant, 1 – least 
important. 
When assessing negative factors resulting from future migration from Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus to the EU, two factors clearly emerged as the most impor-
tant. Respondents in all the EaP countries agree that they are very concerned 
by “depletion of their labour force” and “brain drain”. Moreover, in harmony 
with what Moldova in particular has already been suffering from, “breakup of 
families” is similarly perceived as a serious threat for the future. 
In which time perspective do you expect that visas for short-term travel to the EU for 
Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans may be abolished? Given that you now know 
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the opinions of other experts, please state your new opinion on your country nation-
als and also on the two other nations investigated in each respective row – one pos-
sibility for each nationality. Please, feel free to comment on your choice; second round 
results only (in the second round respondents were asked to present the estimates for 
two other nationalities as well).
The resulting picture clearly shows that respondents from all the EaP coun-
tries foresee possible abolition of the given visa regime for Moldova very soon 
– in a horizon of 2-3 years. (Moreover, the other 4 Ukrainian respondents voted 
for an even shorter period – “in 2014” – though this possibility was not offered 
at all). In fact, the same opinion is shared by Ukrainian and Moldovan respond-
ents about Ukraine, whilst Belarusian experts split in this assessment into two 
clear groups – 43% voted for 2-3 years, 43% for 4-6 years. Belarus in itself might 
face abolition of the short-term visa regime according to Ukrainian and Moldo-
van respondents in a horizon of 7-10 years, while according to the Belarusian 
experts it would occur earlier, after 4-6 years. It is also important to point out 
that when comparing the given assessment with the results for V4 states both 
of them presented a very similar picture. The only difference may be that the 
EaP experts seem to possess a more thorough knowledge of visa liberalisation 
processes in relation to the EU than the V4 experts; in any case, this conclusion 
does indeed appear to be quite logical.
How do you assess current political debate in your country around the issue of visa 
abolishment for Eastern Partnership states? Please answer yes or no.
Table 12. Public debate in Eastern Europe over visa liberalisation 
UKraine Yes no n
this is an important topic for the general public 17 0 17
this is an important topic in political debate 14 3 17
the general public is favourable towards visa abolition 17 0 17
politicians are favourable towards visa abolition 14 1 15
state officials/administration are favourable towards visa 
abolition 14 2 16
business circles are favourable towards visa abolition 17 0 17
beLarUs Yes no n
this is an important topic for the general public 12 4 16
this is an important topic in political debate 10 6 16
the general public is favourable towards visa abolition 15 0 16
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politicians are favourable towards visa abolition 6 8 16
state officials/administration are favourable towards visa 
abolition 5 10 16
business circles are favourable towards visa abolition 15 0 16
moLdoVa Yes no n
this is an important topic for the general public 17 0 17
this is an important topic in political debate 17 0 17
the general public is favourable towards visa abolition 16 1 17
politicians are favourable towards visa abolition 17 0 17
state officials/administration are favourable towards visa 
abolition 17 0 17
business circles are favourable towards visa abolition 16 1 17
Two different national environments clearly appeared. On one side, Ukrainian 
and Moldovan respondents similarly and strongly expressed that internation-
al migration, in general, and visa abolition for EaP countries in particular, are 
perceived by all the relevant actors in their countries (namely, the public, poli-
ticians, state officials and business circles) as important issues. Opinions were 
almost unambiguous, supported by all the respondents or by a substantial 
majority of them. On the other hand, Belarusian respondents shared similar 
opinions to the Ukrainian and Moldovan respondents only when supporting 
a view that: “business circles are favourable towards visa abolition” and “the 
general public is favourable towards visa abolition”. Interestingly, more Bela-
rusian experts expressed their disagreement (than agreement) with the state-
ment that “politicians are favourable towards visa abolition” and that “state 
officials/administration are favourable towards visa abolition”. 
When comparing EaP results with those for V4, one can clearly notice that visa 
liberalisation issues are of the highest importance for EaP societies, while cer-
tainly this is rather a marginal topic for Visegrad countries citizens. 
Main results: policy measures
Respondents from all seven states were asked in the final question of the first 
Delphi round: “to formulate important strategic policy measures which should be 
newly applied in the near future (in a three year horizon) by destination Visegrad 
countries, by the EU and by countries of origin - to better manage the migration be-
tween Visegrad states and Eastern Europe and make migration more beneficial for 
all the actors”. The Delphi coordinators did not propose any policy solutions to 
choose in the first Delphi round; it was an open-ended question.
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When putting all the results together, the following picture appears (policy 
measures which were mentioned more than five times are listed9). It is no sur-
prise that there is an evident correlation between policy measures designed 
for Visegrad countries, on one hand, and the EU as a whole, on the other hand. 
Table 13. Important strategic policy measures to better manage the migration 
between V4/EU and Eastern Europe 
policy recommendations for Visegrad countries Frequency
- to promote mutual (both bilateral and multilateral) cooperation with eap while 
making efforts to liberalise the migration regime and to abolish visa requirements 
for entering v4 and eu
33
- to sign agreements to guarantee rights and entitlements of migrant workers; to 
counteract discrimination 15
- to enhance the integration process of migrants in v4 11
- to facilitate circular migration 10
- to recognize eap migrants’ qualifications and diplomas 8
- to apply stricter migration policy and controls towards eap migrants 6
policy recommendations for eU 
- to promote mutual (both bilateral and multilateral) cooperation with eap while 
making efforts to liberalise the migration regime and to abolish visa requirements 
for entering v4 and eu
40
- to sign agreements to guarantee rights and entitlements of migrant workers; to 
counteract discrimination 14
- to recognize eap migrants’ qualifications and diplomas 9
- to further work on possible accession of eap to eu 6
- to open the national educational system to foreign students 6
- to facilitate circular migration 6
policy recommendations for countries of origin
- to sign agreements to guarantee rights and entitlements of migrant workers; to 
counteract discrimination 26
- to go through democratisation and socioeconomic reforms; to foster economic 
growth and implementation of policies for sustainable economic development, 
thereby decreasing emigration from countries of origin in a mid-term horizon 
22
- to press for liberalisation or to even lifting visa restrictions in eu for migrants from eap 12
- to carry out effective return migration policy including reintegration programs 9
- to facilitate circular migration 7
- to sign readmission agreements with the eu countries 7
9 They were “put together and unified”, in other words, designed (precisely formulated) by 
coordinators of the whole survey in harmony with respondents’ formulations. 
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The most important policy measure that was recommended for both V4 states 
and the EU by all the experts was the promotion of mutual cooperation, which 
could be assessed as too vague a suggestion for it to be implemented in practice. 
However, this recommendation is followed by the recommendations to liberal-
ise migration regimes and visa requirements. Another important point is that 
experts in both of the questioned groups are in favour of “signing agreements on 
the rights and entitlements of migrant workers”, which may indicate the general 
feeling that it is high time that migration from Eastern Europe was tackled in 
a more comprehensive and considered manner, rather than in an ad hoc way as 
it is today. Other suggestions included introduction of measures to facilitate cir-
cular migration or allowing for recognition of migrants’ qualifications. Only one 
policy measure among those which were more frequently raised calls for a more 
restrictive regime via “applying stricter migration policy and controls towards 
EaP migrants” – it was recommended for the Visegrad states.
When it comes to the recommendations for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, the 
issue of migrants’ rights protection and their legalisation in destination states 
comes to the fore. On the other hand, experts call for necessary political and 
socio-economic reforms that would allow for the sustainable development of 
those states and result in the reduction of emigration. Logically, the issue of 
visa abolition is also very high on the agenda. 
In the second Delphi round, all the respondents were asked to: “assess the situa-
tion by individual policy measures (obtained from the first Delphi round) with regard 
to their desirability and feasibility”.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
48
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
14
Table 14. Assessment of policy recommendations with regard to their feasibi-
lity and desirability 
desirability feasibility
aM sd n aM sd n
policy recommendations for V4 – oVeraLL 
resULts
- to sign agreements to guarantee rights and entitlements of 
migrant workers; to counteract discrimination 4,3 0,9 97 3,4 1,0 95
- to promote mutual (both bilateral and multilateral) cooperation 
with eap while making efforts to liberalise the migration regime 
and to abolish visa requirements for entering v4 and eu
4,3 0,7 101 3,4 0,8 95
- to design and implement a proper migration strategy 4,3 0,7 98 3,8 0,8 94
- to recognize eap migrants’ qualifications and diplomas   4,4 0,7 100 3,4 1,0 94
- to apply stricter migration policy and controls towards eap migrants 2,3 1,0 99 3,4 1,0 94
- to analyse labour market needs in v4 and, accordingly, to 
decide what one wants to gain via migration/immigration 4,3 0,7 101 3,6 0,8 98
- to generally promote transparency within migration policy  
and practice 4,4 1,6 102 3,5 0,9 98
- to launch programs for attracting immigrants to v4 3,6 1,0 97 3,3 0,9 93
- to spread information about migration/integration measures 4,2 0,8 102 3,9 0,8 96
- to facilitate circular migration 4,3 0,8 99 3,7 0,8 94
- to enhance the integration process of migrants in v4 4,2 0,7 100 3,3 0,7 96
- to open the educational system to foreign students 4,4 0,7 98 4,1 0,8 84
- to weaken the emphasis which is placed on security aspects 
of the migration process 3,0 1,0 100 2,9 1,0 97
- to apply a more friendly attitude towards visa applicants in 
consulates of v4 abroad 4,3 0,8 99 3,7 1,0 96
- to increase the number of border checkpoints at the border 
with third-countries 3,6 1,1 97 3,2 0,8 95
- to launch additional programs of cultural and scientific ex-
changes among v4 and third-countries 4,3 0,7 96 4,0 0,7 94
- to facilitate repatriation 3,9 0,9 98 3,5 0,8 94
- to lessen the bureaucratic burden and administrative require-
ments which migrants are often exposed to 4,3 0,8 100 3,4 0,8 97
policy recommendations for eU – oVeraLL 
resULts aM sd n aM sd n
- to sign agreements to guarantee rights and entitlements of 
migrant workers; to counteract discrimination 4,2 0,9 101 3,4 1,1 97
- to combat irregular migration 4,2 0,9 101 3,5 1,0 99
- to design and implement a proper migration strategy 4,2 0,8 97 3,5 0,8 92
- to promote mutual (both bilateral and multilateral) cooperation 
with eap while making efforts to liberalise the migration regime 
and to abolish visa requirements for entering v4 and eu
4,3 0,7 100 3,4 0,8 97
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- to support trans-border cooperation 4,5 0,6 98 4,0 0,7 96
- to enhance the integration process of migrants 4,2 0,7 98 3,5 0,7 94
- to improve migration statistics 4,3 0,8 103 3,6 0,9 99
- to further work on possible accession of eap to eu 3,9 1,0 101 2,9 1,1 98
- to open the national educational system to foreign students 4,3 0,7 102 3,8 0,9 99
- to recognize eap migrants’ qualifications and diplomas   4,3 0,8 102 3,4 1,0 99
- to assist in improving development in countries of origin  
(also via business activities) 4,4 0,7 99 3,4 0,8 96
- to tighten migration policy towards third countries 2,6 0,8 101 3,6 1,0 96
- to facilitate circular migration 4,1 0,8 101 3,5 0,7 97
- to harmonize migration and integration policies 4,2 0,7 100 3,3 0,7 97
- to support ngos’ role in solving migratory issues 4,1 0,9 99 3,7 0,8 96
policy recommendations for countries of origin – 
oVeraLL resULts aM sd n aM sd n
- to sign agreements to guarantee rights and entitlements of 
migrant workers; to counteract discrimination   4,3 0,8 99 3,5 0,9 95
- to facilitate circular migration 4,1 0,8 101 3,4 0,8 96
- to sign readmission agreements with the eu countries 4,1 0,9 96 3,8 1,0 92
- to create more favourable conditions for money transfers 
(remittances) via official channels 4,3 0,8 101 3,6 0,9 99
- to combat irregular migration (including trafficking) 4,4 0,7 100 3,5 0,8 98
- to go through democratization and socioeconomic reforms; 
to foster economic growth and sustainable economic devel-
opment, thereby decreasing emigration in a mid-term horizon
4,6 0,6 101 3,1 0,8 99
- to spread information about migration in the society 4,4 0,8 100 3,8 0,8 97
- to combat corruption 4,7 0,6 99 3,0 1,0 97
- to press for liberalisation and for lifting visa restrictions  
by the eu 4,2 0,9 99 3,3 0,9 96
- to support the development of the “prague process” – 
targeted migration dialogue policy 4,2 0,9 100 3,6 0,8 97
- to support eu enlargement via signing association agree-
ments with eu countries 4,2 0,7 99 3,4 0,7 97
- to develop effective communication channels with diasporas 
and to consolidate mutual relationships 4,2 0,8 101 3,5 0,8 98
- to improve migration statistics 4,4 0,8 97 3,5 0,9 95
- to develop border cooperation, inter alia, by launching 
local border traffic regimes between particular v4 and eap 
countries
4,4 0,7 101 3,8 0,8 99
- to carry out effective return migration policy including reinte-
gration programs 4,3 0,7 102 3,2 0,8 100
- to establish better coordination between state institutions 
dealing with migrants 4,5 0,6 98 3,5 0,8 96
- to streamline migration policy as such 4,5 0,7 97 3,4 0,8 95
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
50
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
14
Via this evaluation perspective, the following policy measures are regarded by 
experts as the most desirable for Visegrad countries: to open the educational sys-
tem for foreign students, to recognize EaP migrants’ qualifications, and to gen-
erally promote transparency within migration policy. As for two former policy 
measures, the strength of opinion is supported by a very uniform assessment 
among the given respondents (low SD figure). As far as the EU is concerned, sup-
porting trans-border cooperation clearly appeared as the most desirable policy 
recommendation (also with a low SD figure), closely followed by “assisting in 
improving development in countries of origin (also via business activities)”. 
Moreover, four other policy recommendations can be considered very desira-
ble too – again those tied to the necessity to open up the educational system and 
to simplify recognition of qualifications and diplomas and the newly stressed 
“improvement of migration statistics” and “promoting mutual cooperation 
with EaP while making efforts to liberalise the migration regime and to abolish 
visa requirements for entering V4 and EU”. Different policy recommendations 
appeared among the most desirable for the Eastern European countries of ori-
gin. “Combating corruption” closely followed by “building more developed and 
democratic societies” were preferred the most. “To establish better coordination 
between state institutions dealing with migrants” and “to streamline migration 
policy as such” were considered very important (again having low SD figures). 
There is an interesting, and indeed important, aspect of those policy meas-
ures which were presented as highly undesirable. This applies to measures 
recommended for Visegrad countries and the EU (there were no such policy 
measures assessed for Eastern Europe). Apparently, there is some kind of dis-
harmony since both pro-restrictive (to apply stricter migration policy towards 
EaP migrants – for V4; to tighten migration policy towards third countries – for 
EU) and anti-restrictive (to launch programs for attracting immigrants to V4 
and to weaken the emphasis placed on security aspects of migration – for V4; to 
further work on possible accession of EaP to EU – for EU) were, in a compara-
tive perspective, more rejected than accepted by respondents10.
With regards to feasibility, “To open the educational system to foreign stu-
dents”, “to launch programs of cultural and scientific exchanges among V4 
and third-countries” and “to spread information about migration/integration 
measures” are among those policy measures which are considered by experts 
to be perfectly feasible for Visegrad countries. “Supporting of trans-border 
10 Highly undesirable policy measures are typical of higher SD figures as compared to highly 
desirable ones. 
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cooperation” and “opening up of educational systems” were similarly stated 
as readily feasible for the EU. As for the EaP states, “to sign readmission agree-
ments with the EU countries”, “to spread information about migration” and “to 
develop border cooperation, inter alia, by launching local border traffic regimes 
between V4 and EaP countries” are again assessed as very feasible. 
On the other hand, the measures evaluated by respondents as extremely diffi-
cult to achieve were “to weaken the emphasis placed on security aspects of the 
migration process” for V4 and “to further work on possible accession of EaP to 
EU” for EU. Recommended policy measures for EaP as “combating corruption” 
and “going through democratization and socioeconomic reforms (…), thereby 
decreasing emigration from countries of origin” are seen by experts – in com-
parison with other policy measures – as very difficult to achieve.
A highly relevant issue is, of course, to identify policy measures which are con-
sidered by experts as highly desirable, and, at the same time, very feasible. 
These are mainly: “to open the educational system to foreign students” for V4, 
“to support trans-border cooperation” and “to open the national educational 
system to foreign students” for the EU. On the other hand, attention must be 
paid to the picture drawn by the EaP experts who, in relation to desirability 
vis-à-vis feasibility, found significant differences. It concerns the following pol-
icy measures: “to go through democratisation and socioeconomic reforms (...) 
thereby decreasing emigration” and “to combat corruption”. Here respondents’ 
assessment demonstrates a high discrepancy between, on the one hand, very 
high desirability and, on the other hand, very difficult feasibility. 
Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth pointing out that there are also measures 
which are considered in agreement and (in a comparative perspective) rather 
undesirable and, at the same time, unfeasible – it concerns “to further work on 
possible accession of EaP to EU” for the EU and “to weaken the emphasis placed 
on security aspects of the migration process” for V4.
Conclusions 
In summarising what we obtained via this Delphi survey, several issues aris-
ing from respondents’ opinions will be outlined in a comparative perspective.
First of all, we turn to one of the main research questions as to what might be 
the effect of visa abolition for the given EaP countries. It is likely that no mas-
sive outflow of labour migrants should be expected after the visa regime for 
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short-term travel for up to 90 days to the EU is abolished. Most of the respond-
ents in the given EaP countries foresee a moderate outflow of labour migrants 
from their countries to the EU. Accordingly, similar views are typical of V4 re-
spondents (a rather moderate inflow of labour migrants, more long-term set-
tlement migration, and, to a lesser extent, growth in irregular employment).
Second, there is a slightly different perception of the probable future develop-
ment of the migration of EaP nationals to V4 countries by experts from individ-
ual countries. Czech and Hungarian respondents expect fewer changes com-
pared to Polish and Slovak experts, who foresee a more dynamic development 
in this respect. Moreover, Czech and Hungarian respondents are – compared 
to Polish and Slovakian ones – more cautious in terms of the statement that 
abolition of visas for Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans is desirable from 
the point of view of their country’s interests. Furthermore, only the respond-
ents in Czechia and Hungary were in agreement on supporting the statement 
that (their national) general public is not favourable towards visa abolition. 
Third, Hungarian respondents apparently treat Ukrainian immigration to 
Hungary as something which differs from other immigrant inflows and per-
haps deserves special attention. The positive assessment of this group is very 
likely connected with the fact that most of these real and potentially would-
be migrants are Ukrainians of Hungarian origin. This phenomenon (a specific 
relationship to compatriots) was not so distinctly observed in relation to any 
other national respondent sample. 
Fourth, Belarus and Belarusian respondents partly differ from the other two 
EaP countries when assessing the current and future migratory development. 
Importantly, only Belarus is considered by most respondents as a country who 
will obtain visa free regime to EU later than Moldova and Ukraine. On the oth-
er hand, unlike in Moldova and Ukraine, low wages, difficulty in finding work, 
poverty and social tensions were not perceived as very important push migra-
tory factors in Belarus. In the same vein, whereas Ukrainian and Moldovan 
experts have no uniform opinion on future migratory developments, Belaru-
sian experts do not anticipate any future changes in the migratory situation. 
Last but not least, unlike experts in Ukraine and Moldova, more Belarusian re-
spondents tend to support the opinion that their politicians and state officials/
administration are not favourable towards visa abolition.
Fifth, when all the respondents (within the first Delphi round) were to “freely” 
formulate important strategic policy measures which should be newly applied 
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in the near future, the recommendation: “to liberalise the migration regime 
and to abolish visa requirements for entering V4 and the EU” is by far the most 
frequently mentioned policy measure recommended for V4 and the EU. It was 
followed by “signing agreements to guarantee rights and entitlements of mi-
grant workers; to counteract discrimination”. The need to sign an accords on 
migrants’ rights was the most frequent policy measure recommended for East-
ern European countries. The second most important recommendation refers to 
the need to build more developed economies and to decrease emigration from 
those countries of origin in a mid-term horizon.
The second Delphi round, where the respondents were asked to assess the indi-
vidual policy measures with regard to their desirability and feasibility brought 
important results. The policy measures which are considered by experts as 
highly desirable, and, at the same time, easily feasible, are mainly: “to open 
the educational system to foreign students” for Visegrad countries, “to support 
trans-border cooperation” and “to open the national educational system to for-
eign students” for the EU. No such measure was stated on behalf of the Eastern 
European countries. 
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2. EConoMETriC ForECasTing oF MigranT sToCK  
FroM EasTErn EUroPE in THE EU MEMbErs sTaTEs
Wadim strielkowski, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University (Prague), 
Czechia 
Marta Jaroszewicz, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Poland
introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to elaborate the econometric model fore-
casting the migrant stock from the Eastern European states (namely Ukraine, 
Belarus and Moldova) in the European Union Member States in 2014-2050. 
Based on economic and demographic data derived mainly from Eurostat, ex-
isting literature and previous own research, a detailed econometric model ful-
filling the criteria of scientific integrity and practical utility was designed and 
executed. To ensure the validity of results, the mathematical correctness of 
the elaborated model was verified and the co-integration of explanatory vari-
ables using panel data was tested. Based on this model, the estimates on mi-
grant stock’s dynamics from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine in the EU states 
were performed and three scenarios of possible developments till 2050 were 
presented.
To our best knowledge, no similar analysis or projections of possible migration 
from the Eastern European countries to the EU has ever been conducted. This 
research builds on similar studies predicting Central European migrations to 
the EU before and after 2004. Our model works with the newest data, takes 
into account the impact of recent economic and financial crises, and employs 
advanced econometric techniques. Hence, this paper might contribute to the 
vast body of research literature and becomes a reference point for relevant 
stakeholders and policymakers.
All three Eastern European countries discussed have experienced labour emi-
gration, although the character and dynamics of the outflows vary substan-
tially between them. Belarus sustained an economic crisis in 2011. As a result, 
mainly industrial workers began migrating to Russia, which accounts for the 
majority of Belarusian emigration. However, the overall migration outflows 
from Belarus probably do not exceed several hundred thousand. The second 
state analysed – Moldova – is one of the countries in the world most heavily 
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affected by its citizens’ labour emigration abroad. The Moldovan Labour Force 
Survey data showed that around 300,000 people, or approximately 25% of the 
economically active population, were working abroad as of 201011. The outflows 
from Moldova tend to take the form of long-term migration which is particu-
larly painful for the country from demographic, economic and social point of 
views. Ukraine is a special case among the three. In 2013 the International La-
bour Organization conducted a Modular Population Survey on Labour Migra-
tion Issues that revealed that as many as 1.2 million individuals (3.4% of the 
population in the 15-70 age group) worked abroad in the period of January 2010-
June 201212. However, the general emigration dynamics of Ukrainians is fall-
ing, the recent events (Euromaidan) in Ukraine and subsequent annexation of 
Crimea by Russia, and finally the violence in Eastern Ukraine raised concerns 
about future politically motivated emigration. 
Reality can be stranger than fiction and many events cannot be captured by 
the econometric models. Forecasts do not have to come true, they may only in-
dicate what might happen. Nevertheless, this elaboration attempts to predict 
the migration stocks in the EU from all three Eastern European countries in 
question, based on the current situation and the three scenarios that are likely 
to capture the possible changes in economic situation in the medium term and 
long term. 
Finally, three important caveats should be made. Firstly, our model is based on 
the Eurostat data for residence permits granted to Ukrainian, Moldovan and 
Belarusian citizens in a given year by particular EU states. Therefore, neither 
circular migration (residence permits granted for stay shorter than 3 months) 
nor irregular migration (unregistered for obvious reasons) have not been taken 
into account. Since no complete historical data related to changes in migrants 
stocks in the EU due to the visa liberalisation were accessible, we use a dummy 
instead – the free movement of people. And lastly, since the following chapter 
aims at presenting the results of the estimates, to both practitioners dealing 
with migration issues and the researchers as well as to the general public, the 
section explaining the model was shortened down to the most important spec-
ifications and assumptions.
11 M. Vremiș, V. Craievschi-Toartă, E. Burdelnii, A. Herm, M. Poulain, Extended migration pro-
file of the Republic of Moldova, Chisinau: International Organization for Migration 2012. 
12 Report on methodology, organization and results of module survey on labour migration in Ukraine, 
International Labour Organisation 2013. 
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The methodology and the model specifications
The research literature implies that it might be possible to explain the migra-
tion trends by the specific framework of push and pull factors. Push factors are 
represented by unfavourable domestic conditions that influence individuals 
to seek work abroad, whilst pull factors can be described as favourable con-
ditions in the target countries of migration that make them more attractive 
in the eyes of potential migrants. One should not think of the push factors in 
purely economic ways, e.g. is in terms of low wages or high unemployment, 
but also in terms of unfavourable political situations, police oppression, and 
corrupt institutions. The same rationale holds for the pull factors, e.g. higher 
wages, higher living standards, better healthcare and other related issues. The 
incentives to migrate decrease with age because the older a person is the lower 
are the expected gains obtained from moving abroad.
The first part of the elaborated model is consistent with those models based 
on a human capital approach that deal with investment in human capital and 
expected future income13. The model applies the econometric methods used by 
Boeri and Brücker (2000) and Alvarez-Plata, Brücker and Siliverstovs (2003) in 
estimating migration from Central and Eastern Europe into the EU 15 before EU 
expansion14, and most recently by Glazar and Strielkowski (2010) and Glazar and 
Strielkowski (2012) in assessing future migration from Turkey to the EU15.
In the elaborated model we assume that people make expectations regarding 
the future income in the target (host) country and source (home) country. The 
differences in incomes in the target and source countries in the past influence 
expectations about the future possible difference in incomes and the income 
a migrant can obtain in the host country. A country’s GDP per capita serves as 
13 L.A. Sjaastad, The Costs and Returns of Human Migration, The Journal of Political Economy, 
1962, Vol. 70, No. 5, pp. 80-93; J. Harris, M. Todaro, Migration, Unemployment and Develop-
ment: A Two-sector Analysis, The American Economic Review, 1970, Vol. 60, pp. 126-142; T.J. Hat-
ton, A Model of UK Emigration, 1870-1913, Review of Economics and Statistics, 1995, Vol. 77, pp. 
407-15.
14 T. Boeri, H. Brücker et al., The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Employment and Labour Mar-
kets in the EU Member States, Final Report, Brussels 2000; P. Alvarez-Plata, H. Brücker, B. Sil-
iverstovs, Potential Migration from Central and Eastern Europe into the EU-15 – an Update; Ber-
lin 2003: DIW. 
15 O. Glazar, W. Strielkowski, Turkey and the European Union: possible incidence of the EU acces-
sion on migration flows, Prague Economic Papers, 2010, Vol. 3, pp. 218-235; O. Glazar, W. Striel-
kowski, Turkish migration in Europe: An economic analysis of possible EU accession on migration, 
Charles University, Prague, 2012. 
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a proxy for individuals’ incomes both in source and target countries (the selec-
tion of GDP per capita can be justified by the limited data sources available). 
The average employment rate in both target and source countries is taken as 
a proxy for labour market conditions. More precisely, the probability of find-
ing a job rises with higher employment and vise versa. The lagged migration 
stock serve as a proxy for network effects. If migration stocks are based on ex-
pectations about past variables, this means that present values are influenced 
by past values16, thus it should be a first-order autoregressive process (AR (1)). 
Therefore, a simple error-correction model (a dynamic model in which the 
movement of the variables in any period is related to the previous period’s gap 
from long-run equilibrium) can be constructed in the following way17: 
 Δmfh,t = β1 * Δln ( wf,t / wh,t ) + β2 * Δln ( wh,t ) + β3 * Δln ( eh,t ) + 
 + β4 * Δln ( ef,t ) ++ β5 * ln ( wf,t-1 / wh,t-1 ) + β6 * ln ( wh,t-1 ) +   (1)
 + β7 * ln ( eh,t-1 ) + β8 * ln ( ef,t-1 ) + β9 * ( mfh,t-1 ) + β10 * DummyF + εt
where:
mfh,t  dependent variable – the stock of migrants from Eastern European 
countries f (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) in the EU Member 
States as a % of home population h 
wf,t/wh,t foreign to home country income difference 
wh,t home country income
ef,t  employment rate in country f
eh,t  country of origin employment rate
mfh,t-1  lagged migrants stock of home country h and target country f 
DummyF dummy variable for the free movement of persons 
t, t-1  denotes time periods 
Variables enter the equation specified in (1) both as fixed quantities and as the 
deltas (differences between the variables in the current and previous time 
periods). Variables’ differences show the short term reaction of migration to 
these fluctuations. On the other hand, the levels of the variables determine the 
16 T.J. Hatton, op. cit. 
17 G. Alogoskoufis, R. Smith, On error correction models: specification, interpretation, estima-
tion, Journal of Economic Surveys, 1991, No. 5(1), pp. 97-128.
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long-run relations between migration stocks and respective independent vari-
ables. The equilibrium stock of migrants can therefore be derived from equa-
tion (1) by setting all changes equal to nil and obtaining the steady state for the 
stock of migrants18:
 mfh = ( β5 /- β9 ) * ln ( wf / wh ) + ( β6 /- β9 ) * ln ( wh ) + 
 + ( β7 /- β9 ) * ln ( eh ) + ( β8 /- β9 ) * ln ( ef ) +     (2)
 + ( β10 /- β9 ) *DummyF + ε 
where mfh is the steady state equilibrium share of the foreign migrants in the 
source population. The β coefficients in brackets are therefore semi-elastic-
ities in the long-run equilibrium and denote the relation between stocks of 
migrants and explanatory variables. The coefficient β9 is expected to be neg-
ative; hence the signs of the original coefficients will not change. A negative 
sign of the coefficient is expected due to the assumption that migration follows 
an AR(1) process (i.e. the output variable depends linearly on its own previous 
values). Hence mt=ηmt-1 where η must be smaller than 1 (If this does not hold, 
the entire population of the source country will migrate). A part of (1) can be 
re-written in the following way:
 Δmt = mt - mt-1 = β9 * ( mt-1 )  (3)
   mt = ( 1 + β9  )* ( mt-1 )
Thus, it appears that β9 should be negative to ensure the sustainability of mi-
gration. If the β9 coefficient were even slightly positive, the coefficient before 
lagged migration would have been greater than one and this would have led to 
an unsustainable migration explosion. 
First we test if the long-term equilibrium between migration stocks and ex-
planatory variables does exist. Therefore, we tested for the cointegration that 
shows that our variables make up the cointegration set, because they passed 
the two stage process. So we can start with estimation of the long term equi-
librium parameters from equation. We set the changes of variables for the 
steady state to zero, and this allows us to estimate the described equation (3). 
18 Variable t (time) was left out from the equation in order to indicate the long-term equilibrium. 
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A part of cointegration that involves the cross-section pooling of data might 
evoke further restrictions that may cause problems to the regression results. 
In the literature, a variety of estimators for estimating such panel data is used. 
From the data assumptions presented in similar studies19 it appears that in this 
framework the most efficient estimator should be the Seemingly Unrelated Re-
gression (SUR). However, we will also evaluate the model by employing clas-
sical panel data Least Squares (PLS) and General method of moments (GMM). 
We will try to confirm the hypothesis that the SUR is the best estimator in this 
respective case. 
Furthermore, the variable denoting the employment rate in the country of ori-
gin (domestic income) had to be eliminated from equation (2) due to the fact 
that it proved to be insignificant in all estimates (it appeared to be redundant 
since the null hypothesis of insignificancy of beta was not rejected). The final 
model can thus be presented in the following way: 
 Δmfht = αh + β1ln ( wft / wht ) + β2ln ( wht ) + β3ln ( eft ) +  (4)
 + β4 ( mfh,t-1 ) + β5 ( mfh,t-2 ) + β6 * DummyF + Zfhγ + εt
where: 
mfht  the dependent variable representing the stock of migrants from 
source  country h living in target country f as a % of source coun-
try population h. 
wht   country of origin income level
wft/wht   foreign to home country income difference 
eft   employment rate in country f
mfh,t-1   lagged migrants stock of home country h in country f 
mfh,t-2   lagged migrants stock of home country h in country f 
Zfh   vector of time-invariant variables which affect the migration 
between two countries, such as geographical proximity and lan-
guage. 
DummyF   Free movement of persons 
19 Alvarez-Plata, Brücker, and Siliverstovs, op. cit. 
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Our model employs the econometric techniques known as Seemingly Unre-
lated Regression (SUR), Panel data Least Squares (PLS) and General method of 
moments (GMM). 
Three types of possible scenarios – low, medium, high – are presented for each 
of the three countries: until the year of 2050 with a simulated shock of intro-
duction free movement of labour in 2015. From a political point of view, it may 
be unreasonable to forecast such an early abolition (2015) by EU MS of restric-
tions on access to their territories for migrants from Ukraine, Belarus and Mol-
dova. It should be emphasised that Poland and other Central European states as 
well as Bulgaria and Romania where offered genuine free movement of people 
only when they joined the EU, while free access for their citizens to the labour 
markets of all MS was guaranteed a few years later. However, by application 
of this dummy (free movement of people) we intended to test whether and to 
what extent such a deep liberalisation of mobility may influence the migrant 
stock dynamics. Two reasons lay behind our decision. Firstly, such a subtle lib-
eralisation of mobility rules as visa liberalisation cannot be introduced suc-
cessfully into an econometric forecast model. Secondly, we did not possess 
comprehensive uniform statistical data (including historical data) back from 
the 90s when EU MS lifted the visa regime for the Central European states nor 
for the Western Balkan states who obtained a visa free regime in 2009-2010. 
The most notorious problem in migration estimation is the absence of data. 
Due to the non-existence of historical data and application of different meth-
odologies in different states (in particular, discrepancies exist between Eu-
rostat migration data and definitions and those applied in Ukraine, Belarus 
and Moldova), comparison of stocks and flows data may be very complicated. 
Therefore, we decided to stick to one source of migration data, namely on resi-
dence permits20 data for the EU-27, which turned out to be more detailed and 
comprehensive than migrant stock data. However, one should remember that 
the simulation presented here concerns future trends in the residence permits 
issuance, which was taken as a proxy for migrants stock. 
20 By residence permits data Eurostat understands: any authorisation valid for at least 
3 months issued by the authorities of a Member State allowing a third country national 
to stay legally on its territory. According to Article 6.2 of   the Council Regulation (CE) 
No 862/2007 of 11 July 2007, when national laws and administrative practices of a Member 
State allow for specific categories of long-term visa or immigration status to be granted in-
stead of residence permits, such visas and grants of statuses are also included. 
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Main results and discussion
In this sub-section three different scenarios for the future dynamics of migrant 
stock of Ukrainian, Moldovan and Belarusian nationals in the EU have been pre-
sented. In our model we worked with the panel data on residence permits issued 
to the nationals of Eastern European states in 27 EU countries and Norway. For 
the vast majority of countries we found observations from 2008 to 2012. In the 
model, we explain migrant stock using the number of issued residence permits 
and by analysing the push and pull factors of migration – the explanatory vari-
ables are unemployment and GDP per capita in both the EU in general and in each 
of the three examined Eastern European states. Population data, data for GDP 
per capita and the unemployment rate in the EU MS were derived from Eurostat, 
while equivalent data for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova come from the World 
Bank and national statistical offices of the respective states. 
Table 15. Statistical sources for the migration projections
data type source Link
Migrants stock eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/popula-tion/data/database
population 
growth: belarus, 
Moldova, 
ukraine
worLd bank http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators
population:  
belarus,  
Moldova, 
ukraine
worLd bank http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators
population: eu 
countries eurostat
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/popula-
tion/data/database
gdp per capita 
in current us 
dollars
worLd bank http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators
unemployment: 
eu countries eurostat
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employ-
ment_unemployment_lfs/data/database
unemployment:
belarus
national statisti-
cal office http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/indicators/labor.php
unemployment:
Moldova
worLd bank, 
national statisti-
cal office
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/
selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators
http://statbank.statistica.md/pxweb/database/en/03%20
Mun/Mun06/Mun06.asp
unemployment:
ukraine
worLd bank, 
mecometer.com
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/
selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators
http://mecometer.com/compare/russia+ukraine/unemploy-
ment/
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The shock which simulates the free movement of people in the EU for the na-
tionals of the three respective states has been set to occur in the year 2015. The 
size and duration of the shock is derived from the situation in Poland, Bulgaria 
and Romania after their accession to the EU, which eliminated barriers to mo-
bility to the ‘old’ EU MS. The results of the shock are recorded in the model one 
year after the free movements restrictions were abolished (there is a lag before 
the data on the stock of migrants are collected and analysed). 
The low (best-case) scenario assumes the unemployment rate to be the average 
of the 2008-2012 observations, as well as the proxy of economic growth and 
well-being represented by 1% GDP growth in the Eastern European states and 
4% GDP growth in the EU Member States. The medium (or the realistic) sce-
nario works with 0% GDP growth in the Eastern European states and 2% GDP 
growth in the EU Member States. Finally, the high (or the worst-case) scenario 
takes in a 2% decline in GDP in the Eastern European states and 0% GDP growth 
in the EU Member States.
Table 16. Specifications of econometric model scenarios 
Low medium high
unemployment = average of 
2008–2012 observations
unemployment = average of 
2008–2012 observations + 0.5%
unemployment = average of 
2008–2012 observations + 2%
1% gdp growth eastern eu-
rope, 4% gdp growth eu Ms
0% gdp growth eastern eu-
rope, 2% gdp growth eu Ms
-2% gdp decline eastern eu-
rope, 0% gdp growth eu Ms
source: Own results
The results obtained for all the scenarios are presented below. It should, how-
ever, be borne in mind that, due to the fact that many migrants from East-
ern Europe in the EU remain there irregularly and migration statistics poorly 
reflect circular migration, this forecast is more likely to point to trends than 
show precise figures. 
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Figure 1. Total Belarusian resident stock 2008-2050 – 3 scenarios, 27 EU coun-
tries and Norway, impact of visa abolition in 2015 
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source: Own results based on Eurostat data
Looking at the results for Belarus one can notice that no major increase in the 
number of Belarusian nationals holding residence permits in the EU MS is to 
be expected in short and medium-term perspectives. According to official Be-
larusian statistics, Belarus belongs to those rare countries in the post-Soviet 
space that has been characterized by positive net migration during the whole 
independence period. However, the country chapter on Belarus in our publi-
cation clearly shows that these statistics vary significantly from the reality. 
Nevertheless, Belarusian nationals exhibit a rather low propensity to migra-
tion. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of Belarusian migrants reside and 
work in Russia. 
In the low scenario no real change in the number of Belarusian residents can 
be expected even up to 2026 and yet the introduction of free movement of peo-
ple does not seem to significantly alter that trend (possible increases can be 
observed for a year or two). In both the medium and high scenarios the shock 
related to visa abolition may have some impact on the rise in migrant stock. 
However, the migration patterns of Belarusian nationals may only change sig-
nificantly in the medium- and long-term perspectives. In the medium scenar-
io, a considerable increase can be expected only in 2026-2032 and may amount 
to around 500,000 residence permits in 2032. In subsequent years migrants 
stocks should stabilize. It is only the high scenario, with very pessimistic eco-
nomic forecasts for Belarus and a growing Belarusian diaspora in the EU, that 
predicts long-term increasing migration dynamics up to 2050.
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When the main destination states for Belorussian migrants are to be selected, 
Poland seems to occupy first position. However, the growth rate of Belarusian 
migrant stock in that country turned out to be smaller than the overall growth 
rate of Belarusians in the EU, which may be due to relatively lower wages in 
Poland in comparison with other EU locations. 
Figure 2. Total Moldovan resident stock 2008-2050 – 3 scenarios, 27 EU coun-
tries and Norway, impact of visa abolition in 2015
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source: Own results based on Eurostat data
Projections for Moldova do not show high growth potential mainly due to the 
very small overall number of the Moldovan population. The second most im-
portant factor is the significant number of Moldovans (as many as 500,000) 
who hold Romanian passports, which is certainly a more comfortable way of 
staying and working in the EU MS than requiring a residence permit21. Cur-
rently, approximately half of labour migrants from Moldova choose Russia 
as a destination state, and half choose EU locations However, the trend in fa-
vour of EU locations may accelerate due to visa relaxation for short-term stays, 
which took effect in April 2014, and the clear pro-European path chosen by the 
Moldova. 
In the case of Moldova, the results for all three scenarios represent an oscil-
lation around 400,000 people (below, at the 400,000 migrant stock level, or 
above that level for the optimistic, realistic and pessimistic scenarios respec-
tively) until 2050. Simultaneously, it should be borne in mind that long-term 
forecasts are subject to higher risks than short-term ones. The introduction of 
free movement of labour (the dummy for visa liberalisation) for Moldovan na-
tionals appears to result in an increase of migration stocks in the EU to a level 
ranging from 250,000 to 300,000 Moldovans. The main destination states for 
Moldovan migrants are Italy and other Southern European states. If we take 
21 For more details see the country chapter on Moldova. 
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into consideration current patterns of Moldovan migration, it is certainly be-
coming more permanent with a visible tendency to ask not only for the status 
of EU long-term resident but also to obtain EU MS citizenships. This may add 
a further explanation to our projections in terms of why the curves of future 
migration stocks are rather flat. 
Figure 3. Ukrainian resident stock in 27 EU Member States and Norway 
in 2008-2050: medium scenario
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Figure 4. Total Ukrainian resident stock 2008-2050 – 3 scenarios, 27 EU coun-
tries and Norway, impact of visa abolition in 2015
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As previously mentioned, the highest possible increase in migrants stock may 
happen in the case of Ukraine due to its relatively large population, significant 
wage gaps in comparison to EU states and strong network effects. What is also 
important is that in recent years Ukrainians were among the top nationalities 
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who received residence permits in the EU, which imposes certain, more dy-
namic, assumptions on the forecasts. On the other hand, the rise in registered 
residence permit data does not necessarily mean the arrival of new migrants 
– the most likely explanation is the tendency of Ukrainian migrants to legal-
ise their stay. It would also confirm the previously mentioned hypothesis for 
Moldova concerning the changing pattern of Eastern European migration as 
becoming the permanent one. Regardless of what has been said earlier, the fact 
that EU residence permit data more accurately show the real migration picture 
provides added value to our projections. 
The low and medium scenarios envisages that by the year 2050 there is going to 
be just around 1,500,000 Ukrainian residents in the EU22. Where the high (worst-
case) scenario is concerned, the stock of Ukrainian nationals in the EU might 
reach some 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 people. However, we should look at these 
long-term prognoses very carefully since many economic and population chang-
es, including unpredictable shocks, may occur over such a long perspective. 
If we look at the short-term projections we can see that until 2014 Ukrainian 
migrant stock should be on the rise, after which they would stabilise for a cer-
tain period of time, and then will likely start to grow again from around 2025. 
Then, after another stabilization period, future growth may occur around 
2028 but only in the pessimistic scenario. The result of visa abolition in 2015 
would result in the low case scenario of a rise of between 200,000-300,000 in 
new residence permits issued. It should be noted that, paradoxically, the in-
crease in migrants stocks may actually be higher in the medium scenario than 
in the high one, most probably due to reduced labour possibilities within the 
EU labour markets in that scenario. As for destination states for Ukrainian mi-
grants in the EU, there is no one dominant location. The most important ones 
are: Poland, Italy and Czechia. 
In all three scenarios for all the states we assumed GDP growth (or decrease) in 
both the Eastern European state and in the EU, although the assumptions for 
the EU were always more optimistic due to the strength of its economy. Never-
theless, if the EU was severely hit by any new recession, this would certainly 
curtail the inflow of new migrants. 
22 For details see the country chapter on Ukraine. 
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Overall, we can state within the framework of this model and using this de-
tailed econometric approach that our results are robust and significant, which, 
in turn, might lead us to the conclusions that migration from Eastern Europe 
to the EU MS would be considerable but manageable representing from 1.5 mil-
lion to 3.5 million migrants in the perspective up to 2050, depending on the 
scenario we use.
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have presented the results of the migrant stock (residence 
permits data) projections, based on the econometric model derived from the 
human capital approach. We assumed that people make expectations regard-
ing the future income in the target (host) country and source (home) country. 
The differences in former incomes influence expectations about future pos-
sible incomes. We explained migrant stocks using the number of issued resi-
dence permits and by analysing the so-called push factors of migration – the 
explanatory variables are unemployment and GDP per capita in the Eastern 
European countries in question. We simulated the shock that causes access to 
the free movement of people for 2015 (a proxy for visa abolition) and the size 
and duration of the shock is derived from the situation in Poland, Bulgaria and 
Romania after their EU accession in 2004 and 2007 respectively.
To sum up, it appears that the hypothetical visa abolition for the Eastern Eu-
ropean countries represented by Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine is not going to 
significantly increase the stocks of migrants from these countries in the EU 
Member States. The results of the forecasts for all the states may amount to 
around 50,000 individuals over a two-year perspective for both Belarus and 
Moldova (taken separately) and around 200,000-300,000 for Ukraine. In the 
longer term (up to 2050) the overall stocks in the EU from those three states 
may oscillate between 1.5-3.5 million migrants, depending on the economic 
performance of both the destination locations and the countries of origin. 
However, it should be emphasized that the forecasts do not need to come true, 
they only model the potential migration dynamics under different scenarios of 
economic development. 
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3. THE iMPaCT oF Visa LibEraLisaTion on MigraTion 
FroM EasTErn EUroPE To THE EU anD V4 – Can WE 
LEarn FroM THE PasT?
bernd Parusel, Swedish Migration Board 
introduction
As a manifestation of their sovereignty, states regulate the access of foreign 
nationals to their territories, both concerning short-term movements (travel), 
and with regard to entries for the purpose of longer-term stay (immigration). 
The most common instruments used for this purpose are laws regulating me-
dium- and long-term stays of foreign nationals, identity checks at the external 
borders (and sometimes also within countries), and the definition and enforce-
ment of entry requirements for short-term travellers, such as passport and 
visa obligations. 
In the European Union, these three basic dimensions of states’ mobility control 
policies (immigration legislation, border control, and visa policy) have been 
subject to processes of harmonisation and communitisation for more than 15 
years. In the area of visa policy, communitisation has seen more progress than 
in other areas of cooperation. With some exceptions, the Member States now 
further develop the Union’s visa policy together. This is done on the basis of 
three main legal instruments, the Schengen Borders Code23, regulating the 
crossing of the EU’s external borders and entry requirements for third-coun-
try nationals, the Visa Code24, which lays down the conditions and modalities 
of granting visas for short stays, airport transits and transit travel, and the EU 
Visa Regulation25, that specifies uniformly which third-country nationals need 
visas to enter the Schengen area, and which do not. 
23 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 
2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code).
24 Regulation 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 estab-
lishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code).
25 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose na-
tionals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose 
nationals are exempt from that requirement.
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It is largely under-researched, however, how the three above-mentioned di-
mensions of mobility control policies, including migration control, affect each 
other, or, to be more precise, whether a change in immigration law can trig-
ger not only (intended) changes in immigration patterns but also (unintended) 
higher (or lower) numbers of applications for short-term visas or, conversely, 
whether measures affecting the granting of short-term visas can have an im-
pact not only on short term travel but also on longer-term immigration and 
residence of foreign nationals. 
When the EU engages in dialogue with third countries on visa facilitation 
agreements or visa-free travel, there is often substantial scepticism towards 
any liberalisation, and even if political leaders are unlikely to openly state this, 
much of their resistance can be attributed to fears of visa abolishment trig-
gering uncontrollable influxes, together with repercussions for the volume of 
longer-term immigration and settlement. To find actual evidence concerning 
any such effects of visa liberalization, however, seems to be more difficult. 
When we want to know whether, or how, changes in the EU visa regime to-
wards third countries, and in particular the lifting of any visa requirements 
with regard to short-term travel, can affect longer-term migration patterns, 
one possible hypothesis is that visa-free travel facilitates mobility and thus 
migration, at least indirectly, while conversely, a visa requirement hampers 
cross-border movements26. When a visa requirement is in place, pre-entry pro-
cedures may have a deterring effect, not least because of costs, waiting times 
at consulates, application procedures and the need to provide documentation, 
among other factors27. It has, however, not been established with certainty 
whether such a link between visa policies and immigration exists in reality.
The objective of this chapter shall be to explore some historic and more recent 
examples of cases in which visa requirements were lifted by the EU Member 
States and to ask whether this may have prompted any measurable changes 
in immigration flows between the countries or regions involved. It is hoped 
that any speculation concerning the impact of possible visa liberalisation in 
26 S. Bertoli, J. Moraga, Visa Policies, Networks and the Cliff at the Border, IZA Discussion Paper 
No. 7094, 2012.
27 E. Neumayer, Unequal access to foreign spaces: how states use visa restrictions to regulate mobil-
ity in a globalized world, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 2006, 31 (1), pp. 
72-84.
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the future, between the EU on the one side and Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus 
on the other side, will profit from this analysis.
Methodology, data sources and caveats
The analysis relies on statistical data related to specific case-studies. The basic 
approach is to look at immigration from a particular country to an EU Member 
States or the EU as a whole over time, and to check whether any significant 
changes, such as a sudden increase in immigration or a rising number of asy-
lum applicants, can be seen immediately after the point in time when the re-
quirement to hold a short-term visa was lifted. 
The analysis will be carried out by examining two case studies. Firstly, a short 
section will look into the case of citizens moving to Germany from Poland, the 
Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Romania before and after the German govern-
ment introduced visa-free travel for the nationals of these countries in 1991, 
1999, 2001 and 2002, respectively. It is assumed that Germany represents a good 
case example, as it has been one of the most important hubs and destinations 
for Central and Eastern European migrants.
The second case deals with the consequences of more recent visa liberalisa-
tions towards the citizens of the Western Balkan countries: Serbia, Montene-
gro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Albania and Bos-
nia-Herzegovina. Here, the abandonment of previous visa requirements came 
as a joint decision by the Schengen countries and took effect in December 2009 
(for Serbia, Montenegro and the FYROM) and in December 2010 (for Albania 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina). These cases will be examined in more detail, also 
due to the better availability of reliable data for EU Member States. Since 2008, 
the statistical office of the EU (Eurostat) has been collecting certain migration 
statistics in a harmonised fashion on the basis of a binding EU regulation28. 
Five statistical sources are used as indicators: data on first-time residence per-
mits issued by EU Member States to nationals of the countries that were re-
lieved from visa obligations, data on immigration flows (nationals immigrat-
ing from these countries in a specific year), population stock data (indicating 
the number of nationals of these countries residing in EU Member States at 
28 Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
on Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers.
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specific points in time), data on asylum applications and data on foreign na-
tionals found to be “illegally present” in EU Member States. All these data, 
with the exception of some additional data from national statistical sources, 
were retrieved from the Eurostat database. 
A few problems were experienced, however. The annual Eurostat statistics 
on immigration flows turned out to be both incomplete and inconsistent over 
time. For some Member States, no reliable data could be found, whereas for 
others, there were breaks in the timeline and the reported figures changed due 
to modifications of underlying definitions or data retrieval methods. There-
fore, some potentially relevant Member States, such as France or the United 
Kingdom, needed to be excluded from the analysis, and data for Germany were 
taken from a national database instead. Statistics on first-time residence per-
mits and population stocks, which both appeared more uniform and consist-
ent, were used as an additional (proxy) source for immigration29. Changes in 
population stocks, disaggregated by nationality, can show whether the num-
ber of nationals of a specific foreign country in an EU Member State has in-
creased or decreased over the years and can thus indicate whether the lifting 
of a visa requirement may have prompted a growing presence of people from 
that country. Statistics on residence permits were considered to be relevant 
since third-country nationals usually need a residence permit in order to le-
gally reside in the EU, irrespective of whether short-term entry is permitted 
solely with a visa or not. 
Data on first-time asylum applications (excluding repeat- or follow-up applica-
tions by the same persons) and persons found to be “illegally present” in the EU 
(persons with irregular stay apprehended in a Member State) were also used, 
particularly in order to find out whether visa-free travel could have prompted 
more dynamic cross-border movements outside legal migration channels.
Within such a statistical analysis of migratory movements, however, any sta-
tistical trend observed must be interpreted cautiously. Migration behaviours 
and trends are determined by many different factors and can never be related 
to one particular trigger or reason alone. In cases in which immigration lev-
els from a certain country are roughly the same in quantitative terms before 
and after visa liberalisation, it can be assumed that visa liberalisation has not 
had any major effect on immigration patterns. When immigration increases 
29 The concept of ”first-time residence permit” means that only new residence permits are 
counted and that renewed or extended permits are excluded.
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following visa liberalisation, there can be a causal relationship, but it can-
not be established whether it is purely down to visa liberalisation or whether 
other factors may also have contributed to this. It is generally assumed that 
the lifting of visa restrictions encourages migration. Conversely, however, it 
could also be true in some cases that citizens of a country that are required to 
hold a visa when they want to travel to another country are inclined to achieve 
a legal immigration status there in order to avoid the inconvenience of repeat-
edly applying for an entry-visa. In such a case, the lifting of visa requirements 
could have the effect of easing immigration pressures.
Last but not least, statistics on irregular migration should also be treated 
carefully. Even when the number of people apprehend for illegal stay the EU 
increases following visa liberalisation, this may be due to other reasons, too, 
such as more controls on foreigners or stricter enforcement of immigration 
rules. When a person is apprehended as an irregular migrant, the statistics do 
not tell us when this person has entered the country. 
Case study 1. Germany and immigration from Poland, Bulgaria and 
Romania (1991-2002)
The first case study deals with immigration to Germany before and after visa-
free travel was introduced for citizens of Poland (in April 1991), Bulgaria (April 
2001) and Romania (January 2002). The example of Poland shows that while the 
realisation of visa-free travel immediately prompted more border-crossings by 
Polish nationals towards Germany, intensified mobility was not accompanied 
by a higher rate of settlement. In fact, recorded longer-term migration from 
Poland to Germany increased only marginally.
Immigration flows 
Immigration from Poland to Germany increased slightly in 1992 as compared to 
1991, when visa-free travel became possible, but then decreased significantly. 
The immigration flows recorded in 1991 can unfortunately not be compared to 
previous years, mainly due to the reunification of the two German States in 
1990. What is interesting to note, is that immigration from Poland to Germa-
ny increased substantially at a much later point in time, namely when Poland 
joined the EU.
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Table 17. Immigration of Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian nationals  
to Germany, 1991-2007
  poland bulgaria romania
1991 128,482 17,172 61,670
1992 131,780 31,395 110,096
1993 75,195 27,241 81,760
1994 78,745 10,387 31,449
1995 87,305 8,064 24,845
1996 77,545 6,335 16,986
1997 71,322 6,433 14,144
1998 66,263 5,275 16,987
1999 72,402 8,143 18,814
2000 74,256 10,411 24,202
2001 79,033 13,156 20,142
2002 81,551 13,191 23,953
2003 88,241 13,369 23,780
2004 125,042 11,586 23,545
2005 147,716 9,057 23,274
2006 152,733 7,749 23,743
2007 140,870 20,919 43,894
source: Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). Shaded cells mark the years in which Germa-
ny introduced visa-free travel for nationals of the respective countries
In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, a small increase of immigration to Ger-
many can be seen for the respective years in which Germany introduced vi-
sa-free travel. However, there was no further increase. Rather, immigration 
levels tended to decrease until 2007, when, most probably prompted by EU ac-
cession, there was a sharp rise again.
The available data for other Central and Eastern European countries, such as the 
former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Baltic States, reveals similar patterns. 
Recorded migration of Czechoslovakian nationals to Germany increased sig-
nificantly in 1992 (36,271) compared to 1991 (22,381). During the following years, 
however, it dropped again. Immigration from Hungary stood at 24,763 in 1991, 
increased to 27,844 in 1992, and then decreased again. Both countries had be-
come visa-free in 1990. As far as nationals of the Baltic States are concerned, re-
corded flows increased slightly from Lithuania and Estonia in the year in which 
the visa obligation was abandoned (1999), but decreased in the case of Latvia. 
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In sum, it is appears unlikely that the visa policy towards the countries of 
Eastern Central Europe and the Baltic states had any significant effect on im-
migration from these countries to Germany. Other developments, such as EU 
enlargement, had a far greater impact.
Asylum data
Statistics on first-time asylum applications submitted by nationals from Po-
land and Bulgaria do suggest that the introduction of visa-free travel had an 
effect on asylum dynamics. The number of new asylum applications submitted 
by Poles increased by almost 23% in 1992 compared to the previous year. Appli-
cations by Bulgarians rose by 91.9% in 2002, compared to 2001. In contrast, no 
link can be established in the case of Romanian asylum seekers. Their number 
actually fell in the year after visa requirements disappeared.
Table 18. Asylum applications by nationals of Poland, Romania and Bulgaria 
to Germany, 1991-2005
  poland bulgaria romania
1991 3,448 12,056 40,504
1992 4,212 31,540 103,787
1993 1,670 22,547 73,717
1994 326 3,367 9,581
1995 119 1,152 3,522
1996 137 940 1,395
1997 151 761 794
1998 49 172 341
1999 42 90 222
2000 141 72 174
2001 134 66 181
2002 50 814 118
2003 32 502 104
2004 21 480 61
2005 16 278 55
source: Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). Shaded cells mark the years in which Germa-
ny introduced visa-free travel for nationals of the respective countries
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Case study 2. The European Union and immigration from the Western 
Balkans (2007-2012)
In the following case study, the picture is widened. Since the visa require-
ments for holders of biometric passports from Western Balkan countries were 
lifted by the EU on 19 December 2009 for nationals of Serbia, Montenegro and 
the FYROM, and on 15 December 2010 for citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Albania, relevant statistical data from Eurostat is available for all EU Member 
States both for the year preceding visa liberalisation and for subsequent years. 
First residence permits
No increase in the overall number of first-time residence permits granted to 
citizens of the Western Balkan countries can be seen for the years in which 
visa-free travel took full effect (2010 and 2011, respectively), with the exception 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a small increase can be detected. In the other 
four cases, the number of residence permits granted decreased. 
Table 19. First-time residence permits granted by 27 EU Member States
Citizenship / year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
serbia 37,893 26,024 23,759 21,962 25,175
fyroM 20,895 15,172 13,654 11,443 9,819
Montenegro 721 1,168 1,067 1,283 1,759
albania 98,704 85,399 75,310 41,204 32,203
bosnia and 
herzegovina 26,330 12,648 11,096 11,862 14,867
total 184, 543 140,411 124,886 87,754 83,823
source: Eurostat database. Shaded cells mark the years in which Germany introduced visa-free travel 
for nationals of the respective countries
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Figure 5. First residence permits granted by EU Member States to Western 
Balkans citizens in 2008–2012
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and Herzegovina
Circular reference points mark the years in which visa requirements were lifted
(December 2009 and December 2010, respectively)
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source: Eurostat database
If we examine the extent to which individual EU Member States have issued 
first-time residence permits to nationals of Serbia, Germany ranks first. Almost 
8,000 such permits were issued to Serbian applicants in 2012, as compared to 
2,700 in 2011 and 3,300 in 2010. In 2009, before visa-free entries became possi-
ble, Germany issued almost 4,900 permits. The fact that the number of residence 
permits decreased immediately after visa liberalisation and only increased in 
2012 suggests that visa policy is not a main underlying reason for the trend ob-
served. Austria and Italy rank second and third. While Austria noticed an in-
creasing number of residence permits, comparable to Germany, the number of 
permits issued by Italy decreased. Thus, visa liberalisation cannot explain by 
itself the increases and decreases noted by the different Member States.
As far as residence permits for Macedonians are concerned, Italy was the lead-
ing country in numerical terms. There, numbers decreased sharply despite 
visa-free travel since 2010. Also, with regard to Albanians, Italy was the main 
receiving country, but while 47,600 residence permits were issued in 2010, this 
number had almost halved in 2011 and further decreased in 2012.
Immigration flows
Among all EU countries (14 in total), for which complete immigration 
flow data for citizens of Serbia, Montenegro, the FYROM, Albania and 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina over the years 2007-2011 were available, Italy, Slovenia, 
Sweden and Germany are the most relevant ones when it comes to recorded 
immigration. Unfortunately, data for some other potentially interesting EU 
Member States, such as France and the United Kingdom, are missing. It is per-
haps surprising that in all 14 cases immigration flows have tended to decrease 
following the introduction of visa-free travel. Most notably, in the case of Italy, 
the immigration of citizens of Serbia, Montenegro and the FYROM more than 
halved between 2008 and 2011. A similar, but even stronger, negative trend can 
be observed for Slovenia, which is interesting also due to its geographic prox-
imity. In Sweden, a geographically more remote but economically attractive 
country, the annual immigration levels regarding citizens of the Western Bal-
kan countries citizens respectively, decreased by around 27% between 2008 
and 2011. In the case of Germany, the trend points towards a very different 
direction. Here, the number of immigrants from the Western Balkan countries 
increased by nearly 75% between 2008 and 2011.
To conclude, the trend concerning the immigration of Western Balkans 
states’ citizens to the EU in 2008-2011 is inconsistent. While geographical-
ly close countries such as Italy and Slovenia witnessed strongly declining 
numbers, Sweden observed a less significant reduction, and Germany saw 
a strong increase. Figures for those EU Member States for which data was 
available, but which were not analysed in detail here, such as the Czechia, 
Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands or Spain, reveal either 
decreasing immigration flows or more or less stable levels. The fact that im-
migration to Germany apparently increased strongly can therefore certainly 
not be seen as a result of the citizens of Western Balkans being released from 
Schengen visa requirements. It appears much more likely that other reasons, 
socio-economic ones or family or networking contexts, affected these immi-
gration flows.
Table 20. Immigration from five Western Balkan countries to Italy, Slovenia, 
Sweden and Germany, 2007-2011
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
italy
serbia + Montenegro 4,904 5,637 4,822 5,121 1,576
fyroM 4,088 5,794 4,942 3,359 2,932
albania 23,292 35,715 27,493 22,591 16,613
bosnia-herzegovina 1,146 1,959 1,435 997 789
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
slovenia
serbia + Montenegro 6,451 4,496 3,020 1,176 1,254
fyroM 3,163 3,196 2,987 1,145 1,016
albania 16 17 34 10 7
bosnia-herzegovina 12,479 13,038 12,910 4,403 3,387
sweden
serbia + Montenegro 2,009 1,877 1,102 946 1,133
fyroM 184 304 255 252 305
albania 96 98 122 164 137
bosnia-herzegovina 584 607 538 516 520
germany
serbia + Montenegro 12,382 10,171 8,667 16,666 17,794
fyroM 2,334 2,308 2 ,399 7,585 5,679
albania 1,106 1,046 961 913 1,417
bosnia-herzegovina 6,403 6,154 6,145 6,920 9,533
source: Italy, Slovenia and Sweden: Eurostat database. Germany: Federal Statistical Office. Shaded cells 
mark the years in which Germany introduced visa-free travel for nationals of the respective countries.
Population stock
Eurostat only has complete data for citizens of Serbia, Montenegro and the 
FYROM, for 2008-2012 for 14 EU Member States only30. Another 13 Member 
States had to be left out of the timeline31. In the cases of citizens of Albania and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15 Member States (including Italy) had complete data 
at Eurostat for all years32.
Germany was the country in which most Serbian nationals resided in 2012, 
almost 214 thousand. In the period from 2008 to 2012, the number of Serbians 
residing there more than doubled. This development, however, was more than 
counter-balanced by the fact that the number of residents in Germany with 
a nationality of the Former Serbia and Montenegro, i.e. who had a passport 
issued before 2006, when Serbia and Montenegro as well as Kosovo were one 
country, decreased dramatically during the same period. 
30 Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Hungary, Netherlands, Po-
land, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden.
31 Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Por-
tugal, Romania and the United Kingdom.
32 Italy has the biggest resident population of Albanian citizens among all EU Member States 
by far (almost 500,000 in 2012).
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When we look at the numbers of citizens of Serbia, Montenegro and the FYROM 
living in the 14 EU MS in 2008-2012, we can see an overall upward trend. Visa 
liberalisation, however, does not seem to have accelerated this growth. It rath-
er seems that population growth became less intense after 2009, at least in 
the cases of Serbia and Montenegro. This finding would be well in line with 
the analysis of data on first residence permits above. Whenever immigration 
exceeds emigration (and/or fertility is greater than mortality), the number of 
foreigners residing in an EU Member State will increase, but when the number 
of first-time residence permits granted decreases, population growth will be 
slower than before. As far as Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina are concerned, 
the number of Albanians residing in EU Member States has continued to in-
crease after visa liberalisation, but the number of citizens of Bosnia-Herzego-
vina has decreased. 
Table 21. Foreign population in 14 EU Member States (citizens of Serbia,  
Montenegro and the FYROM)
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
serbia 136,809 175,777 213,167 233,506 251,492
Montenegro 3,379 7,896 12,483 15,812 18,665
fyroM 85,116 85,831 88,505 94,513 97,088
total 225,304 269,504 314,155 343,831 367,245
Table 22. Foreign population in 15 EU Member States (citizens of Albania  
and Bosnia-Herzegovina)
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
albania 419,591 459,426 485,949 503,175 518,324
bosnia-herzegovina 261,404 260,908 265,503 263,336 240,132
total 680,995 720,334 751,452 766,511 758,456
source: Eurostat database. Shaded cells mark the years in which Germany introduced visa-free travel 
for nationals of the respective countries
Asylum data
The abolition of visa requirements contributed to a significant increase in na-
tionals from the Western Balkan countries applying for asylum in some EU 
Member States. The number of first-time asylum applications lodged by Ser-
bians increased by more than 360% in 2010, as compared to 2009 (Table 7). The 
trend is even clearer for nationals from Macedonia, where almost ten times as 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
80
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
14
many applications were received in 2010, compared to the previous year. Mon-
tenegro does not matter much as a country of origin, in quantitative terms, but 
also in the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania, strong increases can be 
seen. The number of Albanian applicants increased by approximately 160% in 
2011, and by another 140% between 2011 and 2012. 
Table 23. New asylum applications by citizens of Western Balkan countries  
in 27 EU Member States
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
serbia 5,360 3,205 14,765 10,650 13,635
Montenegro 105 190 340 540 1,105
fyroM 315 615 6,135 4,535 6,705
albania 620 1,305 1,095 2,860 6,875
bosnia and herzegovina 435 1,040 1,910 2,400 5,235
total 6,835 6,355 24,245 20,985 33,555
source: Eurostat database. Shaded cells mark the years in which Germany introduced visa-free travel 
for nationals of the respective countries
To complement this overall picture, it should be noted that increases in the 
number of asylum applicants from the Western Balkans did not materialise in 
all EU Member States. Concerning applicants from Serbia, mainly Germany 
and Sweden were affected, and to a lesser degree, Denmark. In the case of Mac-
edonians, increases were significant in Germany, Belgium, France, the Neth-
erlands and Sweden. For applicants from Albania, this was noted by Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxemburg, Sweden and the UK. Finally, as far as Bosnian 
applicants are concerned, Germany, France and Sweden recorded increases. 
Analyses of these trends have shown that visa liberalization has made it easier 
and cheaper for citizens of the Western Balkan countries to travel to some EU 
Member States, and to apply for asylum there. If visa requirements had still 
been in place, they would have functioned as a filter, because the EU Member 
States do not grant visas for the purpose of seeking asylum.
Irregular immigration and overstaying
As a final analysis, the question may be posed as to whether the possibility of 
travelling to Schengen states without visas has been used by nationals of Ser-
bia, Montenegro, the FYROM, Albania or Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to stay 
there on an irregular basis, either without a residence permit, with expired 
documents or in excess of the time periods a person may stay as a traveller 
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(three months). Eurostat provides statistics on third-country nationals that 
are found to be “illegally present” in the EU. These are people who are detected 
by Member States’ authorities and have been determined to be illegally present 
under national immigration laws. To be regarded as “illegally present”, a per-
son must have been found to have entered illegally or entered legitimately and 
subsequently remained on an illegal basis (for example by overstaying their 
permission to remain or by taking unauthorised employment).
An analysis for the EU as a whole shows that the number of Serbian nation-
als who were found to be “illegally present” was higher in 2010 as compared 
to 2009, when the visa requirement was abolished. It then decreased in 2011 
and increased again in 2012. Additionally, in the case of Macedonian citizens, 
an increasing trend can be observed from the year in which visa-free travel 
became possible onwards. For nationals of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a rising trend 
can be seen, albeit not a very significant one. Albania should be regarded as 
a case apart, since extremely high numbers of irregular migrants were report-
ed by one country alone – Greece. While 72,660 Albanian nationals were found 
to be illegally present in the EU in 2008, Greece alone reported 65,000 cases. 
In 2011 and 2012, the numbers dropped dramatically – which is also only due to 
a dramatic decrease reported by Greece. For all other countries, an increasing 
trend can be observed. 
In sum, it seems legitimate to assume that the number of people staying on an 
irregular basis has increased after the introduction of visa-free travel. Wheth-
er there is a direct causal relationship is not clear, but if we see this trend in 
connection to the asylum trends described above, a causal link would make 
sense.
Table 24. Citizens of Western Balkan countries found to be “illegally present” 
in EU Member States, 2008-2012
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
serbia 13,315 8,335 12,050 9,315 10,475
Montenegro 350 310 365 390 450
fyroM 2,780 1,915 3,160 3,235 3,400
albania 2,660 68,985 52,375 17,220 18,610
bosnia-herzegovina 2,525 2,095 2,255 2,690 2,715
source: Eurostat database. Shaded cells mark the years in which Germany introduced visa-free travel 
for nationals of the respective countries
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Conclusions and possible lessons for future cases: Ukraine, Moldova  
and belarus
From the statistical case studies above, what can now be learned about the pos-
sible outcomes of visa liberalisation measures to be introduced for citizens of 
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus for short-term travel to the EU? The clearest 
result to emerge from the analysis of the Western Balkan countries examples 
is that visa liberalisation has had little or no effect on the number of first-time 
residence permits, or on immigration flows to EU Member States. Contrary to 
what might have been expected, the overall number of residence permits issued 
to nationals of these countries decreased rather than increased. Furthermore, 
the analysis of the available immigration flow data showed declining trends 
– with the notable exception of Germany. Only with regard to the number of 
nationals of Western Balkan countries living in the EU (population stocks) has 
there been an increasing trend – except for nationals of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
This could, however, be unrelated to the introduction of visa-free travel. In all 
cases, the number of residents of the Western Balkan countries in the EU had 
already been growing before visa liberalisation. When visa liberalisation fi-
nally occurred, the growth of the number of residents from these countries in 
EU Member States did not accelerate – in fact it slowed down. 
The only clearly positive relationship between visa liberalisation and migra-
tion was shown in the areas of asylum and, to a smaller degree, irregular stay. 
There, visa liberalisation almost certainly triggered increasing numbers, even 
if far from all EU Member States experienced this, and even if visa liberalisa-
tion itself may not have been the only contributory factor. The abolition of visa 
requirements could only have produced this effect because it coincided with 
other factors, such as enhanced transportation infrastructure and reduced 
transport costs, geographic proximity, socio-economic conditions and asylum 
seekers’ access to accommodation and benefits. There are also exceptions to 
this development, such as the case of Greece, where the number of nationals of 
Western Balkan countries who were found to be “illegally present” decreased 
markedly.
In a similar vein, the example of citizens moving to Germany from Poland, the 
Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Romania after visa liberalisation in 1991, 1999, 
2002 and 2003, respectively, further revealed that the impact of the introduc-
tion of visa-free travel on longer-term immigration and settlement was rather 
marginal, and that only with regard to asylum can some impact be assumed. 
The number of asylum seekers coming to Germany from these countries 
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quickly became insignificant, however, most probably due to improved politi-
cal and socio-economic conditions in the countries of origin. 
Whether any of these observations can have a bearing on possible future ex-
amples of countries being relieved from visa requirements, such as Moldova 
(which saw EU visa requirement lifted from April 2014), Ukraine and Belarus, 
is highly uncertain. If the effects of abolishing visa requirements were the 
same as in earlier cases, then we could expect the number of residence permits 
issued to nationals of these countries and overall immigration flows towards 
the EU to decrease, the number of nationals of these countries living in the EU 
to increase more slowly than before, and the number of asylum seekers to rise, 
at least in some Member States.
When we look at the number of residence permits granted by EU Member 
States to nationals of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, there is no clear pattern 
for the EU as a whole. The number of permits granted to nationals of Ukraine 
and Belarus has increased and was at a significantly higher level in 2012 as 
compared to 2008, while in the case of Moldova, immigration to the EU has 
moderated. One reason for this is that many Moldovan citizens have Romanian 
passports, which makes it easier for them to live and work in other EU Mem-
ber State. With regard to Ukrainians, the biggest country among these three, 
Poland was by far the leading country of destination within the EU, mainly 
due to its liberal immigration policy and geographical proximity. There, more 
than ten times as many Ukrainians were granted a residence permit (in most 
cases for temporary stay) in 2012 than in 2008. In Italy, which has also been an 
important destination country, the number of permits granted to Ukrainian 
nationals decreased strongly as a result of the economic crisis. The same is true 
for Czechia, Hungary and Spain. In Germany, a gradual increase could be seen, 
and in the United Kingdom, the number of permits granted to Ukrainians has 
remained roughly stable throughout the period 2008-2012. 
In the case of Belarus, Poland has been the most important country of destina-
tion within the EU for several years, and the number of first residence per-
mits granted to nationals of Belarus has risen strongly. In the other main des-
tination countries, such as Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the United Kingdom or 
Czechia, the number of residence permits granted has tended to decrease dur-
ing the five-year-period 2008-2012. All countries except Poland granted less 
than 1,000 residence permits in 2012. Similarly, the number of permits granted 
to Moldovans has declined or remained stable in almost all cases. Czechia, for 
example, issued more than 3,600 first-time residence permits to Moldovan 
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nationals in 2008, but only about 900 in 2012. The only notable exception from 
this trend is Poland, where around 4,700 permits were granted in 2012, com-
pared to less than 1,000 in 2008 and 2009. 
Table 25. Residence permits granted by 27 EU Member States to nationals 
of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, 2008-2012
  2008 2009 2010 2012
ukraine 115,770 87,740 166 ,945 163,083
belarus 12,644 9,848 10,406 29,649
Moldova 58,442 45,619 55,626 20,321
total 186,856 143,207 232,977 213,053
source: Eurostat database 
note: Data for 2011 were incomplete at Eurostat and therefore not included
As the experience of the Western Balkan countries has shown, it seems un-
likely that any future step in visa liberalisation will have a strong impact on 
immigration patterns. It appears more reasonable to assume that the number 
of residence permits granted responds to a certain degree on developments 
within the EU, such as changes in the economic situation and the possibilities 
for foreign nationals to legally immigrate for work reasons. Domestic factors 
in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, such whether or not there will be political 
stability and a positive economic outcome, will also most likely play a certain 
role. In the event of a protracted economic crisis in Ukraine, young people may 
decide to leave and to study or work in the EU. Others may try to find work in 
the EU on either a longer-term or – most probably – short-term basis, as sea-
sonal workers or circular migrants, for example. Since circular migration is 
the most prevalent immigration pattern of Eastern European migrants in the 
EU, visa liberalization may facilitate short-term immigration, depending how-
ever on whether or not EU Member States grant temporary residence permits 
for work purposes. 
As far as asylum is concerned, the political situation in Ukraine, and to a lesser 
degree in Belarus, will certainly have a strong impact. In the case of the West-
ern Balkan countries, the introduction of visa-free travel triggered a sharp 
increase in the number of people from these countries applying for asylum in 
some EU Member States. It would, however, be wrong to automatically assume 
that the same will happen in the case of the abandonment of visa obligations 
for nationals of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. According to Eurostat, 2,325 
nationals from Belarus, 1,590 from Ukraine and 840 from Moldova applied 
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for asylum in the EU in the years 2011 and 2012 – 4,755 people in total. When 
we compare this figure to the number of people from the Western Balkans 
that applied for asylum in the EU in the two years (2008 – 2009) preceding 
the introduction of visa-free travel, which amounted to more 13,000, this fig-
ure appears rather small – especially when we take into account the fact that 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova together have a population of almost 58 mil-
lion, while the Western Balkan countries only account for some 17 million. 
Thus, any dramatic development regarding the number of asylum applicants 
from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova coming to the EU as a result of an eventu-
al introduction of visa-free travel can practically be ruled out. The only “risk 
factor” in this context is the political situation in these countries. Protracted 
or aggravated instability in the Ukraine, for example, interference by Russia, 
separatist tendencies and uncertainty regarding the rights of minorities can 
rapidly change asylum patterns. 
Despite the assumptions and expectations presented here, one should bear in 
mind that any country has its specific socio-economic characteristics, history 
and relations with other countries in the wider region. Hence, in all cases, the 
factors encouraging citizens to emigrate, or discouraging them, will be differ-
ent, irrespective of the EU’s visa policy. However, as visa liberalisation did not 
have any measurable effect on longer-term migration trends regarding such di-
verse examples as Poland, the Baltic countries, Romania and Bulgaria, and later 
Serbia, Montenegro, the FYROM, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would 
be extremely surprising if a completely different pattern would emerge in the 
cases of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. It should be assumed that the extent to 
which citizens of these countries will immigrate to the EU, or seek asylum there, 
will depend on EU immigration provisions, economic developments both in the 
countries of origin and in the EU, and the political situation in the source coun-
tries. The question as to whether or not visa requirements are in place will af-
fect the possibilities of people to travel, but not so much their migration. What 
can be said, however, is that visa-free travel will widen the options of potential 
migrants since it saves them money and administrative difficulties. Other fac-
tors, such as whether EU Member States open up for circular migration, labour 
migration and temporary stay, or differences between salaries in countries of 
origin and destination, will most likely have a far greater impact. 
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1. MigraTion bETWEEn THE EU, V4 anD EasTErn 
EUroPE: THE PrEsEnT siTUaTion anD PossibLE 
FUTUrE THE PErsPECTiVE oF PoLanD 
Zuzanna brunarska, Magdalena Lesińska, Centre of Migration Research 
Foundation, Poland
introduction
Although Poland still is a net emigration country, its migration status has been 
changing, and the transformation process from an emigration country into an 
emigration-immigration country is (slowly but steadily) discernible. The size 
of the foreign population in Poland is growing, but is still marginal in com-
parison with other European Union states. Persons of foreign origin consti-
tute less than 1% of the resident population (National Population Census 2011). 
Moreover, Poland has the lowest proportion of foreign workers among the 
working population within OECD countries – 0.3%, while the average for OECD 
countries is 12%33.The inflows to Poland are predominantly of a temporary and 
circular character (as opposed to settlement migration), and the major groups 
of newcomers originate from the Eastern European neighbouring countries, 
Ukraine in particular.
Poland’s migration profile is shaped by several factors. Since the early 1990s, 
Poland, due to its geographical location, has been a transit area for people mov-
ing from the former USSR countries and Asia towards Western Europe. Among 
the factors of key importance which shape the migratory flows are: cultural 
proximity to the neighbouring Eastern European countries, migration policy 
which has recently become more and more open for foreigners, and migration 
networks which exist between Poland and its neighbours. The steady econom-
ic growth seen recently is also an important factor in increasing Poland’s at-
tractiveness as a destination country. 
Poland’s EU accession in 2004 was a key turning point in terms of the dynamics 
and trends of human inflows and outflows as well as legal and political devel-
opments within its migration policy. One of these effects related directly to mi-
gration flows was the obligatory implementation of the EU acquis communitare, 
33 OECD, International Migration Outlook 2010.
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including introduction of a visa regime towards third country residents, i.e. 
eastern neighbours, which was introduced in 2003 and fully implemented in 
2007, when Poland became a part of the Schengen zone. It had a powerful im-
pact on traditional migration channels existing between Poland and Eastern 
European countries. An even more significant effect arising from EU mem-
bership was the massive emigration of Poles, mainly to the UK and Ireland, 
especially shortly after accession. 2007 was a year when the outflow reached 
its peak and more than 2.3 million Poles (6.6% of the total population) were 
registered in other EU countries as temporary residents34. The unexpected 
mass outflow on the one hand, and steady economic growth and large invest-
ments in infrastructure and regional development on the other (also owing 
to EU structural funds), generated significant shortages in the labour market 
and growing demand for foreign workers, especially as regards seasonal jobs 
in agriculture. Processes such as serious depopulation (already noticeable in 
some regions), very low fertility rates and the process of population aging are 
expected to have a negative impact on Poland’s economy and Polish society in 
the long run. Therefore, migration policy has grown in importance. 
The endeavours of the Polish government to make Poland more attractive as 
a destination country are evident. They include, among others, a gradual sim-
plification of admission rules to the labour market for foreigners, addressed to 
citizens of EaP countries and Russia, as well as visa system liberalization and 
better integration of migrants already residing in Poland.
The main aim of this report is to present the current and future role of East-
ern European countries in shaping Poland’s migration profile. It consists of five 
main parts. The report starts with a brief description of Poland’s migration 
profile. The second section analyses the key determinants influencing the cur-
rent migration flows from Eastern Europe. The media and public discourse on 
migration in Poland is briefly summarized in the third part. The last two sec-
tions include a prognosis of migration inflows from Ukraine, Belarus and Mol-
dova as well as elaboration of the challenges, opportunities and risks potential 
flows may have, based on the Delphi survey on migration trends between EU/
V4 (Poland) and Eastern Europe carried out by the chapter’s authors. The Delphi 
survey was conducted from November 2013 to March 2014 among Polish migra-
tion experts representing academic institutions, NGOs, governmental bodies 
34 A. Fihel (ed.), Recent Trends in International Migration in Poland. The 2011 SOPEMI report, CMR 
Working Papers 52 (110), Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami UW, Warsaw 2011, Online: http://
www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/publ/1778/, p. 25.
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and international organisations. The survey was performed in two rounds, the 
first run involving 18 experts and the second among 17 experts.
immigration profile of Poland – a brief description
To reliably estimate the stock of the foreign population residing in Poland, sev-
eral data sources have to be taken into account. The last population census was 
completed in 2011 and shows the great ethnic homogeneity of Poland’s popula-
tion and the marginal number of foreigners among its residents. Almost 99.7% 
of people living in Poland are persons having Polish citizenship. Among the 
foreigners officially residing in Poland the most numerous groups are Ukrain-
ians (24,100), followed by Germans (9,200), Belarusians (7,500) and Russians 
(7,200). The overall number of foreigners registered in the census is very small 
(63,000). However, the category of ‘foreign citizens’ used in the census does not 
include all categories of migrants, e.g. temporary or irregular migrants, and 
thus the real number of foreigners residing in Poland may be much higher in 
reality.
The number of officially registered foreign residents in Poland has been in-
creasing year by year. According to the records of the Office for Foreigners, at 
the end of 2013 almost 121,000 foreign nationals with valid residence permits 
(of all kinds) were registered in Poland. About a half of all permits was issued 
for a fixed period of time, while 42% are permits for a long-term residence. 
The top ten nationalities include: Ukrainians (31% of all foreigners with valid 
residence permits), Vietnamese (11%), Russians (10%), Belarusians (9%), Chi-
nese and Armenians (4% each), Turks, Indians and Americans (2% each), and 
South Koreans (1.5%). Jointly, citizens of the three neighbouring countries 
(Ukraine, Russia and Belarus) constitute a half of the foreign population pos-
sessing residence permits in Poland. Additionally, at the end of 2013 around 
60,000 EU citizens registered their stay in Poland. Most of the EU citizens 
residing in Poland come from Germany, Italy, France, the UK, Bulgaria and 
Spain.
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Table 26. Number of foreigners with valid residence permits in Poland  
(as of 31.12.2013) according to different status of residence (top five countries)
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ukraine 7 17,959 2,198 142 1 17,372 37,679
vietnaM 1 4,340 1,947 368 4 6,744 13,404
russia 2,243 4 ,813 425 610 530 4,024 12 ,645
beLarus 15 7,077 367 38 92 3,570 11,159
China 4 514 259 16 – 4,223 5,016
all nationalities 2,446 51,027 7,490 1,838 888 57,529 121,218
* Tolerated stay is one of the protection statuses; it is granted e.g. to persons whose removal is impossible 
for practical or humanitarian reasons 
source: The Office of Foreigners (www.udsc.gov.pl)
There are additional important data sources related to the labour market which 
illustrate the scale and characteristics of foreigners’ inflows to Poland. There 
are two main legal schemes enabling foreigners to be employed in Poland: the 
work permits system and a simplified employment scheme (addressed to short 
term workers from five EaP countries and Russia). Both schemes have become 
progressively more popular over recent years. There has been a noticeable in-
crease in the number of issued work permits, from 12,300 in 2004 up to 39,000 
in 2013. Among the recipients the prevailing number are EaP states citizens. 
More than a half of all granted work permits have been issued annually to 
EaP states residents with Ukrainians receiving almost one-third of all work 
permits. A steady growth in the number of workers coming from the Balkan 
states and from Asia to Poland has been also evident recently – mainly from 
China (which is a direct effect of Chinese companies’ investments in Poland). 
A steady increase is also noticeable in the number of foreign students coming 
to Poland. In the academic year 2012/2013 the number of foreign students regis-
tered in higher education institutions in Poland reached 24,253 persons, more 
than a half of which were students from EaP countries (13,500 persons), and 
the most numerous groups were Ukrainians (9,474) and Belarusians (3,388) 
who constituted 33.4% and 11.6% of all foreign students in Poland respectively35.
35 Data according to Raport Studenci zagraniczni w Polsce 2013 [Foreign students in Poland 2013].
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Other categories of migrants include asylum seekers and undocumented mi-
grants. At the end of 2013, the number of persons having valid stay permits 
under different forms of protection in Poland reached 5,100 (including 888 
refugees, 2,446 persons with status of tolerated stay, and 1,838 with status of 
complementary protection). However, a significant increase in the number of 
applications for refugee status was noticeable in the last two years. The highest 
number of applications ever was registered in 2013 (15,000). The vast major-
ity of asylum claims were submitted by citizens of Russia (almost 85%, mostly 
persons declaring Chechen nationality), followed by Georgians (8%), Syrians 
(2%), Armenians (1%) and Kazakhs (1%). Most of these applications were reject-
ed as manifestly unfunded. In 2013, only 1% of all the applicants who asked for 
protection were granted refugee status according to the Geneva Convention, 
additionally 1.5% was granted status of tolerated stay and 0.5% were granted 
complementary protection.
Although estimating the number of undocumented migrants is very problem-
atic, the most popular nationalities among this group may be identified based 
on information obtained from migrant regularisation programs. Throughout 
the whole regularisation campaign which took place in the first half of 2012, 
the number of registered applications reached 9,500. Among the top nationali-
ties whose representatives applied for legal status in Poland were citizens of 
Vietnam (23% of all applications) and Ukraine (21%)36.
It may be assumed that there are at least 120,000 foreigners currently legally 
residing in Poland, and that half of them are settled migrants. Additionally, the 
number of seasonal foreign workers amounts to around 250,000 a year. What 
has to be underlined is that the temporary (seasonal, circular) type of inflows 
clearly dominates. The interest in permanent settlement in Poland among for-
eigners is rather limited. Moreover, existing legal and political frameworks 
(related to admission, stay and employment) provide an opportunity to cir-
culate, encouraging and sustaining short-term mobility, and at the same time 
they discourage long-term or settlement migration.
The Delphi survey on migration trends between EU/V4 and Eastern Europe 
conducted in Poland revealed that according to expert knowledge, the number 
of migrants from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in Poland oscillates around 
36 Ministry of Interior of Poland, Polityka migracyjna Polski w odniesieniu do obywateli Republiki 
Białorusi, Ukrainy i Federacji Rosyjskiej [Migration policy of Poland in relation to citizens of 
Belarus, Ukraine and Russian Federation], Warsaw 2012, p. 35.
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the figures of 240,000, 58,000 and 4,400 respectively (arithmetic means from 
experts’ estimations were calculated; estimates were given by 15 experts for 
Ukrainians, 11 for Belarusians and 13 in the case of Moldovans). Moreover, the 
experts estimated that irregular migrants in Poland account for about 45% of 
all migrants in the case of Ukrainians, 26% for Belarusians and 29% for Mol-
dovans. Importantly, a broad definition of irregular migration was used in the 
survey, thus including both irregular stay and unregistered work. As regards 
Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans, their irregular status lies mainly in 
undertaking work without registration while being in possession of a valid 
residence or stay permit. Moreover, experts assessed that Ukrainian migrants 
prefer circular migration, are involved in manual labour (e.g. in agriculture, 
construction and household services), and do not experience problems commu-
nicating with Poles. As regards Belarusians, experts agreed that migrants are 
involved in manually demanding jobs and can communicate in Polish, while 
in the case of Moldovans they acknowledged only the former. Although this 
may imply that Belarusian and Moldovan migrants do not follow such clear 
behavioural patterns as Ukrainians, it may also indicate that knowledge about 
Belarusian and Moldovan migration is significantly less than that of Ukrain-
ian nationals (and thus the experts have more frequently chosen the answer 
‘maybe yes, maybe no’).
Main determinants of immigration processes to Poland 
The key advantages of Poland as a destination country influencing the scale, 
trends and sources of current inflows are as follows: 1) the growing attractive-
ness of Poland as a result of its recent economic development, 2) increasing de-
mand for foreign workers in some sectors of the economy, 3) recent liberalisa-
tion of the rules related to admission and employment of foreigners, 4) political 
developments addressed to particular groups perceived as desirable, such as 
students and foreigners of Polish origin.
Poland has seen stable economic growth in time of severe worldwide recession 
over recent years. Moreover, thanks to EU funds and structural and foreign 
investments, Poland’s attractiveness increased (especially in comparison with 
Southern European countries which have faced economic crisis and rapidly 
growing unemployment in recent years). Not only return migration of Poles 
but also the inflow of foreigners from different (sometimes very ‘exotic’ coun-
tries like China, Philippines or India) is becoming more apparent. The mass 
post-accession emigration of Poles on the one hand, and economic development 
on the other, in short time brought about serious labour market shortages and 
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growing demand for foreign workers. It was particularly noticeable in agri-
culture and construction. Therefore, there was intensive pressure exerted by 
employers on the government to simplify the rules regarding employment of 
foreign nationals, particularly for short-term contracts and seasonal jobs.
As a result of these overlapping processes, a complementary scheme to the 
work permit system was introduced in 2006 (and came into operation in the 
mid-2007) to support short-term circular labour migration. It is based on an 
employer’s declaration of intent to employ a foreigner and allows citizens of 
six countries (initially Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, and since 2009 Moldova 
and Georgia, and from 2014 Armenia) to perform work in Poland for up to six 
months within a period of twelve consecutive months without a work permit. 
The employer’s declaration scheme implemented as a pilot project has evolved 
into the most significant formula for the employment of foreigners in Poland.
The number of work visas issued based on employer’s declarations has grown 
from 142,000 in 2008 to 217,000 in 2013. More than 90% of them have been is-
sued to citizens of Ukraine, followed by citizens of Moldova and Belarus, while 
in the case of Russians and Georgians it remains at a very moderate level. Mi-
grants mostly undertake employment in low-skilled and low paid jobs (some-
times despite possessing a high level of education).
Figure 6. The employer declarations to hire a foreigner by country of origin  
in Poland in 2007-2013
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Ukraine Belarus Russia Moldova Georgia
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source: Ministry of Labour and Social Policy of Poland
Although the level of wages in Poland may be perceived as a pull factor at first 
sight as average wages are much higher than in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, 
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it is not necessarily the most important factor when choosing Poland as a des-
tination country.
Figure 7. Annual average monthly wages in EaP countries and Poland in 2012
Belarus Moldova Poland Ukraine
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source: Belstat; statbank.statistica.md; zus.pl; Ukrstat37
First of all, wages in Poland are not so attractive when compared to Western 
European states. Secondly, it has to be taken into account that migrants usual-
ly earn less than the average wage in the host country (both because migrants’ 
earnings are in general lower than those of the natives and because they main-
ly work in sectors which include worse paid jobs).
In July 2012, the Council of Ministers adopted the policy document entitled 
Migration Policy of Poland – the Current State and Postulated Actions38 as a result 
of multi-year work by an inter-ministry group coordinated by the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs. This document recommends determining priority groups 
of migrants which should be treated according to preferential rules of admis-
sion. Among others, three groups are singled out: foreigners of Polish origin, 
students and scientists, and the self-employed. In particular, the first group 
deserves close attention due to special legal provisions addressed to them.
37 Calculated using official exchange rates available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
PA.NUS.FCRF.
38 Ministry of Interior, Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działania [Migra-
tion policy of Poland – the current state and the postulated actions], Warsaw 2012. 
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There is a long-lasting tradition of political measures addressed to individuals 
of Polish origin residing abroad (diaspora policy) who may be willing to resettle 
to Poland. The current repatriation wave, actively stimulated by Polish author-
ities, started in the early 1990s. In time, the interest in repatriation has become 
marginal (only 120 repatriation visas were issued in 2012). In general, the larg-
est group of incoming repatriates originated from four countries: Kazakhstan, 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Due to problems with financing the repatriation 
scheme and its limited effectiveness, the Card of the Pole (Karta Polaka) was 
implemented in 2007 as a substitutive measure. It is addressed to foreigners 
of Polish origin who are citizens of the former Soviet Union states. The Card of 
the Pole entitles the holder, among other things, to apply for a free-of-charge 
multiple-entry visa to Poland, to procure employment without a work per-
mit, and to study on the same basis as Polish citizens. The Card circumvents 
the most difficult legal obstacles, such as the obligation to have a work permit 
and the need for frequent visa application procedures, and therefore serves as 
a pull factor for migration. Its growing popularity is reflected in the numbers. 
In 2008-2012, more than 100,000 Cards were issued, approximately 90% to cit-
izens of Ukraine and Belarus, far fewer were issued to Lithuanians, Russians 
and other nationalities. 
The data on border crossing movements shows that entry to the Schengen zone 
and restrictions on visas and the border control system had an impact on the 
number of people coming to Poland from the eastern neighbouring countries 
(although the visa regime was introduced for neighbouring countries in 2003 
and until 2007 visas for Ukrainians were issued free of charge). The data from 
Polish Border Guards show that there was a serious drop just after the visa 
regime’s introduction, but shortly afterwards the number of border crossings 
at the Eastern border again increased. This means that people have gained 
awareness of the new rules and got used to application procedures over time. 
An important determinant influencing migration flows are admission rules, 
including visas and border control. Problems stem from both the visa appli-
cation system (including online registration and long queues in front of the 
Polish consulates), and daily reality at the border crossing points. These dif-
ficulties have been frequently investigated by mass media and NGOs, and were 
a subject of serious criticism39. The fact that Polish consulates have issued the 
39 See e.g. M. Kindler, E. Matejko, Gateways to Europe. Checkpoints on the EU External Land Bor-
der. Monitoring Report, Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw 2008, Online: http://www.mi-
gracje.uw.edu.pl/download/publikacja/408/;
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largest number of visas (all kinds – national and Schengen ones) for citizens of 
Ukraine and Belarus among the EU countries over recent years makes the prob-
lem even more relevant. The majority of visas issued by Polish consulates are 
short-term uniform Schengen visas (79% of all visas issued in 2013). Moreover, 
more than 90% of all visas were issued for just three nationalities: Ukrainians, 
Belarusians and Russians40. There has been a stable increase in the number of 
short-term Schengen visas issued by Polish consulates since 2008, in particu-
lar regarding Ukrainians. The visa statistics confirms marginal interest from 
Moldovans in making visits to Poland, which is unsurprising given the fact 
that there are other attractive destinations in its immediate neighbourhood. 
Among the declared purposes on visa applications, the most popular is busi-
ness (21% in 2013), tourism (20%), and employment (14%).
Figure 8. Visas (Schengen visas, type C) issued by Poland for citizens 
of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova (2005-2013)
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source: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/in-
dex_en.htm
In the first round of the Delphi survey, experts were asked to assess the im-
portance of the current main push and pull factors determining migration of 
Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans to Poland. As regards Ukraine, ex-
perts evaluated the most important factor to be geographic proximity between 
Poland and Ukraine and low travel costs. The second most important factor 
J. Konieczna-Sałamatin, E. Świdrowska, P. Wołowski, Granica do naprawy. Problemy po-
granicza Polski i Ukrainy [The border to be repaired. The problems of Poland’s and Ukra-
ine’s borderland]. Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw 2012, Online: http://www.batory.org.
pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Otwarta%20Europa/Granica_do_naprawy.pdf
40 Raport polskiej służby konsularnej za 2013 rok [Consular Service of Poland Report 2013], De-
partment of Consular Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw 2014.
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proved to be migration networks (the presence of relatives or close friends al-
ready staying and working in Poland). The third most important factor con-
cerned, in the opinion of experts, the relatively liberal visa and migration 
policy in Poland. As far as Belarus is concerned, experts ranked the first three 
most important factors as follows: 1) geographic proximity and low travel costs, 
2) cultural and language proximity and 3) political oppression and/or destabi-
lization of the political situation in the sending country. In the case of Moldova, 
poverty and social tensions in the country of origin and higher wages in Poland 
were perceived by experts as most important. 
An interesting finding was obtained from the question concerning the impact of 
the economic crisis of 2008-2012 on immigration patterns. The majority of ex-
perts claim that the number of migrants from Ukraine grew, while the minority 
stated the same for Belarus and Moldova. Although in the case of Moldovans it 
is not surprising, in the case of Belarusians it may seem somewhat unexpected 
taking into account the fact that in 2011 the Belarusian economy underwent a se-
vere economic crisis, which resulted in intensified labour migration outflows. It 
may result from the fact that Russia is an indisputable leader among destination 
countries for Belarusian migrants41 and it has attracted most of those departing 
due to the crisis or from the fact that knowledge of Belarusian migration is much 
lower among Polish migration experts than that of Ukrainian.
Media and public discourse on migration
On the one hand, the problem of immigration and foreigners residing in Poland 
has not been a subject of any profound public, political or media debate over 
the last few decades. It is an exceptional phenomenon in the EU, where gener-
ally immigration is one of the hottest topics of public discourse and political 
campaigns, and at the same time is widely discussed in mass media. On the 
other hand, the mass emigration of Poles (in the post-accession wave) became 
a subject of public and political debate (it is also frequently present in the me-
dia) as well as being included in political parties’ programmes during election 
campaigns.
The non-existence of a debate on migration in Poland could easily be explained 
by the fact of ‘invisibility’ of foreigners in Polish society which is currently 
41 See Z. Brunarska, M. Lesińska, Poland as a(n) (un)attractive destination for Belarusian labour 
migrants, CMR Working Paper 70/128, 2014 (online: http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/pub-
likacja/rodzaj/CMR/).
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one of the most homogenous in Europe (in terms of cultural, ethnic, religious 
and linguistic diversity). There is a marginal number of settled migrants re-
siding in Poland, moreover most of them come from neighbouring countries 
and have no serious integration problems due to their cultural and linguistic 
proximity. Other immigrant groups, such as the Vietnamese, are generally in-
group oriented, concentrated in particular locations in the largest cities, with 
very limited contacts with their Polish neighbours in daily life (yet the social 
self-isolation of Vietnamese communities does not create any problems or ten-
sions between them and Polish inhabitants). Another important factor is that 
foreigners living in Poland are generally not perceived as a threat of any kind, 
which is often the case in traditional immigration countries, where migrants 
are accused of increasing unemployment, criminality and being a burden to 
the welfare system. Moreover, the conflicts or incidents of racial or ethnic 
background against foreigners recorded in the police statistics are rather mar-
ginal in scale.
The studies analysing perceptions towards foreigners in the Polish media con-
clude that a positive message prevails, focusing on the advantages stemming 
from immigration for a destination country and its society42. Among the public 
institutions involved in discourse on immigration, the most active are NGOs 
and a few administrative bodies, such as the Department of Migration Policy 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is directly responsible for migration 
policy. The increase of migrants’ presence in the public sphere and media is 
visible whenever a new legal act or political measure related to foreigners is 
introduced, e.g. the last regularisation program in 2012 or the presentation of 
a draft of the new alien act a year later. These are the rare occasions when the 
mass media also showed an interest (at least for a while) in issues related to for-
eigners. Usually they are absent from public or political discourse at any level. 
Even the important modifications in migration law (such as liberalisation of 
labour market admission rules for foreigners or the new alien act) have not 
been a subject of wider interest or debate in the Polish parliament, not to speak 
of any dispute among political parties.
Foreign residents have no voting rights at any level (with the exception of EU 
citizens). They are not represented in any labour union or political party in 
Poland. This could be an explanation for why immigration-related issues are 
42 I. Jóźwiak, J. Konieczna-Sałamatin, M. Tudorowski, „Bez cudzoziemców bylibyśmy ubożsi”. 
Wizerunek obcokrajowców na łamach polskiej prasy [Without immigrants we would be poorer. 
The image of foreigners in Polish Press], The Institute of Public Affairs 2010, Warsaw.
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absent from the agendas of political parties. Moreover, although foreigners 
have the right to establish associations, their number and impact is rather lim-
ited. There is no institution – such as a consultative or advisory body – that 
functions as a forum for communication between immigrants and authorities 
at the central level. In practice, it also means that immigrants and their or-
ganizations are very rarely visible in the media – at the same time in the public 
or political sphere.
In the Delphi survey, experts were asked whether visa abolishment for EaP 
country nationals is an important topic for the general public and in politi-
cal debate in Poland. The overwhelming majority claimed that this topic is not 
important for the general public. The results regarding political debate were 
more surprising – only about half of the experts stated that visa abolishment 
for EaP countries does not constitute an important topic. This may, however, be 
explained by the fact that although the subject of immigration in general is not 
a relevant element of political debate, practical measures that could be imple-
mented in this domain, such as visa abolishment, arouse more interest. In the 
Delphi survey, the question related to attitudes to visa abolishment manifested 
by certain actors was also asked. The figure below summarizes the results ob-
tained.
Figure 9. Are those actors favourable to visa abolition for Eastern Partnership 
countries? (answers for Poland)
General public Politicians Business circlesState officials
/ administration
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source: Delphi survey Poland 2013-2014
As we can see, the group perceived as the most favourably disposed to Schen-
gen visas abolition is that of business circles. This is hardly surprising, given 
the fact that this is the group that would potentially benefit most from immi-
gration (as it includes employers).
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The general conclusion is that the mass media (and public opinion in general) 
are not interested in issues related to immigration and foreigners in Poland. 
Although mass media as a basic, and often the only source of information, have 
a powerful impact on shaping public opinion and mainstream discourse on mi-
gration and foreigners, they do not fulfil their mission as a reliable source of 
information and for raising the awareness of Polish society on this subject at 
any level.
Prognosis of immigration – a brief summary
It is not easy to forecast future migration trends, especially in a situation of 
scarcity of data due to the informal character of part of the ongoing migration 
processes as is the case in Ukrainian, Belarusian and Moldovan migration to 
Poland. Moreover, the current political situation in Ukraine makes the poten-
tial prognoses as regards this country of origin especially weak.
In the Delphi survey, migration experts were asked to give their prognosis 
of future immigration trends to Poland from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. 
Asked if the dynamics of migration flows should change in the next decade, 
most of the experts who answered this question gave an affirmative response, 
predicting an increase in the case of Ukrainian migrants, while only a few ex-
perts foresaw that the situation will remain stable. The main arguments for an 
increase listed by experts included: economic and political crisis in Ukraine 
coupled with growing demand for foreign labour in Poland. In the case of Be-
larusian and Moldovan migration, fewer experts predicted an increase, while 
more opted for the status quo. Some experts claimed, however, that changes 
might occur provided that an active recruitment policy is implemented in Po-
land. In the case of Moldova, an argument was also raised that compared to 
other EU destinations, Poland is not and will not in the nearest future become 
an attractive destination country for Moldovans and, moreover, Moldova’s mi-
gration potential has already been largely depleted.
Furthermore, most of the experts predicted that there will also be transfor-
mations in migrants’ economic performance. Experts pointed to the fact that 
migrants will be employed in more diversified sectors, including occupying 
highly skilled positions, according to their qualifications. Therefore, and due 
to the predicted growing demand for labour in Poland, their wages are ex-
pected to grow. These prognoses may come to pass, especially if there follows 
an increase in enrolment to Polish universities by students of Ukrainian, Be-
larusian and Moldovan origin. Such a scenario is likely given the decreasing 
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number of secondary school graduates in Poland, and the survival strategies 
undertaken by institutions of higher education aimed at attracting foreign 
students. As regards the future of Poland’s migration policy, the experts were 
unanimous that it will undergo change and become more liberal, as will be 
necessitated by a growing demand for labour and the worsening demographic 
situation in Poland.
Experts were also questioned on what they would expect to happen in a short-
term horizon of three years if visas for short-term travel (up to 90 days) for 
Ukrainian, Belarusian and Moldovan nationals to the Schengen area were 
abolished (they were asked to choose the three most probable options), in order 
to find out whether in their opinion there is a link between visa liberalisation 
and migration patterns. The figure below shows the most frequent responses.
Figure 10. What do you expect to happen (in a short-term horizon of three 
years) in Poland if visas for short-term travel for up to 90 days for Ukrainian, 
Belarusian and Moldovan nationals to the Schengen area are abolished? (most 
frequent answers)43
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source: Delphi survey Poland 2013-2014
As far as Ukrainians are concerned, most of the experts who answered this 
question marked moderate inflow of labour migrants as one of the three most 
possible scenarios. In second place, experts placed possible growth in irregular 
employment and regularisation of existing labour migrants. In the case of Be-
larusians, the most likely outcomes were indicated as follows: moderate inflow 
of labour migrants, more long-term settlement migration and regularisation of 
43 16 experts answered this question for Ukrainians, 13 – for Belarusians and 14 – for Moldovans.
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the already present labour migrants. As regards Moldovans, the most signifi-
cant were: moderate inflow of migrants, increase of irregular employment and 
more long-term settlement migration and regularisation of those migrants al-
ready present. There were only single responses predicting significant chang-
es in migration processes – mass inflows of labour migrants, or the contrary 
– a decrease in the number of labour migrants.
As for prospects for visa abolition for short-term travel to the EU, for Ukrain-
ians the majority of experts were convinced that visas will be abolished in no 
later than six years (6 out of 15 indicated a 2-3 year horizon; 8 indicated a 4-6 
year horizon). The main obstacles included: the current political crisis in 
Ukraine, slow progress in implementation of the EU-Ukraine Visa Liberalisa-
tion Action Plan and the lack of political will to liberalize on the EU level. As 
regards Belarus, the experts were more sceptical: most of them (8 out of 12) 
opted for long-term future (seven years and more), while the rest argued it will 
happen within four to six years. Here the experts supported their opinion with 
arguments on the political situation in Belarus, its dependence on Russia and 
its lukewarm relations with the EU. As far as Moldova is concerned, visas for 
short-term travel for Moldovan citizens were already abolished by the EU in 
late April this year.
The experts were also asked what they predict to happen provided that Po-
land lifts restrictions on access to the labour market for Ukrainian, Belaru-
sian and Moldovan nationals, which seems to currently be the most important 
legal obstacle for Eastern European migrants wishing to work in the EU. As 
regards Ukrainians, most of the experts (11 out of 16) predicted a rise in mi-
gration inflow from Ukraine over a three year horizon after the restrictions 
are abolished, while the minority of them foresaw that it will become much 
higher and additionally, one person indicated no changes at all. In the case of 
Belarus, experts were even more unanimous – the majority of them predicted 
higher (but not much higher – this option was selected by only one expert) in-
flow, while only two respondents expected no changes. Regarding Moldova, 
opinions were more divided: some expected higher inflow of migrants, others 
foresaw no changes whereas some predicted much higher inflows.
The Delphi survey started at the end of the year 2013 when the political crisis 
in Ukraine had just begun. Since then the situation in the country has changed 
dramatically and Russian occupation of Crimea has additionally influenced 
the propensity to migrate for the inhabitants of Ukraine, and of Crimea in 
particular. Moreover, seeking to prevent the results from being biased due 
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to placing undue emphasis on short-term effects, experts were asked to con-
centrate on general trends and were not asked to comment on the Ukrainian 
crisis explicitly. Theoretically, it is possible that Ukrainian migrants abroad 
will re-orientate towards the EU, provided that Russia tightens its regula-
tions towards them. As Russia occupies first place among receiving states for 
Ukrainian labour migrants, potential inflow to the EU may possibly grow. 
However, Poland is definitely not the most desirable destination for migrants 
who previously occupied higher status positions in Russia and who would 
not be satisfied with unskilled, low-paid jobs in agriculture, construction or 
household services in Poland, and thus for them it may function more in the 
role of a transit country.
Challenges, opportunities and risks of further immigration
The potential increase in migration to Poland may involve both possible risks 
and bring new opportunities. However, taking into account the character-
istics of migrants coming to Poland from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova – 
especially their cultural closeness, minor integration problems and high 
economic activity – the most frequently mentioned risks are actually mini-
mised. This observation is in line with the results of the Delphi survey. The 
surveyed respondents rated the possible rise in xenophobia or ethnic prob-
lems connected with immigration from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as un-
important. Similarly, they do not expect any problems with integration of 
these migrants, nor do they predict that future immigration may lead to the 
growth of unemployment or place an additional burden on the social services 
system. As far as the integration of migrants is concerned, experts were more 
uncertain in the case of Moldova – the results obtained show that according 
to the respondents Moldovans may encounter some integration problems. 
An argument often raised in immigration countries – that the presence of 
migrants drives down wages and that they constitute competition for local 
workers – was not regarded as an important risk connected to future migra-
tion of Ukrainian, Belarusian and Moldovan nationals to Poland. The figure 
below summarizes the assessment of potential negative impacts of Ukrain-
ian, Belarusian and Moldovan immigration to Poland by those experts tak-
ing part in the Delphi survey.
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Figure 11. Negative impacts of future migration from Ukraine, Belarus 
and Moldova to Poland (average answers)44
Rise of xenophobia
and ethnic problems
in the society
Problems
with migrants’
integration
Rise
of unemployment
Burdens on social
services system
Driving down
wages and unfair
competition
for local workers
Ukrainians Belarusians Moldovans
1
2
3
4
5
5-most important; 4-important; 3-neither important, nor unimportant; 2-unimportant; 1-least important
source: Delphi survey Poland 2013-2014
As far as opportunities connected with Eastern European migration to Poland 
are concerned, none of the experts surveyed stated that she/he ‘does not see any 
positive impacts’ which migration from these countries may have. As the most 
important positive impact of immigration from Ukraine, respondents identified 
the fact that it compensates for labour shortages, including the supply of a la-
bour force possessing sought-after vocational skills, and that it attracts new stu-
dents to the Polish educational system. As regards Belarusians, opportunities 
connected with the possibility of attracting new students and bringing ethnic 
compatriots home obtained the highest average rank. What is interesting here is 
that this point was assessed as a slightly more important in the case of Belarus 
as in the case of Ukraine. The other two positive impacts rated as important for 
Ukraine (‘filling labour market shortages’ and ‘bringing required labour force 
with vocational skills’), were evaluated as slightly less important in the case of 
Belarusian migrants, which may be explained by differences in population size 
and thus migration potential between these countries.
The experts participating in the Delphi survey were not overly enthusiastic 
regarding the chances for mitigating the consequences of the demographic 
crisis which lies in store for Poland. Naturally, potential future Ukrainian mi-
gration got the highest placing in this domain among the three countries of 
origin, while Moldova the lowest. In general, Moldovan migration proved to 
be identified as having the least important impact in all domains, which is not 
44 Each point has been ranked by at least 11 experts from whose answers the arithmetic mean 
has been calculated.
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surprising given the fact that Poland does not constitute a particularly popular 
destination. The figure below presents the average of ranks given to potential 
positive impacts from Ukrainian, Belarusian and Moldovan immigration to 
Poland as assessed by the experts taking part in the Delphi survey.
Figure 12. Positive impacts of future migration from Ukraine, Belarus 
and Moldova to Poland (average answers)
Filling labour
market shortages
Mitigating
consequences
of demographic 
crisis
Bringing required
labour force
with vocational
skills 
Bringing
highly skilled
migrants
Bringing
ethnic
compatriots
home
Bringing
new students into
the educational
system
Ukrainians Belarusians Moldovans
1
2
3
4
5
5-most important; 4-important; 3-neither important, nor unimportant; 2-unimportant; 1-least important.
source: Delphi survey Poland 2013-2014
Experts were also asked to assess whether it lies in Poland’s interest to attract 
ethnic Poles living in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Most of the experts who 
answered this question gave an affirmative response. The most frequently cited 
arguments supporting this opinion include: the importance of this measure in 
light of the current demographic situation in Poland and future labour market de-
mand and the fact that those people will easily integrate with Polish society. Two 
experts argued that migrants of Polish origin will be more easily accepted by so-
ciety than foreigners not possessing Polish roots. Those experts who represent-
ed the opposite view point of view referred to the fact that Polish descent should 
not be treated as a key determinant in defining the most desirable immigrants.
Asked whether abolition of short-term Schengen visas for Ukrainian, Belaru-
sian and Moldovan nationals is desirable from Poland’s perspective, experts 
almost unanimously gave a positive answer. First of all, experts think that 
simplification of entry rules is important in light of a shrinking working age 
population in Poland. Moreover, experts also drew attention to the fact that it 
would enable the strengthening of neighbourhood cooperation with Eastern 
European states and positively influence mutual relations. Some experts also 
argued that this step may be perceived as a soft-power measure since it may 
improve Poland’s image in these countries and help to promote democracy, in 
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particular among Belarusian citizens. Furthermore, visa abolition will facili-
tate circular migration and contribute to an increase in the number of tourists 
and shopping visits to Poland.
Taking into account the challenges associated with population decline and 
population aging facing Poland, it is clear that Poland has to turn to foreign la-
bour forces to compensate for population losses and to maintain the social and 
pension system. Moreover, another argument in favour of attracting workers 
from abroad is the fact that immigrants only compete with local workers to 
a limited extent as they usually hold jobs in sectors which are relatively un-
popular among Poles. Immigrants tend to occupy positions in such sectors as 
agriculture, construction and household services. The labour demand in some 
of these sectors, e.g. elderly care, will certainly grow. In addition, Western Eu-
ropean experience shows that these are usually immigrants who are employed 
e.g. as senior care assistants.
What seems to be one of the challenges of future migration from Ukraine, Bela-
rus and Moldova to Poland is the problem of irregular migration. Irregular sta-
tus of stay or employment translates into losses both for Poland as a receiving 
country (as it means losses to the state budget as irregular workers do not pay 
taxes) and for migrants themselves (as they are not protected by the labour law 
and are not entitled to certain benefits, e.g. social benefits). Therefore, the state 
has to support legal employment and create the conditions whereby regulari-
zation becomes profitable both for Polish employers and immigrants. Another 
challenge concerns the problem of transit migration – Poland may prove not to 
be attractive enough to make the migrants stay long-term.
Conclusions
Poland is still in a transition period from emigration to an immigration coun-
try, and it is not obvious when and whether it will be completed, and to what 
extent Poland follows the cases of Western and Southern European countries 
in the migration cycle. Emigration still dominates. Although the inflow of for-
eigners is increasing, it is mainly of a short term and circular character. More-
over, immigration is not yet a subject of widespread debate in Poland, nor do 
the media devote much attention to this theme.
Taking into account the economic stability and social developments which have 
taken place in the last decade, it can be expected that the attractiveness of Po-
land as a destination country will grow, in particular for citizens of Eastern 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
108
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
14
European countries. This opinion was confirmed by experts participating in the 
Delphi survey conducted among Polish migration experts in 2013-2014. Migra-
tion policy remains one of the key factors influencing the scale and character 
of immigration trends. The legal framework shapes migrants’ opportunities re-
lated to admission. The entry and stay requirements (including visas) are barri-
ers which have a real impact on migration decisions. Also, the rules regulating 
access of foreigners to the labour market are important and may act as a pull 
factor for potential labour migrants. Migration policy in Poland has changed sig-
nificantly over recent years towards a more open and friendly approach to new-
comers, especially as regards Poland’s eastern neighbours. The simplified sys-
tem for employment of foreign workers proved to be a positive measure which 
has attracted quite a significant number of short term workers, especially from 
Ukraine. Poland’s authorities are also promoting a visa free regime for nationals 
from Eastern Partnership countries. Further liberalisation of migration policy 
is only a matter of time, this is also the considered opinion of the overwhelming 
majority of experts surveyed. This trend towards a more controlled opening up 
for enhanced mobility (including migration) is perceived as positive and in line 
with Polish state interests in sustaining economic and demographic growth, ac-
cording to the Delphi experts. However, whether these improvements bring de-
sirable effects depends on many factors, including the future economic and po-
litical situation in the sending countries (particularly in Ukraine) and economic 
developments in Poland.
Migration from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova is expected to grow in the com-
ing years, especially as regards Ukraine, while the number of Moldovan mi-
grants is not expected to grow markedly. Furthermore, a potential increase, 
in particular regarding Belarusians, depends on the effectiveness of an active 
recruitment policy conducted by Polish authorities towards foreigners. In the 
future, labour migrants from these countries in Poland are expected to occupy 
more diversified sectors and be more frequently employed in positions reflect-
ing their qualifications. Liberalisation of admission procedures towards east-
ern neighbours, such as EU uniform short-term visas abolishment or – more 
importantly – lifting restrictions in access to the labour market, is expected to 
lead to growth in migration inflows, albeit not a very high growth. However, as 
was pointed out by some of the experts interviewed, visa abolition may lead to 
a growth in irregular employment. That is why it seems reasonable to alleviate 
restrictions in access to the labour market simultaneously with the introduc-
tion of changes concerning the visa regime (e.g. by prolonging the period for 
which employer’s declarations are valid).
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2. MigraTion bETWEEn THE EU, V4 anD EasTErn 
EUroPE: THE PrEsEnT siTUaTion anD THE PossibLE 
FUTUrE. THE PErsPECTiVE oF CZECHia 
Dita Čermáková, Faculty of Science, Charles University in Prague, Depart-
ment of Social Geography and Regional Development, Geographic Migration 
Centre – GEOMIGRACE, Czechia
introduction
Czechia, as a country with twenty years of continuous growth in migrants, can 
nowadays be treated as a typical immigration country. The process of integrat-
ing migrants may be regarded as a success, mainly due to the fact that most 
migrants come from culturally close countries (Slovakia, Ukraine, Russia, Po-
land) and from countries where adaptation to new customs is not principally 
rejected (i.e. Vietnam). After significant growth in the number of migrants in 
2001–2009, it seems that Czechia currently finds itself at a crossroads, where 
the next migration development is not obvious. 
Have the migration dynamics stabilised over the long-term perspective or will 
larger waves of migration appear after the economic crisis is overcome? What 
does the present political crisis in Ukraine augur? What new measures should 
be adopted in the immigration policy? The following chapter will attempt to 
address these questions. Besides migration patterns, the text also considers 
the strategies of migrants in terms of their length of stay, economic and de-
mographic behavior. However, the main aim of this report is more specific – to 
present the current and future role of Eastern European countries in shaping 
Czechia’s migration profile. The chapter will analyse what benefits and draw-
backs Eastern European migration has brought to Czechia so far, and what are 
the future perspectives in times of restrictive migration policy conducted by 
the Czech government.
The chapter contrasts existing statistical data, previous quantitative and 
qualitative research, with the results of the Delphi survey on migration trends 
conducted in November 2013 – February 2014 for the purposes of the current 
publication. 17 experts took part in the first round of Delphi survey and 16 in 
the second round. The experts represented Czech governmental institutions, 
non-governmental organizations, international organizations and the scien-
tific community. 
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immigration profile of Czechia – a brief description 
Within a short time span, following the democratic transformation of 1989, 
Czechia shifted from a country of emigration to a transit country, and then 
to a country of net immigration. The stock of migrants has increased six fold 
since 1993. The period of dynamic growth in the foreign population began in 
2001 when the number of incoming immigrants totaled about 25,000 per year 
and reached approximately 100,000 in 2007. The global economic crisis, how-
ever, dented that trend and resulted in a decline in the number of migrants 
after 200845.
Figure 13. International migration flows to/from Czechia in 1995-2012
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Although non-natives constitute only around 4% of the total population, this 
number ranks Czechia at the top among the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, and at the same level as Portugal or the Netherlands. On January 1, 
2013, the number of legally residing migrants reached 438,000. Migrants from 
Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus accounted for 123,000 (almost 30% of the entire 
migrant population). The estimate of the total number of migrants made by the 
experts who took part in the Delphi survey is higher, standing at 149,000 in the 
first round of the survey and 129,000 in the second round. This is due to the 
fact that the experts’ estimates also included irregular migrants. 
45 Foreigners in Czechia, 2013, Czech Statistical Office, Prague; http://www.czso.cz/csu/ 
2013edicniplan.nsf/engp/1414-13 (10.05.2014).
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Nevertheless, the Delphi experts’ estimates for the stock of irregular migrants 
seem to be rather low in comparison with the results of previous investigations 
concerning irregular migration in Czechia46 and closer to the numbers of irregu-
lar migrants apprehended in the country. It is interesting that experts estimated 
that the majority of irregular migrants (in relative numbers) come from Belarus. 
It seems that estimating the figures for the less common groups of migrants is 
more difficult than for the ones that are more numerous (i.e. Ukrainians). How-
ever, the surprising conclusion is that the experts kept their estimate low and 
in the second round this estimate was reduced still further, which may also be 
explained by the general decrease in all types of migrants residing in Czechia. 
Table 27. Number of foreigners in Czechia 
 
registry of 
population  
(1 January 2013)
delphi estimate  
(first round, 
11/2013)
delphi estimate  
(second round, 
2/2014)
belarus 4,480 6,400 5,200 
Moldova 6,373 7,700 6,000 
ukraine 112,642 135,000 118,000 
total (bL, Md, 
ukr) 123,495 149,100 129,200 
other foreigners 314,581 – –
total foreigners 438,076 – –
source: Directorate of Alien Police, Asylum and Migration Policies Department (MI CR), Delphi survey 
Czechia 2013-2014 
The composition of the main countries of origin for migrants arriving in 
Czechia has been stable since the 1990s. The migrants from non-EU countries 
prevail: Ukrainians, Vietnamese, and Russians. However, the share of EU citi-
zens has shown an increasing trend, from 32% in 2010 to 37% in 2012. The geo-
graphical composition of immigrants has been affected by the economic crisis 
since 2008. Those who left the country were mainly migrants from Ukraine, 
Moldova and Poland. This does not apply to migrants from Belarus, who are 
believed to be political rather than economic migrants. The number of mi-
grants from Bulgaria and Romania has increased since the accession of those 
countries to the EU, (one expert of the Delphi survey pointed out that there are 
Ukrainians with Romanian passports among this group). 
46 D. Drbohlav, L. Lachmanová, Irregular Activities of Migrants in Czechia: a Delphi Study on Ad-
aptations in a Globalising Economy; (in:) P. Dostál (ed). Evolution of Geographical System and 
Risk Processes in the Global Context, Prague 2008, Charles University, P3K, pp. 129-156. 
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Figure 14. Foreigners in Czechia by country of origin in 1994-2012 
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Source: Czech Statistical Office, 2014
Regarding the types of residence, 2012 was the first year when foreigners with 
permanent residence status outnumbered those with long-term residence sta-
tus47. This is due to the higher number of migrants fulfilling the requirement 
of five-year residence, which is one of the conditions for obtaining permanent 
residence. Migrants’ increased interest in permanent residence reflects the 
change in the prevailing pattern of migration from a short-term into a perma-
nent one. However, the results of the Delphi survey have shown that the trends 
of both permanent and circular migration still remain. 
Other categories of migrants residing in Czechia are marginal, such as refugees 
and persons having subsidiary protection status. Between 1994-2012, 79,000 
foreigners applied for asylum and less than 2,000 individuals were granted 
international protection, which ranks Czechia among the EU states with one 
of the smallest number of foreigners granted asylum. Belarusians (along with 
Russians) represent the national group with the highest share of refugee status 
granted in the years 1993-2010 (13%)48. 
47 Permanent residence (unlike long-term residence) provides a number of benefits to mi-
grants, such a permit to stay for five years, the opportunity to obtain/change employment 
without permission. Also, family reunification members do not need a work permit. 
48 Czech Statistical Office, www.czso.cz (accessed 10.05.2014).
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Figure 15. Foreigners in Czechia by category of residence (1st January 2013)
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The migrant population is dominated by men (57%), but the proportion of 
women is slowly but steadily increasing (Czech Statistical Office data, 2013). 
The lowest proportion of women is among migrants from the ‘old’ EU states. On 
the contrary, a higher proportion of woman can be seen among representatives 
of the FSU (Russians, Kazakhstanis and Belarusians). There are also noticeable 
differences in the age profile of foreigners. The young age group (25-39 years) is 
strongly represented in the migrant population, in contrast to a small share of 
people beyond working age. Statistical data correspond to the Delphi experts’ 
opinions. 
In general, migrants are concentrated in the capital city and the surrounding 
region. The share of foreigners registered in the city of Prague reached 37% 
(of the total number of migrants) in 2012. The spatial distribution of foreign-
ers, however, shows certain differences depending on the nationality. Where-
as Ukrainians have tended to cluster in the Central Bohemia Region and the 
South Moravia Region, Vietnamese settle in Prague and areas close to the 
Czech-German frontier, and Russians in Prague and the Carlsbad Region. The 
highest share of irregular migrants is recorded in Prague. Their number was 
estimated at 47,000 in 2008, which is more than one third of the entire foreign 
population in this city49. 
The economic performance of foreigners in Czechia differs by country of ori-
gin. Alongside this is the dual labour market theory, whereby foreigners from 
Western Europe and the US are highly skilled and work mainly in the “primary” 
49 L. Medová, D. Drbohlav, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 2012, Vol. 104, No. 1, 
pp. 75-89.
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sector, while those from Eastern Europe occupy the “secondary” sector of the 
Czech labour market (e.g. industry and manufacturing). One third of the eco-
nomically active foreigners are self-employed. The official gross monthly av-
erage salary of migrant is lower than the average salary received by Czech 
national. However, the average earnings may be higher in reality since many 
migrants have more than one job and work many hours over the legal limit. 
The experts surveyed in the Delphi panel claimed that migrants from Ukraine 
and Moldova are mainly engaged in manually demanding sectors, such as con-
struction and industry, although they are also said to perform highly qualified 
jobs. An interesting finding is that migrants from Belarus are said to be more 
often employed in the service sector than in manually demanding jobs. The ex-
perts also reflected on recent growth in the domestic sector, where Ukrainian 
women are primarily located. 
Main determinants of immigration processes to Czechia
Migration inflows are closely connected with the economic development of 
the country. Czechia is the most stable and prosperous country in Central and 
Eastern Europe. GDP per capita at purchasing power parity was USD 27,100 in 
2011, which is 85% of the EU average. The whole transformation period has also 
been characterized by other favourable economic characteristics, such as low 
unemployment rates (6% in 2014) and a low inflation rate (0.9% in 2014). 
The periods of strongest economic growth (1990-1997 and 2003-2008) were ac-
companied by high demand for labour and consequently by higher immigration 
flows. During these two periods, the demand existed primarily in low-skilled 
occupations in the construction and manufacturing industries. Nevertheless, 
the structure of demand changed over time. Today, growing demand in the 
domestic services sector has been observed. Moreover, in recent years, the in-
terest in studying at universities, which is free of charge in the Czech language 
in state colleges, turned out to be one of the popular motives among young mi-
grants for coming to Czechia. 
According to results from the Delphi research, the factors that attract mi-
grants from Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, are primarily economic (and to 
some extent political in the case of Belarus). The strongest pull factor is the 
economic and political stability of the country. Other reasons for selecting 
Czechia as a destination country are: migration networks, geographical, cul-
tural and language proximity (language proximity does not apply to migrants 
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from Moldova, but many of them are also fluent in Russian, which is similar 
to Czech). In the case of Ukrainian migration, another advantage is a long last-
ing tradition from the interwar period (1918-1939), when Ukrainian Transcar-
pathia was part of the former Czechoslovakia. 
An additional factor facilitating migration from post-soviet states, mainly 
from Ukraine and Moldova, is the presence of semi-legal networks, which de-
veloped in the early 1990s. These semi-legal networks assist in the obtaining 
of entry visas, work permits, insurance, and accommodation and then place 
the migrants in semi-legal employment system controlled by the network. 
That scheme became commonly known as the “client system”. The key person 
is called a “client”, who is usually a person who arrived in the 1990s and over 
some time set up his/her own business in Czechia and then provided services 
as an intermediary in migrants’ employment. The costs for migrants of being 
involved in the “client system” are the restrictions to their freedom (difficul-
ties in changing a job, retention of wages, liability to exploitation), and lesser 
prospects of integration into the Czech society. It is estimated that as many as 
one third of migrants are involved in the “client system”50.
Table 28. Current main push and pull factors influencing migration flows 
from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in Czechia
Ukrainians  belarusians moldovans
  aM sd n aM sd n aM sd n
ethnic links (migration of ethnic hungarian, 
poles and slovaks) 2.8 1.2 16 1.8 1.2 16 1.6 1.2 16
ease of finding a job in destination country 4.1 0.6 16 3.4 0.6 16 3.9 0.6 16
high wages in destination country 4.0 0.5 16 3.8 0.5 16 4.0 0.5 16
high living standards in destination country 2.7 1.1 16 2.6 1.1 16 2.6 1.1 16
poverty and social tensions in sending 
country 3.9 0.7 16 3.8 0.7 16 4.0 0.7 16
political oppression and/or destabilization of 
political situation in sending country 3.3 1.2 16 4.2 1.2 16 2.8 1.2 16
Cultural and language proximity 4.2 0.7 16 3.6 0.7 16 3.1 0.7 16
50 D. Čermáková, M. Nekorjak, Ukrainian Middleman System of Labour Organization in the Czech 
Republic, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 2009, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 33-43. 
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Ukrainians  belarusians moldovans
  aM sd n aM sd n aM sd n
Liberal visa and migration policy of destina-
tion country 2.9 1.3 16 2.9 1.3 16 2.8 1.3 16
already existing strong group of compatri-
ots in  destination country 4.5 0.6 16 3.5 0.6 16 3.8 0.6 16
already staying and working relatives or 
close friends (migration networks) 4.6 0.6 16 3.8 0.6 16 4.2 0.6 16
geographic proximity and low travel costs 4.2 0.9 15 3.6 0.9 15 3.3 0.9 15
tradition of migration 4.0 1.4 2 3.0 1.4 2 2.5 1.4 2
source: Delphi survey Czechia 2013-2014 
note: AM – arithmetic mean (mean of all received answers), SD – standard deviation (how much varia-
tion from the average exist,) and N – number of respondents; Rating according to agreement with the 
statement: 5 surely yes, 4 – perhaps yes, 3 – maybe yes, maybe no, 2 – perhaps no, 1 – surely no
The structure of migration inflows is also influenced by the migration policy 
of a receiving state. Czech migration policy has transformed several times. It 
started out as liberal (during the 1990s), switched to being restrictive (at the 
turn of the millennium), was then harmonized with EU legislation (at the time 
of accession in 2004), became more restrictive after 2008 global economic cri-
sis, and could today be characterized as being both active and restrictive simul-
taneously. The Delphi experts described the migration policy of Czechia after 
2008 as more restrictive, but also as active and selective. Among others, such 
measures aimed at attracting high-skilled migrants as the project “Selection of 
Qualified Foreign Workers” (2003), Green Card (2009)51, Blue Card (2009), and 
the opportunity to change employers without the need to leave the country, 
could be seen as examples of active policy. On the other hand, the introduction 
in 2009 of restrictions on accepting job applications, aimed at nationals from 
Vietnam, Ukraine, Mongolia, Moldova, and Uzbekistan, could be considered 
a restrictive action. These restrictions are implemented through the quota sys-
tem which requires submitting an application via the system VISAPOINT at 
the Czech consulates abroad. 
Migrants from Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus come from culturally close coun-
tries, i.e. their integration primarily due to linguistic and cultural proximity 
51 The Green card simplifies entry to the job market for foreigners who have qualifications for 
which Czechia has a job opening. It is for qualified workers with university education and 
also for workers in jobs with a minimum educational requirement (more at http://portal.
mpsv.cz/sz/zahr_zam/zelka/ciz#coje). 
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is well underway. The Delphi experts do not regard these three countries as 
‘problematic’ in terms of their integration with Czech society. Nevertheless, 
a consequence of the employment market regulation is that, in practice, mi-
grants from these countries work in less attractive sectors of the labour mar-
ket, which, in many cases, does not match up with their education and profes-
sional experience. Among the main obstacles to the integration of migrants 
are: problems with recognition of migrants’ qualifications, discrimination by 
employers, and involvement in the “client system”52. 
Media and public discourse on migration 
The media image of foreigners has been perceived by researchers for many 
years as unchanging and rather unfriendly. Generally speaking, migrants are 
not at the centre of mainstream media attention. However, there are some ex-
ceptions, such as the story on the accidental fire of the Vietnamese market in 
2008 or of a demonstration by an extreme right-wing party against migrants. 
Among the various groups of foreigners, only refugees are positively perceived 
by the media53. 
When it comes to Czech society, it is considered to be tolerant in many respects, 
but not necessarily towards migrants. The degree of tolerance varies depend-
ing on migrants’ country of origin – Czechs are most tolerant towards Slovaks 
and Poles. A lower level of tolerance is shown to migrants from the post-Soviet 
and Balkan countries. Nevertheless, considerably more toleration is revealed 
to migrants than to the Roma minority54.
With regard to more in-depth public discourse on migration and visa issues, 
a key moment of Czech migration policy was the introduction in 2000 of short-
stay visas for the citizens of post-Soviet states, which marked the end of the 
liberal migration policy and was discussed publicly. Since then, the topic of 
a visa-free regime for the Eastern European countries and migration policy 
aimed at this category of foreigners has not been discussed in public.
52 M. Rakoczyová, R. Trbola, Sociální integrace přistěhovalců v České republice, Praha, Slon 2011, 
p. 310, in Czech.
53 A. Szczepanikova, „Zatim s nimi nejsou problemy”. Medialni obraz azylantů a jejich integrace do 
česke společnosti, (in:) Cizinci, našinci a média. Mediální analýzy, Praha 2007, Multikultur-
ni centrum Praha, pp. 37-47, in Czech. 
54 D. Drbohlav et al, Migrace a (i)migranti v Česku. Kdo jsme, odkud přicházíme, kam jdeme? Praha 
2010: Slon, p. 207, in Czech. 
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Prognosis of immigration – a brief summary 
For short-term future migration trends (with a horizon of three years), the Del-
phi experts are expecting no change. Some of them believe that inflows may 
increase slightly in the future and more migrants will take up employment 
on the Czech labour market. Although the Czech government is currently im-
plementing measures aimed at reducing the number of irregular migrants, 
primarily by combating irregular employment, the Delphi experts seem to be 
skeptical about the prospects of this policy and they expect growth in irregu-
lar employment. Although in the first round of the survey the experts consid-
ered regularisation of existing labour migrants as feasible, in the second round 
they were doubtful that it could happen.
With regard to the long-term perspective the experts expect more long-term 
and settlement migration from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in the future. 
Over a ten-year perspective they anticipate stable migration flows, but their 
prognosis is conditioned by various future developments in the national econ-
omy and the EU, the political situation in sending countries, and migration 
policy. In particular the experts foresee an inflow of young migrants includ-
ing students, a rising number of migrant women and continuity of family re-
unification. Experts believe that the economic performance of migrants will 
be characterised by an increase in job opportunities, wages, volume of remit-
tances, and diversification of the sectors occupied by migrants (a shift from 
industry to social services). 
The Delphi experts also agreed that the abolition of uniform EU visas for short-
term stays for the citizens of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova is both desirable 
and feasible (in the second round more experts agreed with that opinion than 
in the first round). For Moldova (experts were surveyed before the EU has lift-
ed visa obligations for Moldovan citizens) and Ukraine, the experts are expect-
ing the abolition of short-term visas within a short time period (2-3 years), and 
for Belarusians over a longer period (7-10 years)55. In general, experts believe 
that abolition of EU short-term visas does not bring serious security risks for 
Czechia. In fact, one expert expressed the opinion that visa abolition could be 
one of the steps to reducing the existing “client system”. In general experts be-
lieve that short-term visas’ regime is certainly linked with mobility, but can-
not be regarded as an effective tool to fight against irregular migration. 
55 Probably due to frozen political relations between the EU and Belarus.
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Table 29. Agreement with the abolition of short-term EU visas for Eastern 
European nationals in Czechia
    Ukrainians belarusians moldovans
yes
First round 
9 8 10
new opinion 
yes
new opinion 
yes
new opinion 
yes
second 
round 10 10 11
no
First round 4 6 4
  new opinion no new opinion no new opinion no
second 
round 4 4 3
       
number of respond-
ents (second round)   14 14 14
source: Delphi survey Czechia 2013-2014
note: The text of the question: Do you agree with the statement that abolition of visas for Ukrainians, 
Belarusians and Moldovans is desirable from the point of view of your country interests?
Challenges, opportunities and risks of further immigration 
Czechia has recorded a natural decline in population for 12 years in succession 
(1994-2005), but thanks to the inflow of foreigners the total population losses 
were not so high. In the future, however, inflows of foreigners cannot be the 
solution to the problem of the population ageing. The Delphi experts therefore 
suggest a selective migration policy as an appropriate tool for partial solution 
to demographic problems, but mainly as an answer to changing requirements 
of the labour market. The experts also supported an approach of promoting 
mutual cooperation with these states while making efforts to liberalise the mi-
gration regime, abolishing visa requirements and facilitating circular migra-
tion. A focus on cooperation with the origin countries of migrants (Moldova, 
Ukraine and Belarus) is seen as the most desirable measure. By that they mean 
increasing business activities in Eastern Europe, trans-border cooperation and 
making the Czech education system more open to foreign students. The Czech 
experts think that migrants and also potential migrants do not have sufficient 
information about the migration process and the situation in the destination 
country. Therefore, they advise that information about migration and related 
matters should be circulated as widely as possible. Specific recommendations 
from Czech experts to the governments of Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine con-
cern the development of effective communication channels with diasporas. 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
120
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
14
The Czech experts’ recommendation for Visegrad countries could be divided 
into two groups: systematic and practical. As systematic measures, the experts 
suggested the design and subsequent implementation of proper migration 
strategies, the promotion of transparency within migration policy and prac-
tice, and the enhancement of integration processes. For migration strategies 
they suggest facilitating circular migration, launching additional programmes 
of cultural and scientific exchanges, and opening up the education system to 
foreign students. As practical measures, experts suggested providing wide-
spread information about migration/integration measures, recognising mi-
grants’ qualifications and diplomas, and lessening the bureaucratic burden 
which migrants are often subjected to. 
Conclusions
Czechia, with a history of over 20 years of immigration and almost half a mil-
lion migrants, has ranked among the countries of significant immigration. To-
day’s Czechia could be considered as a stabilising immigration country with 
both permanent and circular migrants. Among the most important develop-
ments in migration sphere the following patterns and phenomena may be 
enumerated: the creation of immigration and integration policies, the issue of 
natural demographic decline in relation to immigration, irregular migration, 
and security issues. These and other topics were included in the Delphi survey, 
where experts expressed their opinions with regard to the current and future 
development of immigration to Czechia. 
Taking in account the economic and political developments, it is expected that 
immigration inflows from Eastern European countries to Czechia will contin-
ue. The Delphi experts see the main push and pull factors for migration from 
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus primarily as economic and for Belarus also as 
political. Other pull factors for migrants are: the existence of migration net-
works, a tradition of migration (Ukraine), geographical proximity, cultural 
and language proximity. 
Over short-term (three years) and long-term (ten years) horizons, stable mi-
gration inflows, or slight growth, are expected. Due to the development of per-
manent migration, an increase in migrants’ wages and employment opportu-
nities is awaited. With regards to the demographic patterns of migrants, one 
can expect immigration of younger people, students, women and children, as 
well as family reunification. 
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The most sensitive question in our Delphi survey was the experts’ estimate of 
irregular migrants. The estimate of irregular migrants was surprisingly low. 
It appears that the problem of irregular migration has currently been resolved 
in Czechia. Nevertheless, for future trends the experts expressed their opin-
ion that next wave of economic growth may again be accompanied by irregular 
migration.
The Delphi experts are more supportive of the abolition of short-term visas 
with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. As one negative consequence of such 
a measure, they anticipate more irregular circular migration. As a positive im-
pact they expect growth in tourism, reducing the scale of the “client system” 
and also the possibility for potential migrants to arrange their employment in-
dividually (without using middlemen), which could be advantageous for both 
migrant and potential employer. 
The key factor for the future development of migration trends will be the mi-
gration policy chosen by Czechia. The restrictive measures which came into 
effect after the 2008 financial crisis showed how strong the impact of migra-
tion policy on immigration trends may be. Delphi experts were rather unani-
mous when criticising the current migration policy of Czechia. They pointed 
out that it is strongly influenced by the fears that political and social develop-
ments in Eastern Europe are moving in the wrong direction and has less to do 
with the true performance of Ukrainian, Belarusian and Moldovan migrants 
in the Czech labour market and their integration into Czech society. 
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3. MigraTion bETWEEn THE EU, V4 anD EasTErn 
EUroPE: THE PrEsEnT siTUaTion anD PossibLE 
FUTUrE THE PErsPECTiVE oF HUngarY
béla soltész, Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Hungary
gábor Zimmerer, Hungarian Institute for International Affairs, Hungary 
introduction 
Located at the crossroads of cultures and population movements since its foun-
dation, Hungary is a country of both inward and outward migration. As the 
southernmost of the Visegrad countries, it is an important hub of transitory 
flows arriving from both the Eastern Partnership countries and the Balkan 
Peninsula. This chapter aims to present the opinion of a carefully selected 
group of Hungarian migration experts surveyed under the Delphi research on 
migration trends between EU/V4 states and Eastern Europe from the govern-
mental, academic and non-governmental sectors, and to compare it with oth-
er sources. Due to geographic proximity and historical ties, the bulk of these 
flows occurs between Ukraine’s Transcarpathia region and Eastern Hungary, 
and involves mainly ethnic Hungarians of Ukrainian citizenship. However, 
there are also many other, very diverse patterns of migration from Eastern 
Europe to Hungary. The future of these patterns is uncertain, especially with 
the 2014 political crisis in Ukraine. Nonetheless, long-term processes can be 
foreseen to some extent, as the aggregate opinion of Hungarian experts seems 
to orient towards rather specific directions. 
In the following country chapter, the Delphi survey results are contrasted with 
statistical data (when available) in first three sub-chapters, while in the con-
cluding sub-chapters opinions about the future of migration flows and the pos-
sible effects of the abolition of the current EU visa requirements are presented. 
15 experts took part in the first round and 12 in the second round of the Delphi 
survey on migration trends (conducted between November 2013 and March 
2014), with equal representation from the governmental, academic and non-
governmental sectors. 
immigration profile of Hungary: a brief description
During the era of state socialism the country enjoyed a relatively stable econo-
my and acceptable living standards, but personal and economic freedoms were 
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limited, and from the point of view of international migration, the country was 
rather closed until the late 1980s. With the transition to democracy in 1989, 
the borders opened and economic collapse occurred across the whole Eastern 
bloc, which had an important push effect on migration. However, Hungary un-
derwent a relatively smooth transition and it was seen as an island of stability 
in the region during the troubled decade of the 1990s, becoming an attractive 
destination for citizens of neighbouring countries, most of them ethnic Hun-
garians. 
The negative post-transition economic trends reached a low point in the second 
half of the 1990s and a slow recovery began. As a consequence, a small but eco-
nomically very active group of non-European immigrants (most importantly 
of Chinese, Vietnamese and Turkish nationality) arrived in the country. The 
accession of Hungary to the EU fostered intra-EU mobility and many EU citi-
zens, mainly Germans, entered the country. On the other hand, with the end of 
limitations for Hungarian citizens on working in EU countries (e.g. in 2004 for 
UK, Ireland and Sweden, 2007 for Spain and Italy, 2011 for Austria and Germa-
ny) and pushed by the unfolding of the global economic crisis, emigration has 
started to rise in recent years. The issue of emigration has gradually become 
a key topic in Hungarian public discourse. Outward migration is especially 
high among doctors and healthcare professionals, engineers, technical work-
ers and students. The migratory landscape of Hungary in the second decade of 
the 21st century is therefore constituted by immigration and emigration flows 
of an almost equal volume56. 
A presentation of a immigration profile of Hungary should begin with the clar-
ification of who is considered as an immigrant by Hungarian law. If we take 
the definitions of Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 as a starting point, Hungary is 
the country of usual residence for more than one year for 143,000 foreign citi-
zens, according to the 2011 census (including refugees). The data for 2011 in the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office’s database was 209,000 but it is believed 
that return migration to countries of origin followed the crisis and the lack of 
de-registration of migrants made the administrative data sources inaccurate. 
This figure, however, does not include the number of dual (Hungarian and 
other) citizens whose number increased by 500,000 between 2010 and 2014, 
another possible reason for the decrease in the stock of foreign citizens. 
56 I. Gödri, B. Soltész, B. Bodacz-Nagy, Dynamic Historical Analysis of Longer Term Migratory, La-
bour Market and Human Capital Processes in Hungary, SEEMIG Country Report 2013, online: 
www.seemig.eu
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The census found that the largest migrant communities in Hungary are formed 
by the citizens from three neighbouring countries – Romania, Ukraine and 
Serbia – and two other – Germany and China. The top five countries account for 
two thirds of the migrant stock. Other, moderately important sending coun-
tries include Russia, Poland, Vietnam, Slovakia and Austria, constituting an-
other 10-12% of the foreign population in Hungary. 
Figure 16. TOP 10 countries of citizenship of foreign population in Hungary in 
2001-2012 (as % of total foreign population)
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source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office STADAT database. Compiled by I. Gödri (2013) 
Immigrants are distinguished according to two key factors: their ethnicity 
and the EU membership of their country of citizenship (or lack thereof). Three 
general categories of foreigners could be pointed out, which are very much dif-
ferentiated in both legal and public opinion terms: 1) ethnic Hungarians from 
neighbouring countries, 2) non-Hungarians from EU countries, and 3) non-
Hungarians from third countries. Arguably, another category can be added, 
namely 4) recognized refugees. 
Ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries are the most populous immi-
grant group in Hungary although they are the most atypical in international 
comparison. As a consequence of the Peace Treaties ending the First World War 
in 1920, large populations of Hungarian ethnicity became citizens of newly cre-
ated or territorially expanded countries. As of 2014, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine 
and Slovakia have the largest ethnic Hungarian populations. As the transition 
to democracy had some rocky moments in these countries, Hungary became 
a prime destination for them, starting with Romania which, in the final years 
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of the repressive Ceauşescu regime, was the source of the first massive flow of 
irregular migration. Also, from Ukraine, Yugoslavia and its successor states 
there were thousands of ethnic Hungarians who decided to move to Hungary57. 
In Ukraine, Ethnic Hungarians live mostly in the districts of Berehovo, Mu-
kachevo, Vynohradiv and Uzhorod. These districts are adjacent to the Hun-
garian border and strong historical and cultural ties link them to Hungary. 
According to Central Statistical Office data 74% of all Ukrainian migrants liv-
ing in Hungary come from these four districts, while the other 16% come from 
other districts of Transcarpathia and 10% from the rest of Ukraine. Tran-
scarpathia (Zakarpats’ka oblast’ in Ukrainian, Kárpátalja in Hungarian), the 
westernmost region of Ukraine, belonged to the Kingdom of Hungary within 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. A sense of historical belonging to Hungary 
and the knowledge of the Hungarian language make the group of ethnic Hun-
garians in Transcarpathia more willing to migrate to Hungary than other 
Ukrainian citizens. 
As a consequence of this mutual sense of belonging to each other, ethnic Hun-
garians have always been privileged in terms of naturalization and obtaining 
settlement permits in Hungary. Legally speaking, in these cases the acquisi-
tion of citizenship derives from their ancestors’ (ex)-Hungarian citizenship 
under the principle of ius sanguinis or, former Hungarian citizens can re-ac-
quire their citizenship upon request. However, between 1989 and 2010, eth-
nic Hungarians could acquire citizenship only by moving to Hungary. From 
1 January 2011 onwards, Hungarian law contains the accelerated or “simplified 
naturalization process” instrument, that is, every ethnic Hungarian is eligible 
for fast-track naturalization. Under this process, non-Hungarian citizens liv-
ing abroad can be naturalized without moving to Hungary, if they or their an-
cestors ever held Hungarian citizenship, are able to speak basic Hungarian and 
possess a clean criminal record. Between January 2011 and April 2014, around 
550,000 new citizenships were granted, of which approximately 70,000 were 
given to Ukrainian citizens, which is one second of the total number of ethnic 
Hungarians living in Ukraine (152,000 according to the 2001 census)58.
57 I. Gödri, E.F. Tóth, Magyarország, Románia és Szlovákia kivándorlási folyamatai a rendszervál-
tozások után – eltérések és hasonlóságok, Demográfia, 2010/53, No. 2–3, p 157–204.; Sz. Póczik, 
L. Fehér and others, Nemzetközi migráció – nemzetközi kockázatok, (in:) Magyar Tudomány, 
2008/09, p. 1095–2008, in Hungarian, online: http://www.matud.iif.hu/08sze/07.html
58 B. Soltész et al., Hungary: cross-border migration in a fragmented ethnic space, (in:) A. Erőss, 
D. Karácsonyi (eds.), Discovering migration between Visegrad countries and Eastern Part-
ners, Budapest, HAS RCAES Geographical Institute 2014.
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The second group of immigrants, namely, EU and EEA citizens in Hungary 
enjoy basically the same rights as Hungarian citizens. The third group is con-
stituted by third country nationals (non-EU). Eastern European and other 
non-EU nationals are required to have a visa for any stay longer than 90 days 
(also for short-term entry in the case of many third country nationalities, 
including the FSU states) and their employment is subject to an employment 
permit. In 2013, a total of 11,000 labour permits were issued by the National 
Employment Service to third country nationals. Third-country nationals are 
thus a well-documented group – although they are not a ‘group’ in sociologi-
cal terms, as their characteristics vary wildly according to their nationality. 
Most of the Chinese, Vietnamese and Middle Eastern immigrants are small 
entrepreneurs who took advantage of the collapsing socialist economy and 
founded successful new businesses. On the other hand, Ukrainian citizens’ 
employment rate is below the average of the total population. Many of them 
work in Hungary on the grounds of a work permit, not a permanent settle-
ment permit, which hinders their labour market mobility. Regarding EaP 
countries’ nationals, Ukrainians constitute the most important group. As of 
2012, there were 15,362 Ukrainian citizens having residence and an immi-
gration or a settlement permit in Hungary, while for Moldovan citizens this 
figure was 196 and for Belarusians – 168. 
The fourth group is comprised of refugees. The arrival of approximately 50,000 
asylum seekers in the last decade from Afghanistan, Iraq, Bangladesh, Somalia 
and Syria is worthy of note, although only around 10% received refugee status. 
Many of them are believed to have moved further West even without a final 
decision on their case. In 2013, a sharp increase in asylum claims occurred: 
around 20,000 asylum seekers arrived in Hungary, as opposed to the 2,150 of 
the previous year.
To sum up, the migrant stock in Hungary is not very large and it is very frag-
mented in terms of ethnicity and legal category. According to the 2011 Census, 
79% of all foreign citizens residing in Hungary were Europeans (59% EU citi-
zens), and 16% Asians. In the public discourse and the media, it is mainly the 
(non-Hungarian) third country nationals and refugees who are identified as 
immigrants, although they account for a very moderate share of the total im-
migrant stock in the country. 
The Delphi survey on migration trends between EU/V4 and Eastern Europe in 
Hungary was somewhat difficult to apply as it did not represent ethnic Hun-
garians as a separate category. However, when contrasted with the data and 
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conceptual categories described above, it can be seen that the experts surveyed 
are aware of the characteristic features of the migrant stock of Ukrainians, Be-
larusians and Moldovans in Hungary. In the second round of the Delphi survey, 
the estimate for Ukrainian citizens given by the experts resulted in an aver-
age of 17,500, which is slightly higher than the 12,000 measured by the Census 
in 2011 (meaning Ukrainians without Hungarian citizenship). For Belarusians 
and Moldovans, the average estimate is under 1000 in both cases, which also 
corresponds to the statistical data. None of the three groups was perceived as 
an immigrant group with a significant share of ‘irregulars’, as answers were 
almost exclusively in the 10% to 20% range.
The survey shows a complex picture of how Hungarian experts assess the so-
cial and economic characteristics of Ukrainian, Belarusian and Moldovan mi-
grants in Hungary. There is a relative consensus about the respondents that 
migrants are at an economically active age. Respondents slightly favoured the 
“young” over the “medium age” answer option. Also, a gender balance is per-
ceived, as none of the three migrant groups are believed to be of a typically 
male or female profile. No serious problems are detected regarding their social 
integration, especially in the case of Ukrainians.
Main determinants of immigration processes 
Given the fragmentation of the migrant stock in Hungary, it is difficult to point 
out the factors that are relevant for the immigrant population as a whole. Leav-
ing aside refugees, it is worthwhile keeping the distinction presented above for 
obtaining a deeper insight into the determinants of migration processes in the 
case of Hungary.
Regarding social factors, the transition to democracy and capitalism brought 
a sudden growth of inequality and there have been several social groups which 
are commonly named in both scientific discourse and everyday talk as “the los-
ers of the transition”: the Roma, the rural population and the elderly (born be-
tween 1930 and 1945). As opposed to the previously mentioned categories, urban, 
younger, higher educated and better-off Hungarians managed to take advan-
tage of the structural transformation of the economy, thus becoming the “win-
ners of the transition”. Immigrants therefore arrived in a society which had 
been polarized and in which many local residents had lost their jobs and a sta-
ble position in the social fabric. Ethnic Hungarians were usually perceived as 
‘close relatives’ although with a rather open discrimination in the labour mar-
ket, where they usually occupied lower-paid positions. Finally, third-country 
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nationals remained largely outside the formal labour market and they became 
temporary manual workers or they founded small businesses.
Economic factors are also a two-faced driver of immigration. As a consequence 
of the transition and the collapse of several branches of industry, Hungarian la-
bour market structure stabilized at a low employment rate and relatively high 
unemployment. Hungarian GDP, measured by its per capita purchase power 
parity in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars, was USD 6,459 which fell to a low point of 
USD 5,506 in 1993 – a significant, but not catastrophic decrease when compared 
to other countries in the region. Economic restructuring started in the mid-
1990s and it was based on the inflow of foreign – mostly German and Austrian 
– capital, and Hungarian GDP climbed back to its pre-transition level in 1999 
and kept on growing during a period of economic expansion that lasted until 
2008 when GDP per capita topped at USD 8,826 in Geary-Khamis dollars. The 
global economic crisis hit the country heavily, causing a recession of 1.5 years 
and a consequent stagnation period.
Figure 17. GDP per capita in Hungary and in selected countries of origin of im-
migrants (TOP 5 + Belarus, Moldova), 1980–2010, given in 1990 International 
Geary-Khamis dollars* 
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* Note: The Geary–Khamis dollar or international dollar is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the 
same purchasing power  parity that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time, (in 
this analysis, in 1990).
Data from Germany is for East and West Germany for 1980–1990. Data for Serbia is for the current territory of the 
Republic of Serbia (without Kosovo) 
source: Maddison Data Bank
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Political determinants are negligible in the Hungarian context, as there is no 
significant political will to attract immigrants. Also, no significant anti-immi-
gration political discourse exists, due to the low share of immigrants in the 
population. 
There are important differences in the perceptions of migrants’ labour market 
situation and further plans. Under the Delphi research, Ukrainians were given 
high scores on the possibility of settlement or circular migration, while Bela-
rusians and Moldovans are believed to come to Hungary having further migra-
tion in mind, e.g. going to Western Europe whenever possible. Additionally in 
the questionnaire, Hungarian experts gave above average scores to Ukrain-
ians in all sectors of the labour market with the exception of highly qualified 
white collar jobs, while in the case of Belarusians and Moldovans they received 
below average scores in almost all cases. A possible interpretation of this aver-
age of replies can be the perception of Ukrainians as labour migrants who can 
integrate in all sectors except the highest-ranking one, while the number of 
Belarusians and Moldovans is so low in Hungary that there is no ‘typical’ im-
migrant profile in the experts’ mind.
To sum up, out of the three main legal categories of migrants, two are relevant 
in the Hungary – Eastern Partnership migratory system. These two (ethnic 
Hungarians and non-ethnic third country nationals) hold a very different le-
gal status and they are perceived very differently by Hungarian society, a dif-
ference which is also reflected in the experts’ responses. Policymaking also 
reflects this duality: the state has a friendly policy towards ethnic Hungarians, 
but non-Hungarian immigrants are not addressed by policymakers, not even 
the highly skilled or seasonal workers59. 
Media and public discourse on migration
Systematic research on Hungarian population’s attitudes towards immigrants 
began in 1992. The longest time series about attitudes towards migrants has 
been produced by the TÁRKI Institute of Social Research. It was conceptual-
ized in the early 1990s when the general perception of the migration issue was 
largely understood as a humanitarian one, as was the case when many Roma-
nian and Yugoslav citizens arrived in the country. The questions in the survey 
thus considered “refugees” instead of “migrants” what, based on the result of 
59 Gödri et al., op. cit.
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other surveys, is not a source of significant difference in the results. The ques-
tion is stated as follows: “Do you agree that Hungary should provide asylum 
to: 1) every refugee, 2) not a single refugee, 3) some of the refugees (depend-
ing on several characteristics)?”. In the following question, a list of ethnicities 
is presented, asking whether these groups should be let in. In the mid-2000s, 
a fake ethnicity (“Piresian“) was included, whose rejection shows the overall, 
unspecified xenophobia of the respondent (59% when first asked in 2006). 
In the last 20 years it has always been the third option (deciding on a “case-by-
case” basis) that the majority of respondents have chosen, although their share 
has fluctuated over time. The share of “xenophobes” (who refuse everybody) 
peaked in 1995. It is believed that freedom of speech following the transition 
to democracy, and the rapidly deteriorating economic situation, brought xeno-
phobic sentiments to the surface, which have been oscillating with an upward 
trend in the most recent years, registering 40% in 2012. Finally, a minor group 
of “xenophiles” have also been present, representing approximately 10% of the 
Hungarian population.
The breakdown by ethnicities shows a very polarized range of attitudes. In 
2012, 82% of the respondents stated they would refuse to grant asylum to any 
Arab, 79% to any Chinese, 75% to any Russian and 71% to any Romanian, re-
gardless of the given person’s circumstances. In sharp contrast, only 4% of the 
respondents thought that ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries 
should not be granted asylum (regardless of the stable political situation). 
Conventional variables for explaining xenophobia were established in Hun-
gary in the 1990s and mid-2000s, namely that the elderly, the rural dwellers 
and those with lower educational attainment tend to be more xenophobic than 
the younger, urban and more skilled population and that knowing personally 
a member of a given group reduces the tendency to favour refusing asylum to 
that specific group. Xenophobia, as fear of the unknown, is very significantly 
reduced by the shared language and cultural traits of a given migrant group 
with the host society, hence the very favourable position of ethnic Hungarians 
from neighbouring countries60. 
Regarding public opinion on the size and economic effects of immigration, in 
TÁRKI’s 2011 Omnibus survey 64% of the respondents stated that immigrants 
60 B. Dencső, E. Sik, Adalékok az idegenellenesség mértékéhez a mai Magyarországon, Educatio 
16 (1), 2007, pp. 50–66, in Hungarian.
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take jobs away from Hungarians, a finding that underpins the European So-
cial Survey’s ranking in which Hungary has the third highest percentage of 
respondents in Europe who believe that immigration is bad for the country’s 
economy. Another TÁRKI survey showed that Hungarians perceive the immi-
grant stock to be around 13 times larger than it actually is61. 
Institutional actors score relatively high in anti-discrimination and family re-
union legislation, while they score low in access to citizenship for non-ethnic 
Hungarians. According to the MIPEX III report, the overall Migrant Policy In-
tegration Index score of Hungary is rather low (45%), mostly because “foreign-
ers living in Hungary for years are slightly discouraged from becoming Hun-
garian, contrary to policies for co-ethnics abroad”62. 
Political discourse on immigration is marked by the conceptual differences be-
tween ‘ethnic Hungarian’ and ‘non-Hungarian’ immigrants. The situation of 
ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring countries and their linkages to Hungary 
are a highly sensitive issue. As stated above, Hungarian public opinion is very 
favourable towards ethnic Hungarian immigrants. However, a controversial 
referendum was held in 2004, in which only 51.5% of the votes were in favour 
of providing dual citizenship to all ethnic Hungarians (with a voter turnout of 
just 37.5%, making the referendum invalid), and the then-ruling Socialist Party 
campaigned against it, based on the hypothesis that it would produce an influx 
of immigrants. The centre-right conservative Fidesz party won the elections in 
2010 and the new government created the simplified naturalization scheme for 
ethnic Hungarians as a policy response to the needs of the ethnic Hungarian 
population in the neighbouring countries. It is, however, understood more in 
terms of a ‘nation policy’ than a ‘migration policy’ tool. The official Hungarian 
standpoint since the transition to democracy has been one of encouraging eth-
nic Hungarians to “get along in the lands of their birth”. However no repatria-
tion program of co-ethnics, like in the case of Germany’s Aussiedler, took place 
in Hungary63. 
61 P. Krekó, A. Juhász, A kínaiak, zsidók és arabok betelepülésére számítunk leginkább. TÁR-
KI Research report, August 2011, online: http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2011/kitekint/20110801.
html; E. Sik, B. Simonovits (eds.),  Migráns esélyek és tapasztalatok – Honnan jönnek, hányan 
vannak, mit csináljunk velük? TÁRKI, 2011, in Hungarian.
62 MIPEX (2010) Country Profile: Hungary, online: http://www.mipex.eu/hungary
63 R. Brubaker, Migrations of ethnic unmixing in the New Europe, in: International Migra-
tion Review, Vol. 32. No. 4, 1998, p 1047–1065; T. Wetzel, A bevándorlás kérdése Magyaror-
szágon, Publikon Pécs 2011, in Hungarian.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
132
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
14
On the other hand, politics on immigration of groups other than ethnic Hun-
garians have never been a major political issue. While a Government Decree 
in 2004 stated that the Minister of the Interior should prepare the migration 
strategy of Hungary, it was only in 2013 that the strategy document was writ-
ten, which is a considerable step forward. In recent decades, immigration 
management has not really gone beyond administrative issues and adopting 
the relevant legislation package of the acquis communautaire. Migrant integra-
tion projects have been set up thanks to the European Integration Fund, with 
Hungarian NGOs handling most of the cases64. 
The mass media’s approach is basically similar to the political approach. Eth-
nic Hungarians are usually presented in a positive but paternalistic way. 
EU citizens are rarely perceived as ‘migrants’ while third country nationals, 
and especially refugees, are often presented as a threat. 
Prognosis of immigration – a brief summary 
In the following section, the opinions of Hungarian experts regarding the 
possible changes in migration patterns of Ukrainian, Belarusian and Moldo-
van migrants in the context of Hungary are presented. The evaluation of the 
potential effects of Schengen visa liberalisation and lifting labour market re-
strictions on the direction and scale of population movements from Eastern 
Europe will be also shown. The second round of the Delphi survey coincided 
with the political crisis in Ukraine of early 2014, which had an effect on – al-
though not substantially changing– the assessment of the dynamics of migra-
tory flows. While in the first round 12 out of 15 respondents believed that the 
number of Ukrainians to arrive in Hungary will increase in the future, in the 
second round every respondent (11 out of 11) stated that an increase in inflows 
is to be expected. It contrasts with the replies given concerning Belarusian and 
Moldovan citizens: in both rounds the great majority of respondents answered 
that the immigration dynamics of these two groups will remain stable in the 
future.
64 Gödri et al., op. cit.
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Figure 18. Expected changes in migration flows in Hungary (2014 and 2024)
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source: Delphi survey Hungary 2013-2014
Experts’ viewpoints regarding migrants’ future economic performance in 
Hungary appear to be more varied. In the case of Ukrainians, slightly more 
than half of respondents expect some kind of change regarding migrants’ 
economic performance in the future. A diversification of the labour market is 
foreseen for Ukrainians: in the second round survey, 6 of the 10 believed that 
they will occupy different (than secondary) sectors as well, while only 3 of 11 
believed so in the case of Belarusians and Moldovans. A possible driver for this 
could be language skills: either ethnic Hungarian or not (but having lived in 
Transcarpathia), Ukrainian citizens in Hungary are widely believed to speak 
Hungarian.
The interviewed experts are rather pessimistic about Ukrainian migrants’ job 
prospects, anticipating a general decrease in wages as well as deterioration in 
employment opportunities. With regard to the economic performance of Bela-
rusian and Moldovan migrants, the majority of respondents predict no change 
in the next decade. Nevertheless, those who do foresee a change, also tend to 
denote negative employment prospects for immigrants. 
Experts’ expectations about Hungary’s immigration policy directives are dif-
ferent with regard to Ukrainian citizens on the one hand, and Belarusian and 
Moldovan citizens on the other. Although none of the respondents indicated 
signs of a foreseeable negative shift in the Hungarian government’s migration 
policy, the majority of respondents presume no positive advancements with 
regard to Belarusian and Moldovan migrants either (in the case of Belaru-
sians, 7 out of the 11, while in the case of Moldovans, 8 out of the 11 respondents 
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expect consistency in the government’s migration policy). In contrast, 8 out of 
the 11 respondents noted that a more open migration policy is likely to be im-
plemented for Ukrainian nationals of Hungarian origin within the framework 
of the government’s citizenship policy. 
Figure 19. Expected changes in the inflow of migrants upon lifting labour 
market  restrictions in Hungary (in a short-term horizon of three years after 
restrictions are abolished) 
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source: Delphi survey Hungary 2013-2014
Although respondents predicted no substantial changes in the inflow of Bela-
rusian and Moldovan migrants in the next decade, the picture would change 
significantly if Hungary allowed greater access to its labour market for the 
aforementioned citizens. As shown in Figure 19, the clear majority of those 
surveyed (8 out of 11 with respect to Belarusians and all respondents with re-
spect to Moldovans) claimed that the inflow of both nationalities would at least 
be higher, whereas 8 out of 12 respondents expect that lifting labour market 
restrictions would result in a much higher increase in the inflow of Ukrainian 
migrants in comparison with the present inflow. 
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Figure 20. In which time perspective do you expect that Schengen short-term 
visas  for Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans may be abolished? (answers 
for Hungary)
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source: Delphi survey Hungary 2013-2014
The survey shows a great variance in experts’ opinions in terms of the time 
perspective in which short-term travel visas to the European Union may be 
abolished. While a large majority of respondents (8 out of 10) believe that for 
Belarusian citizens abolition of the visa regime will not be possible in the near- 
or even medium-term (in 4-6 or 7-10 years), with respect to Moldova, respond-
ents’ forcasts are distributed fairly equally among categories. Finally, accord-
ing to half of the 12 respondents, Ukrainians might be able to enjoy visa-free 
travel to the Schengen area within 2-3 years, while the other half expect the 
restrictions to be maintained for at least 4 years.
Challenges, opportunities and risks of further immigration
Respondents of the Delphi survey were asked to evaluate the importance of 
each impact on a 5-point scale, where the score of 5 means “most important” 
and the score of 1 means “least important”. Comparing their answers, we can 
see that respondents painted a rather positive picture regarding the overall 
impact of future migration on Hungary. There were no respondents who be-
lieved that the migration of Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans has no 
positive impact on Hungary at all. Overall, respondents also attributed less 
significance to negative impacts (such as the emergence of ethnic problems 
in society, problems with migrants’ integration, increased competition with 
local workers or increased burden on social services) than to positive ones. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that most of them believe that immigration 
of Ukrainians would have a slightly more positive impact – on filling labour 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
136
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
14
market shortages, mitigating the consequences of demographic crisis or bring-
ing new students into the educational system compared to the other two na-
tionalities. The only positive impact factor with a more significant disparity 
concerns the immigration of ethnic Hungarians. 
Figure 21. Desirability of immigration of ethnic Hungarians 
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of origin would be more beneficial
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We can conclude that the majority of respondents regard economic as well as de-
mographic benefits to Hungary as the most significant in terms of the positive 
impacts of migration in general. However, we can also count on other minor but 
nevertheless positive impacts which Hungary could benefit from – such as the in-
creased number of students in the educational system. At the same time, two of the 
respondents noted that instead of helping ethnic Hungarians in their endeavour 
to establish permanent residence in their national homeland, facilitating circular 
migration patterns would be even more beneficial in economic terms. 
The experts’ assessment of the current political debate in Hungary around the 
issue of visa abolishment for Eastern Partnership states also seems to confirm 
our previous findings. According to 11 respondents, visa liberalisation is not 
an important topic for the general public, while 9 of the 12 believe that it does 
not constitute an essential part of the political debate either. In contrast, 10 of 
them perceive that business circles are favourable to visa abolishment which has 
a strong correlation with immigrants potential to fill existing skill gaps in the 
Hungarian labour market and gaps in the labour force. Furthermore, the gener-
al public disinterest and lack of concern regarding the issue of visa liberalisation 
suggests that people do not perceive future immigration as a potential threat. 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
137
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
14
Taking into consideration all the negative and positive impacts of visa liberali-
sation, we can say that respondents do find the abolition of visas for Ukrain-
ians, Belarusians and Moldovans desirable from Hungary’s point of view. No 
respondent indicated otherwise with respect to Ukrainian citizens, while 
a minority of them (4 out of 12 with respect to Belarusians and 3 out of 12 with 
respect to Moldovans) stated that visa liberalisation for the other two nation-
alities is not in Hungary’s interest. 
Conclusions
Given the historical and cultural ties, as well as geographic proximity, it is 
Ukraine, and most importantly its border region of Transcarpathia, which 
plays the major role in immigration processes to Hungary, especially because 
a considerable share of its population is ethnic Hungarian. Ukrainian migra-
tion is, however, not limited to this particular group, as ethnic Ukrainians also 
come to Hungary. In comparison, immigration from Belarus and Moldova is 
negligible.
The simplified naturalisation process made it possible for ethnic Hungarians 
in Ukraine to receive Hungarian citizenship, thus their free movement to Hun-
gary is guaranteed with or without an alteration to the current EU visa regime. 
Nonetheless, there is a consensus among Hungarian experts surveyed under 
Delhi research that the abolishment of Schengen visa requirements would 
serve Hungary’s national interests. On the other hand, experts are more cau-
tious with Belarusian and Moldovan citizens in this respect, but still they have 
a generally positive approach to the issue.
Coupled with the recent political crisis in Ukraine, most Delphi experts believe 
that the number of immigrants from that country would rise considerably if no 
visa for short-term stay were needed to enter Hungary from the Eastern Part-
nership countries. There was somewhat anxious coverage of the events in the 
Hungarian mass media which might have had an influence on the responses. 
No significant inflows are expected in the nearest future, however, from Bela-
rus and Moldova.
Regarding policy recommendations, for Visegrad countries the importance of 
strategy building was stressed by most Hungarian experts surveyed under the 
Delphi research. Also, a less bureaucratic management in state administration 
and recognition of qualifications would be an important step ahead. Promoting 
bilateral cooperation in different areas with the Eastern Partnership countries 
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would also be crucial. The European Union is seen by Hungarian experts as 
the key actor for development of the Eastern Partnership countries in terms of 
technical aid and investment. Liberalisation of the visa regime is also urged by 
the respondents, while the accession of these countries to the EU is not really 
seen as desirable. Instead, Finally, EaP countries also have their work cut out 
on improving the current situation. Hungarian experts believe that combat-
ing corruption, implementing socioeconomic reforms and strengthening de-
mocracy would largely reduce the drivers for emigration. Very importantly, 
Ukraine’s future path should remain within the realm of peaceful solutions. 
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4. MigraTion bETWEEn THE EU, V4 anD EasTErn 
EUroPE: THE PrEsEnT siTUaTion anD THE PossibLE 
FUTUrE. THE PErsPECTiVE oF sLoVaKia
Vladimír benč, Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 
Slovakia
introduction
The major challenge for Slovakia and the new EU MS in the foreseeable fu-
ture will be immigration. The question is not if, but from where the possible 
immigrants might come, if Slovakia and Central European countries wish to 
maintain their economic growth and living standards. The neighbouring re-
gions could become the most suitable ‘providers’ of mutually beneficial migra-
tion and among them (preferably for Slovakia) countries like Ukraine, Belarus, 
and Moldova. Therefore, the possible abolition of Schengen short-term visas 
for those countries and future migration flows from Eastern Europe are im-
portant issues for both the foreign policy and migration policy of the Slovak 
Republic65.
The number of foreign workers in Slovakia has not yet reached a significant 
volume. Even when considering the potential presence of irregular migrants 
on the Slovak labour market, it probably does not constitute too high a level. 
However, it will certainly become more important in the years to come when 
Slovakia should make economic progress within the EU and thus become 
a more attractive destination for permitted or unpermitted labour migrants.
The aim of this chapter is to present the role of Eastern European migra-
tion in a immigration profile of Slovakia, to investigate whether (or not) 
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus may become important countries of origin 
of incoming migrants and what risks and opportunities this process may 
bring. The chapter was compiled based on the outcome of desk research and 
a Delphi forecast expert panel among Slovak migration experts. Statistical 
data in the report have been provided by three state institutions: Ministry 
65 V. Benč, J. Buzalka, Analysis of the visa systems of the Visegrad countries – the case of Slovakia, 
(in:) M, Kindler & E. Matejko (eds.), „Gateways to Europe: Checkpoints on the EU External Land 
Border Monitoring Report”, Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw 2008.
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of Interior66, the Statistical Office and the Central Office of Labour, Social 
Affairs and Family.
Delphi research was conducted from November 2013 to March 2014, addressing 
34 Slovak migration experts including academia, the NGO sector, governmen-
tal institutions, international organisations and independent experts. Sixteen 
of them returned questionnaires for the first round of evaluation and fourteen 
returned questionnaires in the second round. 
immigration profile of slovakia – a brief description 
Slovakia is not yet one of the traditional destination countries for migrants – it 
has in fact one of the lowest proportions of migrants per capita among the EU 
MS. However, in relative terms, in years 2004-2008, Slovakia experienced one 
of the hugest increases in migrantes population among the EU countries and 
the Bratislava region received the second largest concentration of foreigners in 
Europe after London67. The main reasons for that unexpected increase are as 
follows: sustainable economic growth over the last two decades, a rapid inflow 
of foreign direct investments and the close proximity of Bratislava to Vienna.
Moreover, migration plays a very important role with regard to population 
growth in Slovakia. If there had not been a positive balance from interna-
tional migration, Slovakia would have experienced a fall in population in 
years 2001-2002. But it is also necessary to state that the statistics on Slova-
kian emigration do not reveal the full picture. Divinský68 for example, points 
out the large differences between the official Slovak statistics on emigration, 
in comparison to the high numbers of Slovak immigrants recorded by statis-
tical institutes of traditional Slovak migration destinations, e.g. Czechia, the 
USA, Canada, Great Britain and Germany. Striking differences arise mainly 
from lax population registry. Moreover, there is no research that would ad-
dress these inconsistencies in the records of migratory movements. 
66 Specifically by the Bureau of Border and Alien Police of the Presidium of the Police Force, 
and by the Migration Office of the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic.
67 IOM Slovakia data, online: http://www.iom.sk/downloads/iom/facts-and-figures-migra-
tion-in-slovakia.pdf
68 B. Divinský, Migračné trendy v Slovenskej republike po vstupe krajiny do EÚ (2004-2008), 
[Migration trends in Slovak Republic after the country accession to the EU (2004-2008)], 
IOM Bratislava, 2009, in Slovak.
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Figure 22. Slovakia: contribution of migration to population growth
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
Natural increase Migration balance Total increase of population
-1 000
1 000
3 000
5 000
7 000
9 000
11 000
13 000
source: Own calculations based on Slovak Statistical Office data 
Immigration to Slovakia has been gradually rising since Slovakia’s accession 
to the EU in 2004, although the growth has been slowed by the economic cri-
sis in recent years. The total share of foreigners among the overall popula-
tion reached 1.35% at the end of 2012. The number of registered immigrants 
amounted to almost 73,000 at the end of 2012, as compared to 22,251 in 2004. 
Figure 23. Share of foreigners in total population in Slovakia in 1994-2012 (in %)
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
 Share of foreigners in total population
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
source: Own calculations based on Slovak Statistical Office data 
Traditionally, the greatest number of foreigners arrives from neighbouring 
countries, namely Czechia (14,744), Hungary (9,920), Poland (7,005), Germany 
(4,415) and Austria (2,308), according to data for the end of 2012. Since Roma-
nia’s accession to the EU in 2007, the number of Romanian citizens increased 
to 5,962 at the end of 2012 (for comparison, it totalled 3,005 in 2007). 
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However, the share of migrants coming from non-EU countries has increased 
slightly. Third-country nationals accounted for around 17,000 people, consti-
tuting around 23% of all the foreigners residing in Slovakia as of end of 2012. 
The highest number of third country nationals residing in Slovakia came from: 
Ukraine (3,915), Russian Federation (1,835), Vietnam (1,544), China (875), United 
States (861), Serbia (716), South Korea (598), Croatia (465), and Macedonia (403). 
The number of legal migrants from Moldova (57) and Belarus (165) is very small.
The highest concentration of migrants can be found in western Slovakia, mainly 
due to better employment possibilities in this region. According to 2012 Statisti-
cal Office data, around two thirds of immigrants are male (59.8% of foreigners). 
Males dominate even more on the labour market, while almost 80% of regis-
tered migrants that are legally employed are male (see Table below). On average, 
migrants from third countries are in a younger age category (20-34 years) than 
those from the EU countries (mid-age: 35-64 years). A ‘typical’ migrant living in 
Slovakia is a younger single man with higher education coming from the EU.
Table 30. Migrants in Slovakia, 2007 and 2012 (at the end of a year) 
2007 2012
total population 5,400,998 5,410,836
sk nationals 5,360,094 5,337,911
other eu(-27) nationals 25,909 55,909
share in total population in % 0.48 1.03
3rd country nationals 14,995 17,016
share in total population in % 0.28 0.32
Most important third country nationals + BY, MD:  
  Ukraine 3,745 3,915
  vietnam 1,432 1,544
  serbia 1,418 716
  russian federation 1,354 1,835
  China 1,198 875
  republic of south korea 1,136 598
  united states of america 769 861
  Macedonia 651 403
 
 
Croatia 328 465
turkey 171 214
belarus 122 165
moldova 76 57
others 2,595 5,368
source: the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 2014
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Access by foreigners to the Slovakian labour market is currently not regulated 
by quotas or similar restrictive measures. The number of employed migrants 
surged noticeably after the accession of Slovakia to the EU and is continuing to 
grow (from 2,761 in 2004, 18,247 in 2010, to 21,265 in 2012). The most numerous 
group of registered employed migrants is constituted by Romanians, followed 
by nationals from neighbouring countries. The number of employed migrants 
from France and South Korea is also high due to huge foreign direct invest-
ments (FDI) within the automotive industry on behalf of those countries. The 
number of employed Ukrainians reached almost 1,000 in 2012, though the 
number of working Belarusians (62) and Moldovans (29) is negligible. 
It can be concluded that migrants do not have a major influence on the labour force 
supply extent in Slovakia at the present time. Most of the migrants from Western 
European countries work in Slovakia as high-skilled employees: managers of com-
panies, lecturers at schools or universities, consultants, trade representatives and 
similar positions. Their work requires specific skills and experience, is mainly 
temporary (e.g. for one year) and concentrated in the largest Slovak cities (Bratis-
lava, Košice) and industrial parks where factories receiving FDI are located69.
Migrants coming from countries of the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Asia are 
frequently employed as small entrepreneurs, retailers, vendors, construction 
or industrial workers (in poorly paid areas such as textile and clothing, shoe-
making and food industries), agricultural workers and in the household sec-
tor. There are differences within this group: Ukrainians prefer working in in-
dustry and construction, Asians prefer the retailing and gastronomy sectors, 
while the citizens of Balkan states lean towards entrepreneurship. 
Table 31. Employment of foreigners in Slovakia in 2008, 2010, 2012 (at the end 
of a year)
2008 2010 2012
total 10,536 15,324 21,265
of which from:
romania 2,279 2,387 4,134
Czechia 1,589 2,246 2,884
poland 1,011 1,394 2,125
69 B. Divinský, Migration Trends in Selected Applicant Countries, Volume V – Slovakia, An Accel-
eration of Challenges for Society, IOM Bratislava, 2004.
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2008 2010 2012
france 802 691 798
hungary 737 1,422 2,078
germany 556 750 803
Ukraine 501 929 971
republic of south korea 403 579 946
bulgaria 328 465 743
great britain 314 376 427
austria 314 497 569
italy 238 392 578
vietnam 115 375 310
moldova 40 41 29
belarus 9 33 62
of which men 8,420 12,303 16,853
of which men (as % of total) 79.9 80.3 79.3
of which registered in Bratislava city 3,442 5,457 7,803
of which registered in Bratislava city (in % of total) 32.7 35.6 36.7
source: Central Office of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of Slovakia 2014
It is also believed that the potential extent of irregular migrants’ work prob-
ably does not amount to a great deal. The exact contribution of irregular mi-
grant labour to the national economy is hard to discern owing to the lack of 
any well-founded studies, surveys or estimates and may thus remain on an 
anecdotal level70. The only analysis made in this connection is the report com-
piled by Boris Divinský71. Based on questionnaire research and estimates by 
the representatives of state authorities and nongovernmental organisations, 
Divinský estimates that as of the end of 2007 the number of irregular migrants 
residing in the SR reached approximately 15,000-20,000 individuals. Divinský 
estimates that Ukrainian nationals constitute at least half of the irregular mi-
grant population in Slovakia, although he does not verify that estimate. 
It may be assumed that due to the significant decline in the number of migrants 
apprehended and the decreasing number of asylum seekers, the phenomenon 
of irregular migration in Slovakia has decreased in recent years. The number 
of migrants apprehended (either for illegally crossing the border or for ille-
gally residing in the SR) reached its peak in 2001 (15,548 people), while in 2013 it 
touched a historical low (1,091). Since 2007, the number of detections for illegal 
70 Ibid.
71 B. Divinský, Migračné trendy v Slovenskej republike po vstupe krajiny do EÚ (2004-2008), op.cit.
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stays exceeded the number of detentions for illegal border crossings. Accord-
ing to Border and Alien Police data, currently around 60% of all apprehended 
irregular migrants are those accused of breaking the rules of stay in Slovakia 
(undeclared employment, visa over-staying, etc.).
As far as ethnic composition is concerned, irregular migrants come to the 
SR from three main regions – FSU countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, and 
Georgia), some Asian countries (Vietnam and China, India, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh), and Western Balkan countries (Serbia, Kosovo, Albania, and 
Macedonia).
Since Slovakia’s accession to the EU, the number of asylum seekers has also 
been gradually declining, from 3,549 in 2005 to 441 in 2013. The number of 
people granted international protection remains consistently low. From 1993 
to the end of 2013, refugee status was only granted to 631 applicants and 532 
applicants were provided with complementary protection. The chances of an 
asylum seeker obtaining citizenship in Slovakia are close to nil, while over the 
last 20 years only 221 asylum seekers received citizenship.
Figure 24. Apprehended irregular migrants & asylum seekers applications  
in Slovakia in 1993-2013 
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The Delphi survey on migration trends between the EU/V4 and Eastern Europe 
conducted among Slovak migration experts was quite a challenge because of 
significant differences in their views. It is quite possibly a consequence of the 
absence of migration statistics, as well as a lack of sociological research on the 
migration of Moldovans and Belarusians to Slovakia.
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The Slovak experts estimate that currently approximately 16,000 Ukrainians, 
1,300 Belarusians and 1,800 Moldovans are living and working in Slovakia, 
both legally and in an irregular manner (see Table below). However, the range 
of responses is quite large, especially in the case of Ukrainian and Moldovan 
nationals. Surprisingly, the estimates for Belarusians and Moldovans are very 
high compared to official statistics. The estimated number of Ukrainian mi-
grants is comparable to official statistics and to the figures in the study of Di-
vinský (2009) mentioned above, where he estimates the number of irregular 
migrants from Ukraine to be in the range of 7,500-10,000.
Table 32. Estimates of a number of migrants from Ukraine, Belarus  
and Moldova in Slovakia (including irregularly staying ones)
nationals  am sd answers from – to
Ukrainians 15,921 9,967 6,000 – 26,000
belarusians  1,257 2,344 1,000 – 3,600
moldovans  1,815 1,474 300 – 3,300
source: Delphi survey (Slovakia) on migration trends 2013-2014
notes: AM – arithmetic mean, SD – standard deviation 
The estimates of Slovak experts on the current proportion of irregular immi-
grants (illegally staying and/or performing undeclared work) in the stock of 
migrants from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova are close to 30%. They estimate 
that 33% of Ukrainian migrants are irregular, 28% of Moldovans and 15% of Be-
larusians. Compared to estimations by Divinský, the numbers are lower, so we 
can assume that migrants in recent years have tended to legalise themselves 
and strict migration policy has been successful in this respect72.
Table 33. Proportion of irregular immigrants in the stock of migrants from 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in Slovakia
nationals  am sd answers from – to (in %)
Ukrainians  33 12 21 – 45
belarusians  15 13 2 – 28
moldovans  28 23 5 – 51
notes: AM – arithmetic mean, SD – standard deviation 
source: Delphi survey Slovakia 2013-2014 
72 Ibid.
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According to the experts, apart from Ukrainian nationals, Slovakia is not a ma-
jor destination country for citizens of Moldova and Belarus. From this point of 
view, the carrying out of undeclared work by nationals of Moldova and Belarus 
in the Slovak Republic can be regarded as rather sporadic. 
The Slovak Delphi experts regard Ukrainians as more likely to prefer settle-
ment migration than Moldovans and Belarusians. However, circular migra-
tion is said to be the preferred type for all three nationalities. The Delphi sur-
vey confirmed the previous expert view (e.g. Divinský 2009) that Moldovans 
and to some extent Belarusians are coming to Slovakia merely for short stays 
and their ultimate intention is to leave for further EU destinations. 
Generally, the Slovak migration experts concluded that there are no major 
problems with integration of Ukrainian or Belarusian migrants into society, 
while they are of the opinion that there may be some problems with integration 
of Moldovan migrants. It is likely connected with language barriers, where ex-
perts perceive a good understanding of the Slovak language by Ukrainians and 
partly by Belarusians, while there may be linguistic difficulties on the part of 
Moldovans.
The experts’ view on the profile of the immigrants is in line with official sta-
tistics. A typical migrant from Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, according to 
the Delphi survey, is a young male, mostly working manually in the construc-
tion or agricultural sectors. Experts also mentioned that some Ukrainians are 
working as highly qualified specialists (engineers, IT specialists, teachers, 
doctors, etc.). These evaluations were probably influenced by current public 
discussions about the immigration of doctors from Ukraine. A series of strikes 
by Slovak hospital doctors in recent years has raised the question of whether 
more Ukrainian doctors should be invited to Slovakia73. 
It should be emphasised that due to the negligible number of migrants from 
Eastern Europe in Slovakia and the lack of in-depth empirical data and scien-
tific and analytic investigations, experts’ opinion may to some extent express 
their perceptions rather than the true picture. 
73 See media articles: Aktuality.sk, online: http://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/237677/slovenski-a-
ukrajinski-lekari-by-podla-ministerky-zvolenskej-mohli-uzsie-spolupracovat/; I-health.sk, 
online: http://www.i-health.sk/inekomentare/1434_ o-prichode-ukrajinskych-zubnych-
lekarov-na-slovensko; SME, online: http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/7042242/nasi-zubari-sa-
boja-ukrajinskych-ktorych-je-len-zopar.html 
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Main determinants of immigration processes to slovakia 
For the target country, economic gains from migration are represented by the 
share of GDP contributed by immigrants and a low-cost, qualified workforce 
capable of filling gaps in the labour market. Nevertheless, the employment of 
immigrants can produce secondary effects on the labour market, potentially 
leading to higher unemployment among local inhabitants and wage stagna-
tion, as well as possible effects on the wider society, such as extra spending on 
social services for immigrants.
The fundamental push factors for recent migration from Eastern Europe are 
mainly the difficult economic and social conditions in the countries of origin, 
the lack of jobs, and poverty. Secondly, issues with persecution on racial, reli-
gious, ethnic or political grounds, and the violation of human rights and free-
doms. The current situation in Ukraine may also provide a strong push factor 
for migration, and not only in the short term. It is worth nothing the example of 
the Balkan wars, which resulted in a huge number of refugees to the EU – large 
waves of asylum seekers from the Balkan states were seen even until 2005. 
The Slovak Delphi experts stated the most important factors for Ukrainian, 
Moldovan and Belarusian migrants coming to Slovakia as being geographic 
proximity and low travel costs, cultural and language proximity, and pov-
erty and social tensions in the sending countries. Experts agreed that the 
main pull factors for migrants entering the territory of the Slovak Republic 
are, among others: aspirations for a better life, better job and education op-
portunities, and opportunities to pursue entrepreneurial activities. Further 
influencing factors may be the cultural, religious and psychological affinities 
of a certain share of migrants to the Slovak environment along with easier 
language communication. The language barrier is fairly small in the case of 
Ukrainian migrants, and to a greater extent in the case of Belarusian nation-
als. Ethnic factors may play a part as well. Representatives of the Slovak mi-
nority in Ukraine are entitled to the status of Foreign Slovaks, and therefore 
possess certain privileges. 
However, most of the experts surveyed are convinced that only a low percent-
age of migrants crossing the borders of the Slovak Republic wish to stay there 
for a longer period or to settle down. The essential pull factor for them is rather 
the fact that Slovakia is a transit country to the EU. Migrants therefore may see 
a good opportunity to continue from Slovakia towards countries of Western 
and Northern Europe with a better economic situation and living standards. 
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The role of family, friends, acquaintances or migrants’ organisations in en-
couraging international migration is indisputable and it may be the same for 
migrants entering or staying in the territory of the Slovak Republic. Commu-
nities of migrants – either official or unofficial – facilitate migrants’ stay, assist 
in job seeking, finding a place of residence, or securing a school place, as well 
as with many other matters that may be trivial for the native-born citizens. 
However, Moldovan and Belarusian communities are not present in Slovakia. 
The situation is different for Ukrainians, whose community is also supported 
by the presence of a sizeable Ukrainian minority which has been settled in 
Slovakia for several centuries. Several associations of Ukrainians disseminate 
essential information and assist Ukrainian migrants with legal consultations 
and job seeking, but also by the organisation of cultural and sporting activities 
and religious events, among other things.
The economic attractiveness of Slovakia plays an even more important role in 
luring migrants year after year. All Slovak regions are converging towards the 
EU average and are catching up with more developed EU regions. Slovakia con-
verged to 76% of GDP per capita compared to the EU27 average in 2012, while it 
was only 47% in 199574. In 2011, the Bratislava region became the fifth richest 
region in the EU75. Nevertheless, the economic situation following the global 
economic crisis remains unsatisfactory. Moreover, Slovakia has been facing 
huge problems in the labour market. Even for a small country, there are sig-
nificant regional disparities and some regions have for several years suffered 
from very high unemployment, reaching more than 25% of the economic active 
population in some regions. Slovakia has also been witnessing problems with 
the long-term unemployment of certain vulnerable groups, especially elderly 
people (50 years old or more) and socially excluded groups such as the Roma. 
In recent years, the problem of youth unemployment has also emerged. Such 
a situation creates obstacles for economic migration from other countries, but 
also puts the government under pressure not to liberalise migration policy to-
wards third countries.
From another perspective, all Slovak governments have historically made use 
of legislation and administrative measures to limit the access of foreigners to 
the labour market. Slovak legislation on employment of foreigners is rather 
74 Eurostat, online: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin
=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114
75 Eurostat, online: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/1-27022014-AP/
EN/1-27022014-AP-EN.PDF 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
150
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
14
complicated and creates a number of different employment regimes: some 
categories of migrants cannot work full time or they cannot work under cer-
tain types of contracts. Some, especially asylum seekers, cannot start working 
sooner than one year after arrival or cannot work at all. Specific restrictions 
in connection with the employment of migrants relate to persons granted tem-
porary residence, for the purpose of employment or business, for example, or 
tolerated stay. It has been believed that in some cases migrants are de facto 
forced by the state to perform illegal activities in order to survive, or else leave 
the country76.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in a recent study on the 
integration of migrants into the labour market made some critical comments 
regarding Slovakia: “Despite a solid legal framework, the application of equal-
treatment and non-discrimination laws is poor. Beneficiaries of international 
protection experience unequal treatment and discrimination during the job-
searching process”77. Slovakia lacks programmes to help migrants integrate 
into society, alongside legal provisions that give them a fair chance of earning 
a secure living. Participation in the labour market is the key to integrating mi-
grants into any society, but Slovakia lacks genuine motivation and willingness 
to realize the potential of migration. The desire to protect the country from im-
migration is in fact considered a major deciding factor, supervening economic 
and social reasons78.
Slovak visa policy represents another example from the past. Slovakia has fre-
quently used visa policy as a restrictive tool for mitigating possible immigra-
tion. Only within the last two years, has Slovakia started to liberalise its visa 
system towards EaP countries. This is evident in the increasing number of ap-
plications for EU uniform and Slovak national visas, with a particularly large 
increase in Ukraine and Russia.
76 Z. Bargerová, B. Divinský, Integrácia migrantov v Slovenskej republike. Výzvy a odporúčania pre 
tvorcov politík. [Integration of migrants in the Slovak Republic. Challenges and recommen-
dations for policy makers], IOM Bratislava, 2008, in Slovak.
77 Access to Employment for Beneficiaries of International Protection in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania 
and Slovakia, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Regional Representation for 
Central Europe, 2013.
78 See e.g. research outputs of the Centre for the Research of Ethnicity and Migration Culture, 
online: http://www.cvek.sk/main.php?p=dokumenty&lang=sk, the Institute for Public Af-
fairs, online: http://www.ivo.sk/145/sk/aktivity/knizne-publikacie?rok=all, or the Foun-
dation of Milan Šimečka, online: http://www.nadaciamilanasimecku.sk/index.php?id=12 
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Table 34. Applications for EU uniform and national Slovak visas according to 
citizenship in 2010-2013 
nationality 2010 2011 2012 2013
Ukraine 22 820 40 882 44 093 88 095
russia 13 505 18 147 18 003 28 196
belarus 2 631 4 083 4 277 6 259
turkey 1 027 1 164 1 164 1 271
china 786 1 138 1 359 1 461
Kuwait 853 943 843 950
india 529 635 748 704
georgia 649 624 680 n.a.
moldova 362 less than 180 less than 134 less than 117
totaL 49 873 73 482 76 937 132 466
source: the Bureau of Border and Alien Police of the Slovak Republic 2014
Table 35. Number of visa applications and visa refusals at the General Consu-
late of Slovakia in Uzhgorod in 2005-2012
Years Visa applications refused applications share of refused applications (%)
2005 25,220 511 2.03
2006 36,595 425 1.16
2007 25,220 882 3.50
2008 15,825 1,264 7.99
2009 10,651 266 2.50
2010 12,158 286 2.35
2012 20,533 283 1.38
source: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic 2014
Media and public discourse on migration
The migration domain is rather a marginal theme for Slovak politicians and 
public opinion, even since the government’s enacted key political legislation 
related to migration in 2011. This situation has also been reflected in somewhat 
short and vague sections on migration policy in the electoral programs of the 
main political parties.
Generally, non-state actors criticise all the post-independence governments of 
having had a very restrictive approach to migration. They maintain that the aim 
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of the governmental institutions is to eliminate immigration rather than man-
age it. Governmental institutions’ typical presentation of migrants (especially 
from third non-EU countries) is as a threat to society and to national security.
Many Slovak people do not recognise the differences between migrants, asy-
lum seekers, refugees, or aliens as such. Slovak society considers migrants as 
a burden on the state budget. Migrants are often ranked among the category of 
undesirable persons. Public opinion is mostly not positively disposed toward 
migrants but, to a different extent, people in Slovakia are in certain cases ex-
pressly open to migrants and regard them positively or in a neutral manner 
when it does not require any actions or contacts from their side 79. 
The extent of prejudices among Slovaks is marked and depends on the level 
of education. The more educated people are, the more positive their attitude 
towards migrants. Another factor is age; younger generations are more open-
minded. The next important factor is the experience of people from living 
abroad. Then there is the urban/rural aspect – people from larger cities and 
developed regions are more tolerant of migrants than those from remote, iso-
lated regions or from the countryside. And, of course, there are personal con-
tacts; this factor could be the most important one in combating prejudices, and 
not only in Slovakia80.
Information gained via several public opinion surveys may be summarised as 
follows:
•	 About 2/3 of the Slovak population agrees with the opinion that refugees 
should be accepted in Slovakia, if they escaped from the motherland for 
serious reasons;
•	 A considerable part of the population, however, has negative feelings about 
the presence of refugees in the territory of Slovakia;
•	 Almost 3/4 of the respondents agree with the statement that refugees are 
costly to the Slovak Republic81. 
79 M. Vašečka, Public attitudes toward foreigners and international migration in Slovakia, IOM 
Bratislava, 2009, in Slovak.
80 S. Letavajová, Predstavy a skutočnosť o utečencoch na Slovensku [Perceptions and reality con-
cerning refugees in Slovakia], in: Etnologické rozpravy, No.8, 2001, pp. 40-61.
81 B. Divinský, 2005, op.cit. 
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In general, it is impossible to speak about explicitly unfriendly or even racist 
attitudes of the Slovak population towards foreigners. Nevertheless, there is 
a high degree of more or less latent discrimination.
Xenophobia and discrimination are a natural reflection of the prevailing im-
ages of migrants in the media. The positive cases, e.g., about the integration of 
migrants into society, are seldom shown. Migration issues are in general not 
objectively presented by the media, so the public cannot change its reasoning 
and is not prepared to countenance a larger movement of people from abroad. 
It is not stressed that migrants pose no threat to society, on the contrary – they 
enrich the indigenous society through their cultures82. But it is not just about 
the media. Politicians do not deal sufficiently with migration questions and do 
not inform the public about their opinions on this subject. Some governmental 
institutions are not adequate advocates for migrants, although this should be 
their duty. Other institutions often neglect obvious manifestations of intoler-
ance and discrimination (even the police). Seen from this angle, public opinion 
only reflects the approach of state policy in this field.
Prognosis of immigration – a brief summary
The expectations of Slovak migration experts surveyed under the Delphi re-
search are that, over a ten year perspective, migration inflows, especially la-
bour migration from Ukraine and Moldova, will increase (depending on the 
political and economic situation). For migrants from Belarus, however, the 
picture is more unclear – their number could either increase or remain stable. 
In the view of Slovak migration experts, migrants’ employment may increase, 
especially that of highly skilled migrants who can be competitive in the Slo-
vak labour market. All 14 experts interviewed in the Delphi survey expect 
an increase in the inflow of labour migrants, 2 of them expect a substantial 
inflow and 12 are expecting a moderate inflow over the next decade. The in-
crease will be connected with visa liberalisation or visa abolition (e.g. the 
case of Moldova) by the EU and if the EU countries lift restrictions on access 
to the labour market for citizens of Eastern Partnership countries (though 
this is less likely taking into consideration current migration pressure on the 
EU as such). 
82 B. Divinský, International Migration in the Slovak Republic – The Current Situation, Trends and 
Impact on Society, Friedrich Ebert Foundation & Research Center of Slovak Foreign Policy 
Association, Bratislava, 2005.
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Slovak experts also expect that the number of female migrants will increase, 
as well as the number of university graduates. They also anticipate that the 
range of economic sectors in which migrants will be involved will expand. 
Some experts, however, draw attention to potential problems, in particular 
the increased opportunities for labour exploitation and illegal employment 
due to the existence of higher social contributions, a greater tax burden and 
further problems related to high unemployment in Slovakia.
According to the Delphi survey, Slovak migration experts estimate that Slova-
kia’s migration policy will undergo a transformation. Most of them estimate 
that state migration policy will be oriented to greater openness for migrants 
from the EaP countries. Most probably it will be more suitable for skilled and 
highly skilled migrant groups. On the other hand, four Slovak experts think 
that migration policy may become even more restrictive. Their assumption 
can be based on current developments in Ukraine that are of concern to the 
Slovak government, where the situation can not only create an influx of short-
term refugees but also precipitate long-term migration. There are also con-
cerns about the increase of irregular migration, with the anarchic situation in 
Ukraine potentially enabling organised crime groups that smuggle migrants to 
increase their activities. 
Challenges, opportunities and risks of further immigration 
There are several factors which could stimulate further migration from 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova to Slovakia, among others: ageing of the pop-
ulation and shortages in the labour market. On the other hand, fears of mi-
grants are deeply rooted in Slovak society. Moreover, the current situation in 
Ukraine and the use of minority politics as a domestic foreign policy tool by 
several countries in Europe is leading to a climate of growing radicalisation 
in society. 
However, when considering immigration to Slovakia from an economic point 
of view, the need for a highly skilled workforce will increase. For this reason, 
it will be necessary to supplement the workforce by immigration or temporary 
migration from third countries. In terms of sustainability and stability, the 
possibility of simplifying circular or temporary migration into the Slovak and 
European job markets becomes a priority. Most Delphi experts recommended 
that Slovakia needs to fill labour market shortages and acquire a labour force 
with the requisite vocational skills from those countries whose migrants 
would be expected to assimilate readily in Slovakian society.
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Another major challenge lying ahead is the transformation of current EU 
visa policy. In order to make further progress in the EU’s visa policy toward 
Ukraine and Belarus, it is essential to keep the twin processes of facilita-
tion and liberalisation close together. Furthermore, in the process of visa 
liberalisation the EU should more clearly distinguish technical from po-
litical benchmarks for progress. Although any final decision on lifting the 
EU’s visa requirement is likely to be political, Ukrainian citizens should 
clearly understand what measurable progress there has been on the tech-
nical aspects of visa liberalisation. The Slovak Delphi experts are in favour 
of visa abolition for Ukraine and Moldova83. The process, however, must be 
accompanied by an amended migration policy that would foresee migrants’ 
integration policy.
Non-state actors are claiming that Slovakia has no reason to fear the influx 
of migrants to an extent that would threaten national security. Conversely, 
Slovakia needs and will continue to need labour from third countries and the 
government should establish mechanisms for integrating and utilising the hu-
man, intellectual and linguistic capital that migrants possess. However, Slo-
vak authorities have so far held a different view. The strategic document “The 
Principles of the Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic” was approved as 
early as in 1993 but until 2005 Slovak migration experts were pointing out the 
“practical non-existence” of the state migration policy. Only at the beginning 
of 2005 did the government approve “The Conception of State Migration Policy 
of the Slovak Republic” as a relatively comprehensive document.
The 2005 Migration Policy Concept was later updated through the document 
“Conceptual Plans of the Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic for the Period 
2011-2015”, which was followed by the new strategic document “the Migration 
policy of the Slovak Republic with a view to 2020”. It aims to create the ap-
propriate conditions in the area of  legal migration with regard to the priori-
ties, needs and reception capacities for migrants, and to participate in building 
a partnership with countries of origin and of transit. The document prioritizes 
immigration of highly-skilled workers with an emphasis on culturally related 
countries. Additionally, a new topic of this policy paper is the connection be-
tween migration and development, in particular by focusing official develop-
ment aid on countries relevant from the perspectives of migration flows, as 
83 Authors’note: visa-free travel for Moldova became reality on 28th April 2014 – three months 
after the Delphi survey was finalised.
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well as using the potential of circular migration when supporting the develop-
ment of third countries.
On the other hand, in 2012 Slovakia adopted the new Act on Residence of Aliens. 
This new law unified previous legal regulations concerning border control with 
the law regulating the entry and residence of foreigners, a move largely criti-
cized by NGOs as creating a climate of state and border police endangerment of 
migrants. This approach is also reflected in the significantly more restrictive 
entry regulations in stricter conditions for granting temporary residence for 
third country nationals. 
The majority of Slovak experts surveyed under the Delphi research (10 of 14) 
are in favour of a more liberal migration policy. In particular, experts from 
NGOs and academic sectors called for transparency within migration policy 
and practice. One of the key recommendations for the government was to de-
sign and subsequently to implement proper migration strategy. Most of the 
experts also called for the development of rules for controlled opening of bor-
ders towards EaP countries. Almost all Slovak experts agreed that it is nec-
essary firstly to elaborate analysis of the labour market needs to make clear 
which professions and qualifications Slovakia requires and whether the po-
tential brain drain hurts the countries of origin. This should be accompanied 
by a wide public debate about the positives and benefits of migration.
On the other hand, some governmental experts expressed the view that Slo-
vakia should be prudent when it comes to discussing the possible liberalisa-
tion of migration policy. The general liberal policy approach should take into 
account how many migrants actually fulfil the declared purpose of stay. One 
of the governmental experts even added: “there are unrealistic assumptions 
that migrants travelling as tourists or business travellers may economically 
contribute to the EU.” Governmental experts also called for an integrated ap-
proach in compliance with the EU’s strict conditions with regard to countries 
of origin, and to focus on more enhanced procedures for ascertaining the true 
profile of migrants and their purpose of travel. 
Conclusions 
On the basis of empirical data, legal documents and also the Delphi research, 
it can be concluded that the Slovak Republic is currently at a turning point 
as to international migration. From a country with a low immigration level, 
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Slovakia has undergone an important transformation during the past 3-5 years. 
The inflow of migrants has grown to unanticipated proportions, carrying with 
it great challenges. There is great fear within Slovak society that liberalisation 
of migration policy may lead to growing unemployment or even an increase in 
criminality. 
The Delphi research has proven that most Slovak migration experts are in 
favour of liberalising migration policy, especially towards Ukraine, Moldova 
and, in the medium term, towards Belarus also. The abolition of short-term 
Schengen visas could be one of the appropriate measures to take. The experts 
welcome the intention to abolish the visa regime and argue that the national 
economy may profit from both arrival of less qualified migrants searching for 
any job in particular and the presence of high-skilled experts from abroad. Mi-
gration could in the future become an important contribution to improving the 
further societal development of Slovakia.
Currently, state migration policy is not a priority topic for the government and 
the public is not well informed about it. State migration policy should repre-
sent a comprehensive approach, encompassing not only the preparation of le-
gal norms, however important, topical and wide-ranging they are. It should 
also comprise a set of responsible institutions operating in synergy with long-
term strategic conceptions, legislative plan, public relations and the like. It is 
also necessary to change adverse public opinion towards migrants and to de-
crease the degree of xenophobia and discrimination in the country. It is highly 
appropriate that the Slovak government conducts education at schools in a pro-
migration way, to provide more positive examples in the media, to organise in-
formational campaigns, and finally to better collaborate with NGOs and local 
authorities. 
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5. MigraTion bETWEEn THE EU, V4 anD EasTErn 
EUroPE: THE PrEsEnT siTUaTion anD THE PossibLE 
FUTUrE. THE PErsPECTiVE oF UKrainE
oleksandra betliy, Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, 
Ukraine 
introduction 
After becoming independent, Ukraine was characterised by substantial emi-
gration flows. According to recent surveys, there are 1.2-2.0 million Ukrain-
ian labour migrants abroad. This number does not include Ukrainian citizens 
that left the country in the beginning of the 1990s due to ethnic reasons. The 
majority of migrants come from Western regions of the country, likely due to 
comparatively lower labour opportunities as compared to the industrialised 
Eastern regions. Over the years, migration became a coping strategy for house-
holds whose members either could not find work or whose salaries did not cov-
er basic needs. In particular, while the unemployment rate (by International 
Labour Organisation methodology) remains comparatively moderate (at 7.2% 
of the economically active population of age 15-70 years old in 2013), employ-
ment does not always guarantee a decent income due to wage arrears as well 
as a shortened working week or unpaid leave. Such strategies are utilised by 
Ukrainian employers, especially at times of financial difficulties. 
The geographical location of Ukraine determines the major destinations for 
migration. In particular, more than 40% of migrants go to Russia and almost 
the same share of labour migrants work in the EU countries. Russia is likely to 
be a major destination due to language proximity and the absence of barriers to 
mobility, while the EU countries are more attractive due to wage differentials. 
Countries such as Poland and Czechia are among the most important coun-
tries, also likely due to cultural proximity. 
Regardless of substantial migration dynamics, migration policy was not a priori-
ty for all of Ukraine’s governments in the past. Under pressure from civil society, 
more attention was devoted to migration after Ukraine received a Visa Liberali-
sation Action Plan from the EU in 2010, a section of which is related to migra-
tion issues. Taking into account the large number of Ukrainian migrants already 
working in the EU countries, estimating the possible increase in migration flows 
following visa liberalisation becomes an important issue for both Ukraine and 
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the EU. On the one hand, further ‘brain drain’, ‘brain waste’ (waste of talent) and 
depletion of the labour force are unwelcome potential trends for Ukraine. On the 
other hand, the higher number of Ukrainians in the EU countries will increase 
pressure on their labour markets, which is already high.
Current political unrest in Ukraine has raised fears that migration flows might 
increase further if the security situation does not calm down in the near fu-
ture. At the same time, current trends suggest higher internal migration, 
when people from the South and East of Ukraine go to Western Ukrainian re-
gions. In the longer run, however, if unrest in Eastern Ukraine and tensions 
with Russia escalate one could expect external migration to gather pace. Cur-
rently, general statistics at the EU level that would show the asylum claims and 
migration dynamics of Ukrainian nationals since the political crisis erupted at 
the end of 2013 are not available. In January-June 2014, around 600 Ukrainians 
asked for asylum in Poland, among them approximately 50 individuals that fled 
from Crimea after its annexation by Russia, which represents a rapid however 
not dramatic inflow. It may be assumed that major destinations for Ukrain-
ian migrants are not likely to change. Individuals from Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine may likely migrate primarily to Russia, while from Western regions 
they would favour EU member countries. 
The major aim of this chapter is to analyse the emigration profile of Ukraine 
with attention to the current stock of migrants abroad, particularly in the EU 
and V4, and potential changes in migration dynamics after the EU’s possible 
lifting of the visa requirement for short-term stays. Alongside this, the main 
determinants of emigration as well as current public discourse on migration 
will be also outlined.
The following country chapter is based on several data sources. In particular, 
there is the Delphi survey on migration trends between EU/V4 and Eastern 
Europe (referred to below as Delphi survey Ukraine), which was conducted with-
in the current project. The Delphi survey was conducted over two rounds: in 
November-December 2013 and February-March 2014. The number of partici-
pants was 19 and 16, respectively, in each round. Respondents included repre-
sentatives of scientific institutions, NGOs, the international community and 
the Ukrainian government. Secondly, two nationwide surveys on migration 
were used. The first survey – the Modular Population Survey on Labour Mi-
gration Issues – was carried out by the National Statistical Service of Ukraine 
(Ukrstat) in cooperation with the Ukrainian Centre for Social Reforms, the 
Open Ukraine Foundation, the International Organisation of Migration and the 
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World Bank in May-June 200884. The second survey was conducted within the 
framework of the European Union-International Labour Organisation project 
“Effective Governance of Labour Migration and its Skills Dimensions” in May 
201285. The definition of labour migrants in these surveys includes employees 
as well as self-employed individuals, both with regular and irregular status. 
However, cross-border commuting is not taken into account. If a migrant was 
absent then another household member answered questions. In this chapter, 
these surveys are referred to as Labour Migration Survey (LMS-2008 and LMS-
2012, respectively). The data on registered migration flows as reported by the 
National Statistical Service are rarely used here as they significantly underes-
timate migration flows.
Emigration profile of Ukraine – a brief summary 
Large cross-border migration outflows were typical for Ukraine over many 
years. However, a precise estimate of Ukrainian migrants abroad is still open 
to question. According to the World Bank, 6.5 million individuals who were 
born in Ukraine lived abroad in 2010. This number is often cited whenever 
the migration issue is discussed by politicians. However, many of these indi-
viduals already have citizenship in other countries and so cannot be counted 
as Ukrainian migrants. According to official data reported by the National 
Statistical Service in the period 1992-2004, around 2.5 million Ukrainians 
left the country on a permanent basis, e.g. they were leaving for good so 
they de-registered themselves with the Ministry of Interior. Later, Ukrain-
ians tended to prefer temporary labour migration, which cannot be captured 
by administrative means. Although a national census could certainly pro-
vide some new estimates, the last one was conducted back in 2001 and the 
new one planned for 2011 was re-scheduled to an uncertain date. Therefore, 
in the case of Ukraine, sociological surveys seem to be the best statistical 
84 This is a nationally representative survey, which was based on a sample of households cov-
ered by the monthly Labour Force Survey and Household Budget Survey (more than 22,000 
households and 48,000 individuals of working age). This survey reports migration between 
2007 and 2008 with some numbers for 2005; Зовнішня трудова міграція населення України, 
Київ, 2009 [External labour migration of Ukrainian population, Kyiv, 2009], in Ukrainian. 
85 This survey was conducted by Ukrstat with cooperation with the World Bank, IOM and the 
Institute of Demography and Social Science. It is also a nationwide survey with the total 
number of households covered at 23,500. This survey reports migration between 2010 and 
mid-2012: Звіт щодо методології, організації проведення та результатів модульного 
вибіркового обстеження з питань трудової міграції в Україні. Міжнародна організація 
праці, 2013, [Report on methodology, organization and results of module survey on labour 
migration in Ukraine, ILO, 2013], in Ukrainian.
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instrument for capturing migration dynamics, particularly that significant 
segment of Ukrainian migrants abroad who stay and/or work there in an ir-
regular manner.
In particular, LMS-2012 indicates that 1.2 million individuals (3.4% of the pop-
ulation in the 15-70 age bracket) either worked or looked for a job abroad in the 
period of January 2010-June 2012. This is lower than the 1.5 million individuals 
that were reported to be working abroad between 2005 and 2008, according to 
the LMS-2008. The share of labour migrants in the labour force fell from 5.1% 
in 2005-2008 to 4.1% in 2010-2012. Such a decline might be explained by the 
depletion of demographic potential as well as fewer job opportunities in desti-
nation countries due to economic stagnation.
According to both LMS, the EU and Russia are major destinations for Ukrain-
ian migrants. According to LMS-2012, 602,500 migrants (51% of surveyed la-
bour migrants) either worked or were looking for work in the EU, with a higher 
share of migrants in Poland, Italy and Czechia. The number of migrants in Rus-
sia declined to 511,000 (or 43.2%) during 2010-2012. 
Figure 25. Estimated numbers of Ukrainian migrants abroad (V4, EU, Russia) 
Visegrad states
* Note: average number reported by respondents
Delphi, round 1
Delphi, round 2
EU in general Russia
0
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* Note: average number reported by respondents
source: Delphi survey Ukraine 2013-2014
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Figure 26. Main destination countries for Ukrainian migrants (2007-2008, 
2010-2012)
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source: Modular sample survey on labour migration in Ukraine (State Statistical Committee of Ukraine 
and others 2010, International Labour Organization 2012)
However, these figures do not correctly reflect the degree of permanent migra-
tion as the survey covered only those labour migrants who were in Ukraine 
during the survey or whose families were at home. As a result, labour migra-
tion of Ukrainians in the EU is likely to be larger than revealed by the survey86. 
According to Eurostat, the number of Ukrainians with a residence permit in 
2011 was at least 648,000 individuals87. In particular, the number of migrants 
depicted by the LMS-2012 survey stood at 156,000 in Italy and 27,800 in Germa-
ny, while according to Eurostat, the number of Ukrainians holding a residence 
permit amounted to 200,700 and 136,300 in 2011, for Italy and Germany respec-
tively. During recent years, the number of short-term as well as long-term visas 
issued by EU member states to Ukrainian nationals increased. Alongside this, 
there is a trend for more Ukrainian citizens to receive either permanent or 
temporary residence permits in the EU as they attempt to legalise their status. 
Based on all these sources, it may be assumed that the current level of Ukrain-
ian migrants stock in the EU stands at around one million people88. According 
86 K. Кравчук, Трудовая миграция как фактор экономического роста в Украине [K Krav-
chuk, Labour migration as a factor of economic growth in Ukraine], in Russian, IER, (to be 
published).
87 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do
88 M. Jaroszewicz, W. Strielkowski, T. Duchac, Ukrainians EU migration prospects, OSW Com-
mentary, March 2014. 
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to the Delphi survey results, the average estimate of Ukrainian nationals re-
siding in the EU (as of February 2014) amounted to 1.1 million. The number of 
migrants in V4 countries was estimated on average at 386,000 individuals. The 
number of migrants in Russia was estimated on average at 1.3 million, which 
is much higher than the figure of 440,000-616,000 labour migrants revealed 
by the survey of the Centre for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies (Russia) in 
201189. Taking these numbers into account, the overall level of labour migration 
might de facto exceed 2 million Ukrainians. A similar estimate of 2.1 million 
migrants was made by Oleksii Poznyak on the basis of the LMS-2008 survey90.
Both the LMS-2012 survey and Delphi survey indicate that the major destina-
tion countries are Russia, Poland, Italy, Czechia, and Spain. Russia, Poland and 
Czechia are likely to be more attractive for Ukrainians primarily due to lower 
travelling costs as well as cultural and linguistic similarities. Italy and Spain 
were traditional destinations for Ukrainians due to large differences in earn-
ings and recently developed social networks are becoming a more important 
factor for Ukrainians to work there. Construction is the major employment 
sector for migrants in four major destination countries, apart from Poland 
where agriculture prevails. The migrants’ profile by education level and skills 
differ according to country. 
The LMS-2012 revealed the social and demographic characteristics of labour 
migrants. In particular, two thirds of labour migrants were men (nearly 5% 
of economically active men and 2% of economically active women were labour 
migrants). There are great disparities between destination countries with re-
gard to gender proportions. However, female migration in general seems to be 
on the rise. 57% of labour migrants were aged between 30 and 49 years old with 
the average age at 37 years old. Men become more active in migration from 25, 
while women go for migration after 30. Women migrate more actively than 
men after 50, which may be explained by differences in the employment sec-
tor. In particular, men are more often employed in sectors that demand physi-
cal strength (e.g. construction). Additionally, this might also be explained by 
family status as women usually migrate after their children grow up. 
89 M. Denisenko, E. Varshavskaya, Migrants at the Russian Labour Market: Characteristics, Sta-
tus, Mobility, National Research University-Higher School of Economics, 2013, No. WP3/21, 
http://publications.hse.ru/preprints/91006949
90 O. Pozniak, External Labour Migration In Ukraine As A Factor In Socio-Demographic And Eco-
nomic Development, CARIM-East Research Report 2012/14.
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The LMS-2012 survey indicates that 46% of Ukrainian migrants worked in 
construction, while 18% provided household services. Only 4% were occupied 
in industry. Another important sector of employment is seasonal agricultural 
jobs, which was also confirmed by respondents of the Delphi survey. 
Table 36. Major characteristics of Ukrainian migrants abroad, 2010-2012 in %
duration 
of work for 
more than 
a year %
major sector of 
activity
profession-
als, techni-
cians, %
craft and re-
lated trades 
workers, %
elemen-
tary occupa-
tions, %
all migrants 17.3
Construction 
(45.7%), individual 
services (18.3%), 
agriculture (11.3%)
10.8 24.7 39.1
russia 8.7 Construction 8.2 36.9 28.3
poland 2.3 agriculture 1.7 10.8 55.9
italy 44.2 individual services 7.0 2.4 68.8
czechia 9.0 Construction, ho-tels and restaurants 22.1 29.8 31.3
spain 64.0 individual services, Construction 13.3 25.5 26.8
source: LMS-2012
According to the Delphi survey and the LMS (2008 and 2012), the share of mi-
grants in seasonal jobs as well as circular migration increased during recent 
years. This might partially be due to friendlier visa and migration procedures 
in the destination EU countries. In particular, between 2010-2012, one labour 
migrant made on average three trips for work, not necessarily to a single desti-
nation country (LMS-2012). The average duration of work was 5 months, while 
only around 17% of migrants worked abroad for the period of 6 to 12 months. 
Overall, the number and length of trips taken depends on the destination 
country. Shorter and more frequent trips are typical for migration to neigh-
bouring countries, likely due to lower travelling costs. 
The change in EU migration policies and visa procedures might have also con-
tributed to a decline in the share of irregular labour migration. In particular, 
the share of migrants that had either a work permit or residence permit or both 
accounted for 51.5% (LMS-2012). Nearly 17% of migrants worked without any offi-
cial status. The share of irregular migrants varied between countries: the share 
of migrants without a work permit stood at 17% in Czechia and 65% in Russia. 
Experts that participated in the Delphi survey indicated the highest share of ir-
regular migration at around 40% in Russia and Italy. The high share of irregular 
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migrants raises concerns about their current social protection as well as their 
future upon reaching retirement age. In particular, only a small percentage of 
labour migrants is covered by social protection in the destination country.
Figure 27. Legal status of Ukrainian migrants abroad in 2010-2012
work and
residence
permit
38.7%
work permit
12.8%
temporary
registration
23.7%
undefined status
4.4%without
official status
16.7%
tourist visa
3.7%
source: Modular sample survey on labour migration in Ukraine (International Labour Organization 2012)
The education profile of labour migrants also differs by country. In particu-
lar, an overwhelming majority of migrants working in Germany had complet-
ed higher education (as the majority of males were employed in engineering 
and other technical activities), while only 10% of migrants had such a level of 
education in Czechia (where the most popular sectors for the employment of 
Ukrainians was construction). Overall, it is determined by the policies of des-
tination countries regarding employment of foreigners as well as the typical 
sectors of employment. In the past, Germany conducted broad-based recruit-
ment campaigns to obtain foreign IT specialists, while Poland and Czechia 
mainly addressed their offer towards low-skilled immigrants wishing to work 
on a circular basis. On average, most Ukrainian migrants had completed sec-
ondary education; however, they often do non-qualified work. 
Table 37. Education of Ukrainian migrants, 2010-2012
destination 
country
total,
in thou-
sands of 
individuals
migrants by level of education, %
completed 
higher
basic 
higher or 
uncomplet-
ed higher
completed 
secondary 
education
basic or 
primary 
education
number of labour 
migrants  
(in thousands)
1,181.6 15.4 15.1 64.9 4.6
In particular, in 
following countries:
russia 511.0 12.5 10.0 72.1 5.4
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destination 
country
total,
in thou-
sands of 
individuals
migrants by level of education, %
completed 
higher
basic 
higher or 
uncomplet-
ed higher
completed 
secondary 
education
basic or 
primary 
education
poland 168.4 12.4 18.0 61.8 7.8
italy 156.0 14.9 28.7 54.0 2.4
Czechia 153.0 9.5 11.1 74.1 5.3
spain 52.6 19.8 33.3 46.9 –
germany 27.8 89.6 3.2 7.2 –
hungary 23.0 19.6 14.3 66.1 –
portugal 21.7 – 6.5 93.5 –
belarus 21.5 – 23.3 76.7 –
other countries 46.6 42.3 16.3 38.2 3.2
source: LMS-2012
According to the LMS-2012, 39% of migrants worked in the most basic professions 
and nearly 11% were professionals and technical staff. This does not correspond 
to the occupational structure of employment in Ukraine, which raises concerns 
about occupational downshifting (‘brain waste’) of Ukrainians working abroad91. 
Main determinants of emigration processes
The major reasons for emigration have changed over the course of Ukraine’s 
independence. In the beginning of the 1990s, Ukrainians left the country 
permanently primarily due to ethnic reasons. In particular, according to the 
2001 population census data, the number of Russians, Moldovans, Belaru-
sians and Poles declined over the previous decade by more than 20%. The most 
dramatic decline occurred for the Jewish minority, whose number dropped 
by nearly 80%. Simultaneously, Crimean Tatars received the opportunity to 
return to Crimea after being deported mostly in 1944 (248,000 Tatars lived 
in Ukraine in 2001, compared to 38,000 in 1989). However, ethnic reasons as 
a push factor for migration diminished in importance after the initial emigra-
tion of minorities took place.
By the mid-1990s, following a period of rapid decline in real GDP and hyperinfla-
tion, migration became a strategy for coping with poverty for many Ukrainians 
91 O. Kupets, Brain gain or brain waste? The performance of return labor migrants in the Ukrainian 
labor market, EERC Working paper No 11/06E; T. Coupé, H. Vakhitova, Costs and Benefits of 
Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries. Country report: 
Ukraine, EuropeAid/130215/C/SER/Multi.
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during times of scarce employment opportunities and wage arrears. Since the 
2000s, the mobility strategy changed from petty trade to labour migration92. 
Still, economic reasons remained the major factor for migration as individu-
als attempted to ensure higher earnings. In particular, the income disparities 
between Ukraine and the major migration destination countries remain sub-
stantial. In 2010, disposable income per household in Ukraine was nearly three 
times lower than in Russia, Czechia and Poland and more than ten times lower 
than in Italy and Spain. 
Changes in migration outflows were anticipated in Ukraine during the global eco-
nomic crisis of 2008-2009, primarily in the form of a higher return of migrants. 
However, Delphi survey experts believed that there were rather moderate chang-
es in migration flows as a consequence of economic crisis in the EU. In particular, 
migrants did not return en masse to Ukraine due to the worse economic situation 
at home, where real GDP declined by 15% in 2009. Ukrainian migrants attempted 
to stay in the destination countries and agreed to lower wages and a change in em-
ployment sectors. On the other hand, weak employment opportunities in other 
countries constrained new migration outflows from Ukraine. 
The worrying economic trends in Ukraine are foreseen in 2014, when real 
GDP is expected to drop by 3-5%. Real disposable income and real wages will 
also decline. However, the unemployment level (according to ILO methodol-
ogy) is expected to be around 8% of the economically active population aged 
between 15 and 70 years old, which is still lower than in many destination 
countries. 
Overall, in the Delphi survey most experts reported high wages in the desti-
nation country as a major pull factor for migration. Individuals are also more 
eager to leave Ukraine when poverty and social tensions increase. These rea-
sons are confirmed by the regional origin of Ukrainian migrants. In particu-
lar, according to the LMS-2012 survey most Ukrainian migrants come from the 
Western part of Ukraine (72%), where poverty is on average higher and wages 
are on average lower than in the Eastern part of Ukraine. The share of work-
ing poor (working people whose incomes fall below the poverty line) is also 
higher in the Western part of Ukraine, which pushes people to look for higher 
earnings. According to the LMS-2012 survey, Ukrainian migrants earned on 
92 O. Malynovska, International Labour Migration From Ukraine: The Last Ten Years, Ukrainian 
Academy of State Management, Kyiv 2004; M.I. Baganha & M.L. Fonseca (ed.), New Waves: 
Migration From Eastern To Southern Europe, Lisbon 2004.
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average nearly USD 930 per month, while the average wage in the home coun-
try was almost three times lower (see Table below). The wage level varied be-
tween countries. Wages in Italy and Czechia were around USD 1100 as more 
migrants work there, particularly in construction. At the same time, wages at 
USD 600 in Poland were likely to be attributed to the fact that typically Ukrain-
ians are occupied there in seasonal agricultural jobs. 
Table 38. Average earnings of Ukrainian migrants abroad, 2010-2012
average wage  
in Ukraine in 
2010–2012: 
Usd 329 
total, 
thous. 
pers.
distribution of earnings in Usd, % average monthly 
earnings, Usd, 
2010–2012<250
251−
500
501−
1000
1001–
2000 >2000
number of labour 
migrants that re-
ported earnings
1,002 4.4 21.8 43.1 24.8 5.9 930
russia 407,7 2.6 24.8 46.2 23.0 3.4 874
poland 151,4 14.9 40.4 38.4 5.4 0.9 560
italy 146,6 4.4 11.5 47.1 27.4 9.8 1056
Czechia 131,6 2.7 6.0 41.5 44.3 5.4 1137
spain 43,5 – 19.8 49.4 26.7 3.9 943
germany 27,8 – – 25.5 25.5 48.9 1798
hungary 19,6 – – 70.9 29.1 – 969
portugal 18,6 – 10.8 53.8 31.2 4.3 1019
other 37,7 – 20.2 16.7 46.7 16.2 1306
source: LMS-2012
The tradition of political emigration never gained much importance in 
Ukraine. Asylum claims from Ukraine in the EU member states are rather rare 
– Ukrainian nationals are not present among the thirty most popular national 
groups whose representatives request asylum in the EU. In the past, Ukrain-
ians mainly claimed international protection abroad due to persecutions over 
sexual orientation or professed beliefs. Under the Presidency of Victor Yanu-
kovych there occurred, however, individual claims related to political activ-
ity or persecution at the hands of Ukrainian judicial authorities. During the 
current political crisis, Ukrainians have sought protection abroad due to the 
poor security situation in the state, political persecution (particularly refugees 
from Crimea), criminalisation and the brutalisation of everyday life. 
Since the end of 2013, political uncertainty has rapidly increased in Ukraine. 
The situation worsened even more in the beginning of 2014 due to the annexa-
tion of Crimea by Russia and unrest in the Eastern part of Ukraine. This raised 
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fears particularly in the EU countries of an upsurge in Ukrainian migrants, es-
pecially asylum seekers. However, recent evidence suggests that at present it is 
actually internal migration within Ukraine that has increased. If the situation 
does not improve in the near future one could expect an increase in the num-
ber of Ukrainian migrants. Concurrently, the major destinations are likely to 
remain the same: the EU and Russia. Nevertheless, the destination of migration 
flows may be more than ever conditioned by migration policy, e.g. whether and 
which EU states will be willing to liberalise migration policy towards Ukrainian 
migrants and whether Russia decides to toughen the admission and stay rules 
for Ukrainian nationals as a means of pressuring the Ukrainian government. 
According to the Delphi survey, the existence of a liberal migration and visa 
policy in a destination country plays an important role in migrants’ decisions. 
According to the monitoring prepared by Europe Without Barriers, Ukraine is 
surrounded by substantial and asymmetrical visa barriers. Overall, migration 
and visa policies were named as the most important factor that determines 
the choice of Ukrainians to work in such V4 countries as Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia. The importance of migration policy as an attracting factor in the case 
of V4 states that provides possibilities for legal stay was also confirmed in the 
Delphi survey. In a similar manner, unfriendly visa policy and harsh migra-
tion measures in some countries deter Ukrainians from working there. In par-
ticular, in 2012 and 2013, Czechia was defined as the country that has a ‘prob-
lematic’ visa practice. 
Language and cultural proximity were also named by Delphi experts as a fac-
tor that impacts Ukrainians’ selection of a destination for labour migration. 
Furthermore, geographical proximity primarily determines the duration and 
frequency of migration. The share of migrants from Western Ukraine may 
also be higher due to proximity to the EU countries. Only 10% of Ukrainian 
migrants to the EU come from the Eastern part of Ukraine.
Moreover, during recent years, social networks have become more important 
in defining the destination country. In particular, 77.3% of Ukrainian migrants 
between 2010 and 2012 found their job in destination countries through friends, 
relatives and acquaintances (LMS-2012). Overall, the evidence shows that most 
social networks remain informal and small. This might be small groups of people 
who are either friends or acquaintances (e.g. from one locality). Alongside this, 
the major formal organisation that is considered to unite Ukrainian migrants 
abroad is the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCG) and also the charity or-
ganization Caritas, which is closely linked with it. Ukrainians often meet during 
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church services in the UGCG, after which they might socialize and address cer-
tain issues, including employment opportunities. Private agencies helped to se-
cure employment for only 4% of migrants. According to the State Employment 
Office, licenced agencies are mostly active in the recruitment of sailors.
The evidence indicates that migration due to family reunification is increas-
ing, particularly owing to the absence of improvement in the economic situa-
tion. This was also reflected in respondents’ answers in the Delphi survey. In 
particular, parents that have legal and permanent jobs abroad try to take their 
children to the destination country as returning home does not grant them 
good employment opportunities.
Media and public discourse about emigration
Regardless of the extensive labour migration of Ukrainians, migration does not 
seem to have been a profound topic of public debate over recent years. Migra-
tion is somehow present in public debate mainly due to the activities of differ-
ent migrant organisations and those dealing with either migration (e.g. Caritas) 
or human trafficking (La Strada). In particular, migrant organisations lobbied 
for approval of a special law on external labour migration, which would provide 
migrants with special status as well as introduce policies for reintegration. Al-
though the text of the law was elaborated by civil organisations in 2013 and sub-
mitted to the Ministry of Social Policy (responsible for policies in the sphere of 
labour migration), it has not been approved so far. However, some attention in 
the media was devoted to the topic due to the drafting procedure of the respec-
tive law and discussion of major provisions in the second half of 2013. 
Lobbying from civil society also made possible public hearings at the Parlia-
ment “Ukrainian labour migration: situation, problems and ways to solve 
them” held on July 3, 2013. However, not many parliamentarians attended 
these hearings and not much has changed since. One thing worth noting is that 
the Delphi survey points out that most experts believe that migration policy 
has not changed for many years. Even though there were some formal changes 
(new laws and regulations), the policy de facto remained the same.
Migration is often covered in the media as a negative factor of Ukraine’s devel-
opment, even though some positive features are also outlined93. The economic 
93 О. Ровенчак, В. Володько, Порівняльний контент-аналіз українських видань щодо 
висвітлення питань міжнародної міґрації та місця в ній України // Статистика України, 
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and social impacts of migration are often discussed. In general, the economic 
impact is mainly assessed positively, especially the role of remittances. How-
ever, the possible problems with pension payments after migrants return are 
also debated in the media. At the same time, the social impact is often assessed 
negatively as it relates to family problems, when one or both of the parents leave 
for migration (which leads to family breakup), while children often stay home 
with their grandparents. The resulting social problems concerning childcare 
are discussed. Furthermore, migrants are frequently portrayed in the media 
as passive victims of the domestic economic situation (e.g. unemployment, low 
or absent earnings) and are sometimes perceived more as ‘losers’ rather than 
active people who seek to ensure a better life for their families. Human traf-
ficking problems as well as bad treatment of Ukrainian migrants by employers 
abroad are among other important migration topics in the media. 
Issues of visa liberalisation by the EU states are covered in the media much more 
than migration. This relates to the time framework of visa liberalisation as well 
as the steps needed to be approved by the Ukrainian government to ensure fast-
er visa abolition. In particular, there were heated debates on the legislation re-
quired to be approved for moving forward to the second phase of the Visa Liber-
alization Action Plan (VLAP) in 2013. However, once again this topic was largely 
supported and promoted by civil society organisations and initiatives. 
The changes that have already occurred in migration policy – namely the ap-
proval of the Migration Policy Concept – have been primarily explained by the 
implementation of the VLAP from the EU, initiated in November 201094. As fu-
ture visa liberalisation will make it easier for Ukrainians to travel to EU coun-
tries, it is not surprising that, according to the Delphi survey, the topic of visa 
liberalisation is an important issue for general public debate. In addition, all 
the experts pointed out the importance of this issue for business development. 
While there is a consensus on the importance of the visa liberalisation issue 
2010, № 3(50), p. 52-58 [O. Rovenchak, V. Volodko, Comparative content-analysis on the dis-
course of migration in Ukraine]; In Ukrainian; В. Володько, Особливості репрезентації 
сучасних міграційних процесів в українській та польській пресі // Методологія, теорія 
і практика соціологічного дослідження сучасного суспільства: зб. наук. праць — Харків: 
ХНУ ім. В. Н. Каразіна, 2007, p. 376–380. [V.Volodko, Representations of modern migration pro-
cesses in Ukrainian and Polish printed media], in Ukrainian.
94 О. Малиновська, Міграційна політика в Україні: формування, зміст, відповідність сучасним 
вимогам. Аналітична записка М1/2014, Інститут економічних досліджень та політичних 
консультацій, [O. Malynovska, Migration policy in Ukraine: formation, content and corre-
spondents to current challenges. Analytical brief M1/2014, Institute for Economic Research 
and Policy Consulting], in Ukrainian.
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among the general public and business circles, only 14 out of 17 respondents 
thought the issue of visa liberalisation was essential for political debate.
The general conclusion is that the visa liberalisation issue is more prominent in 
the media and in public discourse than migration policy as such. Due to the prob-
lems of ‘brain drain’ and depletion of the labour force, officials refer to issues of 
reintegration policy for migrants wishing to return home, as Ukraine currently 
lacks highly skilled labour. At the same time, Ukrainian government represent-
atives claim during meetings that immigration policy issues are likely to become 
more important in the near future, as the desirable return of migrants requires 
tremendous efforts towards improving the economic situation in the country.
Prognosis of emigration – brief summary 
There are fears in the EU that the lifting of visa requirements for Ukrainians 
for short-term stays will result in increased migration flows. In concert with 
this, the timing and magnitude of the change in migration flows needs careful 
assessment, which is a tricky task considering the lack of necessary data.
The migration experts that participated in the Delphi survey were asked for 
their assessment on the timing of the elimination of requirements for short-
term EU visas for Ukrainians. Their answers revealed that this is expected to 
be a step taken by the EU in the near future (which is more likely after the 
Ukrainian parliament approved legislative changes in May 2014 that should 
result in a move to the second phase of the VLAP). In particular, 10 out of 16 ex-
perts anticipate that uniform short-term visas to EU states are to be abolished 
by the EU within 2-3 years, while 2 more think that it will happen in 4-6 years. 
Other experts think that it will happen sooner (by mid-2015). 
Nevertheless, experts do not expect that migration flows to the EU will increase 
sharply afterwards. 10 out of 16 respondents stated that migration flows might 
increase moderately over the next ten years subsequent to visa liberalisation. 
Somewhat higher migration flows are explained by the difficult economic situ-
ation in Ukraine, which will push Ukrainians to look for a job abroad, as well as 
family reunification processes. Moreover, more young people are expected to go 
to EU countries to study in universities. Other respondents said that migration 
flows will not change as emigration potential is exhausted primarily due to an 
ageing society. The migration stocks forecast model conducted within our project 
also suggests that lifting the requirements for short-term EU visas for Ukrain-
ians should not cause an increase in the number of Ukrainians emigrating. 
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Figure 28. What can be expected to happen (in 3 years perspective) if visas for 
short-term travel up to 90 days to the Schengen zone for Ukrainian nationals 
are abolished? (answers for Ukraine)
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The expectation that migration flows will not increase sharply is also partially 
borne out by other research95. According to the LMS-2012 survey, by the end of 
2012, 2.6% of surveyed household members (876,000 people) indicated plans to 
travel abroad. From these individuals, 52% were planning to go there for travel 
purposes, 26% were going to work abroad, while 14% wanted to look for a job 
abroad. However, according to the survey of the Institute of Sociology, nearly 
4 million Ukrainians declared an intention to work abroad in 2013, which is 
more than in 2012. The rise in potential migration is explained by the decline 
in the living standards of Ukrainians. The actual share of those who de facto 
go for work abroad is typically lower than those who declare their intention of 
doing so. Still, it should be noted that surveys on migration intentions should 
95 Донецький інститут соціальних досліджень і політичного аналізу, Міграційний по­
тенціал України в контексті набуття безвізового режиму з ЄС, листопад 2011, [Migration 
potential of Ukraine in the context of visa abolishment], Donetsk Institute for Social Stud-
ies and Political Analysis, November 2011, in Ukrainian; І. Прибиткова, Структура 
міграційних потоків і пересувні ринки праці в Україні, Українське суспільство 1992­2013. 
Стан та динаміка змін. Соціологічний моніторинг. За ред. д.ек.н. В.Воронин, д.соц.н. 
М. Шульги – К.: Інститут соціології НАН України, 2013 [I. Prybytkova, Structure of migra-
tion flows and mobile labour markets in Ukraine, Ukrainian society 1992-2013. Situation and 
trends. Social monitoring, V. Voronin, M. Shulga (eds.), Kyiv, Institute of Sociology of Acad-
emy of Science of Ukraine, 2013], in Ukrainian.
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be treated with the utmost caution since they primarily indicate respondents’ 
assessment of the economic/political etc. situation in a given country, and only 
partially reflect genuine intentions and motivations to migrate. 
Therefore, overall migration potential does not seem to be much larger than 
current migration flows. However, it might sharply increase if the economic 
situation in the country fails to improve and political unrest escalates. Ob-
viously, if current instability and the security threats observed in Eastern 
Ukraine will continue or spread to other regions, it may exacerbate politically-
motivated migration. After Crimea’s annexation by Russia, people emigrated 
primarily from Crimea to other parts of Ukraine, though in the longer run they 
may ask for asylum abroad if the situation does not improve. 
In the case of visas for Ukrainians for short-term travel to the Schengen zone 
being abolished, respondents of the Delphi survey expect migration strategies 
to change. 8 out of 16 migration experts expect the regularisation of already 
present labour migrants, which is likely to increase their social protection. Be-
sides, abolition of short-term visas would lead to an increase in circular migra-
tion and seasonal jobs. Migration is expected to become younger in terms of 
age profile, primarily due to the trend towards family reunification as children 
join their parents in destination countries. 
Figure 29. Possible migration outflows from Ukraine after possible EU labour 
markets opening (in 3 years perspective) 
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* Note: none of respondents reported decline in migration outflows
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There is no consensus among respondents of Delphi survey concerning the 
economic performance of labour migrants. In particular, some experts ex-
pect an increase in remittances due to moderate increase in migration. In 
turn, other experts stress that family reunification might result in lower 
monetary transfers to Ukraine as family members also migrate to other 
countries. The employment sectors of Ukrainian migrants are also expected 
to change as regularisation of migrants might allow them to work at more 
qualified and better jobs.
Higher social protection of labour migrants is expected due to more active 
work by the Ministry of Social Policy in the sphere of negotiating respective 
agreements with other (primarily EU) countries. In particular, the agreement 
with Italy is one of the most important issues as it is a destination for many 
Ukrainian migrants.
Moreover, according to the Delphi survey, 10 out of 16 experts believe that mi-
gration policy will change over next ten years. In the future, the Ukrainian 
government is expected to focus more on reintegration policies and put more 
emphasis on immigration policy to counterbalance the workforce losses due 
to labour emigration. In particular, discussions on the reintegration of re-
turned migrants into the Ukrainian labour force have been conducted. This 
is seen to be important due to the brain waste problem. Debates on the rec-
ognition of informal skills are also thought to be helpful as a comparatively 
large share of migrants work abroad in sectors other than formal education. 
At the same time, there seems to be an understanding that return of migrants 
will be possible only after the economy is firmly on the growth path, which 
requires comprehensive economic and structural reforms and a favourable 
business climate. 
Challenges, opportunities and risks of further emigration 
Labour migration usually has benefits and costs, which impacts the devel-
opment of the country. Further emigration might increase already existing 
costs and benefits for Ukraine, though it is not likely to create substantial 
new risks. To address this issue, the participants of the Delphi survey were 
asked for their opinion on the benefits and costs of the migration. 16 out of 
18 respondents pointed out an important benefit from migration in terms of 
lessening social and economic tensions, reducing poverty and unemploy-
ment, and providing remittances. Moreover, the potential for growth in en-
trepreneurship is considered significant. However, the latter is limited by 
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the lack of a favourable business climate as well as the substantial starting 
capital required. Furthermore, 17 out of 18 respondents reported that deple-
tion of labour force and ‘brain drain’ are among the most important negative 
consequences of migration. 
Two nationwide migration surveys showed that while migrants initially 
planned to work abroad for short periods of time and then return, in reality 
many of them stay for much longer. As a result, temporary migration turns to 
be permanent over time96. This creates risks for the subsequent demographic 
structure of Ukraine as it contributes to the ageing of society through sev-
eral channels. Firstly, mostly younger people leave the country and they may 
choose to stay abroad on a permanent basis. Secondly, migration is likely to 
lead to fewer children in migrant families. Moreover, social connections break 
down, which includes family breakup. The extended absence of one or both 
parents (especially the mother) results in the negative social externality of 
psychological disorders among their children. 
In spite of this, labour migration also serves to lessen pressures on the labour 
market. In particular, the unemployment rate could have been 1.6 times higher 
than reported in Ukraine (the Institute of Demography by Ptukha at the Acad-
emy of Science of Ukraine) if emigration had not occurred. However, there is 
a high level of skills mismatch, when regions with higher migration (e.g. West-
ern Ukraine) lack such highly skilled specialists as doctors and teachers, who 
go for work abroad due to very low wages paid in health care and education at 
home. 
Remittances make a positive impact on the domestic economy97. They are es-
timated to reach USD 6-7 billion a year, which contributes to a lower current 
account deficit. They also result in higher private final consumption, which is 
a typical driver of economic growth in Ukraine, and thus, improved welfare of 
migrants’ families. Additionally, remittances are also invested in the mainte-
nance of existing housing or the acquisition of new housing. Some proportion 
96 Трудова міграція: соціальні наслідки на шляхи реагування, Аналітична доповідь, 
Національний інстутут стратегічних досліджень, Київ 2011 [Labour migration: social im-
pact and ways to react, Analytical report, National Institute of Strategic Studies, Kyiv, 2011], 
in Ukrainian.
97 O. Kupets, The Development and the Side Effects of Remittances in the CIS Countries: the Case of 
Ukraine, CARIM-East Research Report 2012/02; W. Strielkowski, O. Glazar, B. Weyskrabova, 
Migration and remittances in the CEECs: a case study of Ukrainian labour migrants in the Czechia, 
IES Working Paper, 19/2012.
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of received transfers is used for the education of migrants’ children, thus con-
tributing to the improvement of human capital. However, remittances have 
limited impact on the development of business, which could be explained by 
the unfavourable business climate in Ukraine. In particular, tax administra-
tion is complex, while the regulatory climate is usually considered by compa-
nies as a barrier to their development.
There is a deterioration in the skills of Ukrainian labour migrants (LMS-2008 
and LMS-2012). As a result, they also have difficulties with reintegration into 
the Ukrainian labour market after coming home. At the same time, the lack of 
recognition of informal skills in Ukraine hinders their employment in sectors 
other than formal education once they return home. 
Another risk relates to the social protection of migrants. In particular, ir-
regular migrants do not have any social insurance, while not all regular mi-
grants have full coverage of social protection. Ukraine still has relatively few 
agreements with other countries on the employment and social protection 
of migrants (e.g. with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
Czechia, Portugal and Spain). As a result, after returning home for retirement 
many migrants may face the risk of not receiving pension payments. However, 
they would be eligible for social protection in Ukraine, thus creating pressure 
on public finances.
Ukraine could face a severe problem in terms of labour deficits in 10-12 years 
due to a shrinking and ageing society (e.g. according to World Population Pros-
pects (UN), during the next 10 years the population could decline by up to 6%, 
while the labour force could shrink by more than 7%). As a result, immigration 
to the country may increase if Ukrainian migrants do not return and demo-
graphic patterns do not improve while the economy is in a growth trend98.
Another of the costs of migration is the increase in youth migration. This es-
pecially relates to students who go to study abroad. Family reunification is one 
of the reasons behind the higher number of Ukrainian students abroad (see 
Table below). Another reason for student migration is related to the destina-
tion countries’ policy of attracting educated young people. In particular, over 
recent years Poland has become more active in attracting Ukrainian students, 
98 О. Позняк, Євроінтеграції України. Міжнародна міграція, жовтень 2012, дослідження 
Фонду Фрідріха Еберта; [O. Pozniak, Social Impacts of Eurointegration of Ukraine: Internatio nal 
Migration, October 2012, Research of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Fund], in Ukrainian.
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which is manifested in a near threefold rise in students based there over the 
last four years. For Ukrainian youth, such a possibility is attractive as it opens 
the external labour market for them and, in any case, it is often not much more 
expensive than commercial programs in Ukrainian universities (including the 
need to occasionally pay bribes for securing places at tertiary education estab-
lishments).
Table 39. Number of Ukrainian students abroad in 2008-2013
2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013
russia 4,236 4,055 4,919 4,644 –
poland 2,831 3,499 4,879 6,321 9,620
italy 800 1,043 1,314 1,556 1,727
czechia 1,046 1,364 1,456 1,647 1,782
spain 558 641 840 1,114 1,323
germany 8,557 8,818 8,830 8,929 9,044
Usa 1,716 1,727 1,583 1,535 1,490
France 1,349 1,388 1,447 1,482 1,282
austria 739 855 926 1,055 1,249
hungary 829 896 862 763 803
australia 614 636 721 692 636
bulgaria 275 296 333 367 411
moldova 271 235 202 157 165
source: Centre of Society Studies, http://www.cedos.org.ua/osvita/kilkist-studentiv-ukraintsiv-za-
kordonom-denna-forma-navchannia-interaktyvnyi-hrafik
To conclude, migration also raises the pressure on the Ukrainian government 
to conduct social and economic reforms and foster economic growth, which, 
although feasible, is in practice not very easy to accomplish. According to the 
migration experts that participated in the Delphi survey, such policies are 
important for preventing migration flows from growing, and thereby reduce 
risks and costs. Higher economic growth might then substitute a decline in re-
mittances for an increase in domestic income, which is important for keeping 
consumption high. 
Conclusions 
Large cross-border migration flows have been typical for Ukraine over many 
years. However, the reasons for migration have partially changed. At the 
demise of the USSR and in the beginning of independence, ethnic reasons 
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prevailed. In the mid-1990s and in the 2000s, the major push factors for migra-
tion became poverty and unemployment. Therefore, migration became one of 
the strategies for Ukrainians to cope with poverty. 
Russia and the EU countries are major destinations for Ukrainians who have 
decided to work abroad. The wage differential remains the major push factor 
for migration. In addition, other reasons for migration which determine the 
destination country include visa procedures and migration policies, language 
and cultural proximity, as well as social networks. These latter factors play 
a more important role in the attractiveness of the V4 countries, where wages 
remain on average lower than in Western European Countries. 
According to the Delphi survey, major costs of further migration from 
Ukraine include the ‘brain drain’ and the so-called ‘brain waste’, where ex-
isting talent or skills are underutilised. Moreover, it leads to depletion of la-
bour especially taking into account the ageing and shrinking population of 
Ukraine. On the other hand, migration mitigates social and economic ten-
sions as it contributes to lower poverty and unemployment. Alongside this, 
it supports balance of payments and economic growth through remittances, 
which are primarily spent on consumption. Nevertheless, the contribution of 
migration to business development remains rather low due to the unfavour-
able business climate.
Lifting the requirements for short-term EU visas for Ukrainians is not expect-
ed to result in a sharp increase in the number of Ukrainians emigrating. Most 
experts that participated in the Delphi survey expected a moderate rise in mi-
gration flows immediately after visa liberalisation. The magnitude of circular 
migration is likely to climb due to easier access to the EU countries. Migra-
tion might become younger in age profile due to the higher share of Ukrainian 
youth going to EU countries for study, which would open up to them the labour 
market of other countries. The migration stock might grow somewhat after 
visa liberalisation due to regularisation of labour migrants already working in 
the EU as well as family reunification. At the same time, the migration forecast 
indicates that migration flows will somewhat decline after 2026-2028, which 
might also result in a lower migration stock. This would require Ukrainian 
government to conduct economic and social reforms aimed at ensuring sus-
tainable economic development in the country.
However, there is a risk that migration flows might increase more than ex-
pected if political tensions with Russia increase and unrest in Eastern Ukraine 
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escalates and spreads to other regions. In this case, one could expect a rising 
number of asylum-seekers. Nevertheless, Russia and the EU countries (in this 
case probably V4 countries, mainly dependent on their migration policies) will 
remain major destinations for Ukrainian migrants. 
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6. MigraTion bETWEEn THE EU, V4 anD EasTErn 
EUroPE: THE PrEsEnT siTUaTion anD PossibLE 
FUTUrE. THE PErsPECTiVE oF MoLDoVa 
Kamil Całus, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Poland
introduction 
Contemporary Moldova has been especially strongly affected by mass labour 
migration. According to various estimates, which will be discussed further in 
this chapter, around 15-20% of its population (circa 3.5 million) are currently 
staying abroad. One in three families in Moldova declares that one or more 
of its members are working abroad99. Labour migration started soon after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a consequence of the sudden deterioration 
of the economic situation in this small state, devoid of natural resources and 
industry. Moldovan labour workers primarily seek employment in Russia and 
the EU, although some of them also work in Turkey, the USA, Israel and the 
United Arab Emirates. 
Moldova has for many years been ranked last in Europe in terms of GDP per 
capita. For many Moldovans, remittances from their relatives working abroad 
are the foundation of their home budgets. From the state’s point of view, labour 
migration has made it possible to soothe social tension and maintain the un-
employment rate at a relatively low level. However, the social costs of so many 
citizens working outside the country are enormous. These include: the loosen-
ing of family bonds, problems with bringing up children and, last but not least, 
the deepening demographic crisis and the increasing burden on the pension 
system. 
This chapter presents the results of the Delphi survey on migration trends be-
tween EU/V4 and Eastern Europe (Moldova), which was conducted between 
December 2013 and March 2014 in two rounds. Seventeen Moldovan experts 
took part in the first round and fifteen in the second. The experts participat-
ing in the survey filled in the questionnaires concerning Moldovan emigration 
abroad, especially to the EU and Visegrad states. 
99 This data originates from the Nexus Moldova project. The survey was conducted between 
May and August 2013 on a sample of 20,850 households in Moldova. 
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Due to time restrictions, the present Russian-Ukrainian crisis, which began in 
late February 2014, was not taken into account by the experts participating in 
the survey. Meanwhile, it might affect emigration from Moldova. On the one 
hand, the situation in Ukraine, and in particular reports on attacks on peo-
ple travelling via Ukraine published in the Russian media, have discouraged 
some Moldovans from seeking jobs in Russia. On the other hand, the deterio-
rating economic and political situation in Ukraine has adversely affected the 
trade volume between Moldova and Ukraine as well as the financial situation 
of those Moldovans who have earned their living through small cross-border 
trade with Odessa region. Both of these factors might contribute to increasing 
the number of Moldovans seeking employment in the EU.
Emigration profile – a brief description
The demographic profile of Moldovan emigrants depends primarily on the 
country of destination. Moldovans who decide to leave for Russia are pre-
dominantly men with secondary education usually hired as manual workers, 
mostly in construction sector. In their case, emigration is usually circular. 
In turn, women predominate among the emigrants leaving for the EU. Mol-
dovan emigrants in the EU mostly find employment in the services sector 
and trade. Migrants are usually young, with as many as one third of them 
aged between 25 and 34. Furthermore, children and adolescents form a rela-
tively numerous group. Three quarters of those who decide to leave abroad 
come from rural areas, thus contributing to depopulation of villages, most of 
whose residents now are old people and children. This is a problem for both 
the economy and society100.
As regards the general characteristics of Moldovan migrant workers obtained 
as part of the Delphi survey, most of them are unqualified ones. Given the 
linguistic similarities between Romanian and Italian or Spanish, Moldovan 
emigrants quite quickly pick up the language of the country they work in. Al-
though their command of the language is usually moderate, they can freely 
communicate in the local environment. A small majority of the respondent ex-
perts concluded that Moldovan emigrants in the EU prefer short-term circula-
tory emigration over settlement one. Young people predominate, although the 
average age has been constantly rising. 
100 This data originates from the report by the Moldovan National Statistical Office, Migraţia 
Forţei de Muncă, 2013 and V. Ganta, The demographic and economic framework of circulatory mi-
gration in Moldova, 2012.
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The experts who took part in the Delphi survey disagreed about the number of 
Moldovan emigrants in the EU and Russia. The differences in their estimates 
were partly a result of the fact that some of the respondents stating the number 
of migrant workers had in mind only those who are working abroad currently, 
while others also included those circular migrants who had returned to Mol-
dova for a short time. According to the experts, the average estimate of Mol-
dovans working in the EU and Russia is around 554,000 as of February 2014. 
That estimate was higher than the one presented in the National Statistical 
Office report (around 430,000) and was comparable to the result of the Nexus 
Moldova 2013 survey (over 550,000).The number of Moldovan labour workers in 
the EU indicated by Delphi experts ranged between 120,000 and 500,000. Big 
differences were also seen in the estimates regarding the number of Moldo-
vans staying in V4 countries. 
Table 40. Main destination states for Moldovan migrants 
no. country mostly regular/ mostly irregular migration 
1. russia irregular
2. italy regular
3.
spain regular
france regular
4. turkey regular
portugal* regular5.
* Similar number of experts placed Portugal on 4th and 5th position 
source: Delphi survey Moldova 2013-2014
The Russian Federation remains the main destination for Moldovan labour mi-
grants. As a consequence of the economic crisis in the EU, the number of Mol-
dovan job seekers in Russia has clearly increased since 2008. According to the 
Delphi estimates around 315,000 Moldovans are currently staying in Russia, 
most of them illegally. Such a large number of irregular migrants is to a great 
extent an effect of stricter immigration regulations having been introduced in 
Russia since 1 January 2014. Furthermore, Moldovans very frequently do not 
hold work permits as required under Russian law. 
The next most popular destination states are Italy, Spain, France, Turkey and 
Portugal. According to the Delphi experts’ calculations, almost 240,000 Moldo-
van emigrants are residing in the EU (as of February 2014). The Moldovan em-
bassy in Rome estimates that around 150,000 Moldovan nationals are staying 
in Italy. A clear majority of them are regular migrants, employed primarily in 
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the service sector, households or construction101. Over the past few years, Italy 
has lost its popularity to France and the United Kingdom due to the economic 
crisis. According to various estimates, between 25,000 and 60,000 Moldovan 
emigrants are currently based in France. Moldovans are usually staying there 
legally, either holding Romanian passports either other EU passports. Most 
Moldovans in France work in the construction, hotel and restaurant sectors. 
Portugal used to be a very popular destination for Moldovan emigrants prior 
to the economic crisis. According to data from the Moldovan embassy in Lis-
bon, the number of Moldovan emigrants in Portugal exceeded 20,000 in 2009. 
At present, less than 10,000 Moldovans live in Portugal, according to official 
data. Such a radical decrease stems from the deteriorating economic situation 
in this country and also the fact that Portuguese citizenship has been granted 
to over 6,000 Moldovan migrants over the past few years. Moldovans in Portu-
gal work predominantly in the services, construction and household sectors, 
which is similar to the situation in Spain.
The Visegrad Group states are not an appealing destination for Moldovan mi-
grant workers. According to the Delphi experts’ estimates, the total number 
of Moldovan migrants staying in the V4 countries is slightly above 11,000 (as 
of February 2014). This is mainly due to: lower wages offered than in Western 
Europe, the absence of migrant networks, and the language differences. Before 
the economic crisis, Czechia was the most popular V4 destination for Moldo-
vans. However, Poland has been the most frequent choice for some time now. 
This is because Poland has adopted a more liberal migration policy which con-
tributes to short-term migration from Eastern Europe. For example, according 
to the records of the Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, in 2013, Polish 
employers issued more than 9,000 employer’s declarations enabling tempo-
rary employment of Moldovan citizens, i.e. almost double the number of decla-
rations issued to Belarusian workers. 
Main determinants of emigration processes
The factors which determine migration processes may be economic, social and 
political. The first two categories are seen as the most important by Moldovan 
Delphi experts. As regards EU member states, the Delphi experts concluded 
101 Unless otherwise stated, all data concerning the number of Moldovan migrants in EU mem-
ber states and their employment originate from the report by D. Cheianu-Andrei, Mapping 
of the Moldovan Diaspora in Italy, Portugal, France and the United Kingdom published in Chis-
inau in 2013 in co-operation with the Moldovan government and the IOM. 
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that the most appealing were the high wages, high living standards and the 
presence of relatives and close friends in the destination country. At the same 
time, the respondents emphasised that the factor which most frequently 
pushed Moldovans into labour migration were poverty and related social ten-
sions rather than the political situation or repression in their country of origin. 
Figure 30. What are the main push and pull factors of emigration pushing 
from Moldova and attracting in the EU? (average results)
Geographic proximity
and low travel costs
Already staying and working relatives
or close friends (migration networks)
Already existing strong group of compatriots
in a destination country
Liberal migration (conducive to emigration)
policy of sending country
Liberal visa and migration policy
of destination country
Cultural and language proximity
Political oppression and/or destabilization
of political situation in sending country
Poverty and social tensions
in sending country
High living standards
in destination countries
High wages
in destination countries
It is easy to find job
in destination countries
Ethnic links
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
5-most important; 4-important; 3-neither important, nor unimportant; 2-unimportant; 1-least important
1.3
3.8
4.6
4.5
4.1
2.2
2.9
3.9
4.2
3.3
2.8
3.1
source: Delphi survey Moldova 2013-2014
The impact of the economic factor on migration is fully understandable. The 
average monthly wage in Moldova at the end of 2013 was around EUR 200 (data 
provided by the National Statistical Office), while a labour migrant in the EU 
may earn more than EUR 1,000 monthly102. Thus, labour migration is a very ef-
fective step and sometimes the only way to protect one’s family from poverty. 
Almost one third of families who have not used the benefits of the labour mi-
gration system live below poverty line. While this problem affects only one in 
102 D. Cheianu-Andrei, Moldovan Diaspora Mapping Series II. Mapping of Moldovan Diaspora in 
Italy, Portugal, France and the United Kingdom, Chisinau 2013. 
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ten families where one of the spouses works abroad, and only a few percent of 
the families where both spouses are labour migrants103. 
The existence of well-developed migration networks is also a key factor which 
determines the choice of the destination state. 63% of Moldovans based in Italy 
have admitted that the “presence of friends or relatives” was the main reason 
for choosing this country. In the case of France, this answer was chosen by 
56% of emigrants, and in the case of Portugal by 46%104. The presence of the 
diaspora makes it easier to find a job and handle formalities in the destination 
state, and also soothes the negative consequences of a change in one’s social 
environment. 
Since 28 April 2014, when the EU lifted the requirement for Moldovan citizens 
to hold short-stay visas, the visa policy of a given destination country has not 
been a factor which determines the choice of migration destination. But even 
before the lifting of the visa regime, only a small percentage of Moldovans who 
decided to leave for one of the EU member states, declared that easy access to 
visas determined their choice of destination state105.
Media and public discourse on emigration
Moldovans generally view labour migration as a necessity resulting from the 
poor economic situation at home rather than an opportunity for development 
or a chance to gain experience. Given this approach, the Moldovan public usu-
ally reacts with resistance to any attempts at presenting emigration as some-
thing desirable. Moldovans want to be well-informed about possible migration 
destinations, legal regulations on migration in a given country, and the scope 
of required visa formalities, but when they begin to see signs that emigration 
is being promoted they clearly resist this. This resistance is especially strong 
when public figures, such as artists or politicians, encourage them to leave the 
country106. 
103 Н.Мкртчян, Социо-политическое влияние трудовой миграции на страны происхождения: 
Сравнительный анализ статей социально-политического модуля проекта Карим-Восток, 
[N. Mkrtchyan, Socio-political influence of labour migration on the countries of origin. The com-
parative analysis of articles from the socio-political module of CARIM-East], CARIM-East 
2012/2013, European University Institute, 2012, in Russian. 
104 D. Cheianu-Andrei, 2013, op.cit., p. 27.
105 Ibidem. 
106 The campaign aimed at encouraging Moldovans to participate in the US green card lottery 
in autumn 2013, in which Moldovan celebrities were actively engaged, was a good illustra-
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Since emigration plays a major role in the lives of Moldova inhabitants, it is not 
surprising that liberalisation of the visa regime with the EU raises massive 
interest in this country. All the experts who took part in the Delphi survey 
agreed that visa liberalisation is a very important issue for the average Moldo-
van and is given a great deal of attention in public debate. In the public opinion 
poll conducted in April 2014 by the Moldovan Public Policy Institute, 50% of 
respondents stated that lifting the visa regime was important or very impor-
tant to citizens of Moldova. This, however, does not mean that Moldovans are 
well-informed about the essence of the visa liberalisation process. According 
to the same poll, as many as 34% of respondents were unaware of the fact that 
lifting the visa requirement alone will not give them the right to work in the 
EU. Furthermore, a significant proportion of Moldovans do not understand the 
complex negotiation process which Chisinau and Brussels were conducting in 
order to introduce a visa-free regime. This is because the Moldovan govern-
ment has failed to hold a public campaign on the European integration process 
in the broad meaning of the term, including visa liberalisation issues. For ex-
ample, despite declarations from Brussels that the visa requirement would be 
lifted soon, only 46% of Moldovans stated in November 2013 that Moldova had 
a chance of achieving a visa-free regime with the EU at all107. 
In the official discourse, politicians do not encourage Moldovans to leave, but 
they clearly emphasise their right to labour migration and support any ini-
tiatives aimed at offering greater opportunities for Moldovan citizens to work 
abroad. For this reason, the visa liberalisation with the EU has been backed 
by all political parties in parliament, regardless of attitude to the European 
integration process itself. Moldovan Communists, who stick to the idea of inte-
gration with the Customs Union promoted by Russia, not only support lifting 
the visa requirement for Moldovans travelling to the EU but they also clearly 
emphasise that it was them who commenced negotiations on this issue back in 
2006-2007. 
Migration issues have also been the topic of a broad public debate in Moldova; 
at expert level and in the media. This debate is primarily focused on the threats 
tion of this approach. This action was broadly criticised by the public. Moldovans did not 
merely dislike the fact that they were encouraged to leave but also that they were encour-
aged by individuals who should have proven by their achievements that success was also 
possible in Moldova.
107 Barometrul de Opinie Publică, Institutul de Politici Publice, online: http://ipp.md/public/
files/Barometru/BOP_11.2013_prima_parte_finale.pdf
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inherent in migration, especially social and demographic ones. It has been em-
phasised that migration is conducive to the breakup of families and adversely 
affects the process of bringing up children. Expert circles are trying to find 
how further increases in emigration could be stopped and how Moldovans 
abroad can be encouraged to come back home. The discussion on possibilities 
for encouraging Moldovans living abroad to invest in their home country has 
become increasingly popular over recent years.
Prognosis of emigration – brief summary
The recent EU lifting of the requirement to hold visas for short-term stay for 
citizens of Moldova is unlikely to cause a rapid growth in the number of mi-
grants from this country. The experts who took part in the Delphi survey agree 
that the number of migrants will increase, but the growth will be moderate. 
This is linked to four key factors. 
Table 41. How big an outflow of migrants from your country will there be if 
the European Union lifts restrictions on access to the labour market for your 
country nationals (in a short-term horizon of three years after restrictions 
are abolished) in comparison with the present inflow?
much higher 0%
higher 80%
no change 13%
Lower 0%
much lower 0%
don’t know 7%
source: Delphi survey Moldova 2013-2014
Firstly, a clear majority of Moldovans who wanted to find jobs in the EU have 
already done this, for example, by using the opportunity to be granted Roma-
nian citizenship. The Soros Foundation estimated in 2013 that around 500,000 
Moldovans already held Romanian passports, and the number of passport ap-
plications was falling. Furthermore, according to the Nexus Moldova survey, 
91% of Moldovans who have not emigrated so far do not intend to seek employ-
ment abroad. Secondly, a possible increase in the migrants outflow resulting 
from the introduction of the visa-free regime with the EU will be compensated 
within a timeframe of several years by older emigrants returning to Moldova 
who have achieved their migration goal (earned enough money to buy real es-
tate in Moldova, provided education to their children, etc.) and do not wish to 
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stay abroad for the rest of their lives. At present, most Moldovans working in 
the EU declare that they want to return home at some point108. The poor de-
mographic situation is the third factor which allows assuming that enhanced 
mobility with the EU will not bring about a significant upsurge in migration 
outflows in the medium or long term. As the population of Moldova is dramati-
cally shrinking and ageing, the number of potential emigrants is diminishing. 
Fourthly, the EU’s lifting of the requirement to hold short-stay visas neither 
grants the right of long-term stay in EU MS nor does it allow work there with-
out holding work permits. 
Figure 31. What can be expected to happen (in a short-term horizon of three 
years) if visas for short term travels for up to 90 days to the Schengen zone for 
Moldovan citizens are abolished?
0 25 50 75 100%
The result do not total 100% because the respondents could choose more than one answer
26%
26%
86%
100%
53%
Regularization of already
present labour migrants in the EU
Moderate outflow of labour
migrants to the EU
No changes in number
of labour migrants in the EU
More long-term settlement
migration from your state in the EU
Other
(more tourism, visits to family
members, circular migration)
source: Delphi survey Moldova 2013-2014
The Delphi experts expect that short-term visas abolition may contribute 
first of all to legalising the stay of Moldovan emigrants currently in the EU. 
However, this depends on the policy the individual EU member states will 
adopt, since as a consequence they would have to temporarily liberalise their 
migration regulations and enable Moldovan visa over-stayers to legally leave 
the EU and then return. The respondents have pointed to the fact that the 
current liberalisation of the visa regime will in the longer term contribute 
to an increase in circular migration. Moreover, Moldovans working in the 
EU will be able to bring their spouses, children and sometimes even parents 
to the country they are based in. Consequently, reunification of families will 
108 D. Cheianu-Andrei, 2013, op.cit., p. 39.
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directly result in a reduction of remittances sent home by labour migrants. 
It is also very likely that the share of students among the total number of 
migrants will increase, both as a consequence of the improved travel oppor-
tunities and of Moldovan students being covered by EU student exchange 
programmes.
The Delphi experts agreed that the position of Moldovan migrants on EU 
labour markets should improve within the next ten years. This change 
should result from three factors: the increasing share of young people edu-
cated, in Romania or other EU states among the emigrants, their further 
integration with the local communities and continuing legalisation of their 
stay. Well-integrated emigrants who have lived in a destination country for 
a sufficiently long time and know the language stand a better chance of get-
ting a better-paid and more prestigious job. This is evident even now, and 
statistics indicate that long-term migrants tend to earn more than tempo-
rary ones. 
Although Moldovans have become slightly more interested in work in V4 coun-
tries, their key emigration destinations are still Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey 
and Greece. The popularity of these destinations depends primarily on their 
economic performance. Further development of Russia’s policy will also have 
a noticeable impact on the structure of Moldovan emigration. Stricter Russian 
migration regulations may make Moldovans less interested in Russia as an 
emigration destination in the short term.
It is still an open question how visa liberalisation will influence the residents of 
Transnistria. Although Transnistria is de facto an entity independent of Mol-
dova, its residents can also benefit from visa-free regime with the EU on con-
dition that they hold Moldovan biometric passports. According to data from 
the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moldovan passports (mostly non-
biometric) are held by around 300,000 people in Transnistria. The number of 
migrants from Transnistria in the EU is unlikely to grow following the lifting 
of the visa requirement. Russia is still the most popular destination among mi-
grants from this region, while the number of Transnistrian job seekers in the 
EU is marginal. 
Challenges, opportunities and risks of further emigration
The key risks linked to further migrations of Moldovans are first of all: the 
separation and consequent breakup of families, the increasing number of 
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so-called migration orphans, the outflow of young workers and the related re-
duction in the sources of economic and demographic growth of the country, 
and the ‘brain drain’. 
Figure 32. Negative impacts from future migration from Moldova to the EU 
by relevance (average results)
Depletion
of labour
force 
4.1
5-most important; 4-important; 3-neither important, nor unimportant; 2-unimportant; 1-least important
4.24.0
2.5
2.1
1.6
“Brain drain” Emigration halts
governments’
efforts to conduct
neededsocial
and economic
reforms
Family
breakup
I don’t see any
negative impacts
Departure
of ethnic
minorities  
Increase
in income
inequalities
and inter-regional
disparities 
1
2
3
4
5
2.8
source: Delphi survey Moldova 2013-2014
Labour emigration contributes to improving of the living standards of Moldo-
van families, but it has a very negative impact on keeping families together and 
the process of raising children. According to surveys conducted by the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), when one or both of the parents leave to 
work abroad, the family’s financial situation improves significantly and access 
to medical services and education improves. Unfortunately, children who have 
been abandoned by one or both of the parents for a long time, usually have 
problems with adaptation and accepting the social norms. Many of them are 
forced to take over the obligations of the parent who have emigrated. The nega-
tive impact of emigration is evident from police statistics, which suggest that 
one in four juvenile offenders comes from a family where at least one parent 
works abroad. The estimated number of so-called migration orphans or semi-
orphans in Moldova currently exceeds 100,000. Emigration is a frequent cause 
of family breakup. When a family where the woman works abroad is divorced, 
the court often grants the right to take care of the children to the father, who is 
then forced to seek employment abroad, because the wife who had supported 
the family financially has left. As a consequence, many children are taken care 
of by their more distant relatives. 
Mass emigration coupled with the deteriorating demographic situation of Mol-
dova has a very strong negative impact on the country’s economy. According 
to data from the National Statistical Office, the share of people of working age 
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in the total population fell from 45% to 33% between 2003 and 2013. As a result, 
labour resources are shrinking, and entrepreneurs as well as public authori-
ties complain about a shortage of young employees109. If the scale of emigration 
continues to grow, the resulting labour shortage may impede the development 
of the Moldovan economy and cause a significant fall in the value of foreign 
investments and paralysis of the state apparatus, which will lack sufficient 
human resources to operate effectively. A deteriorating demographic situa-
tion also gives rise to concerns about the efficiency of the Moldovan pension 
system. At present, the proportion of workers per retiree in Moldova is 1.8:1. 
According to estimates, this proportion will fall to a ratio of 1:1 within the next 
five years. This will impose a very serious burden on the state budget. Accord-
ing to scholars from the Moldovan Academy of Sciences, as a consequence of 
population ageing, the share of people older than 60 among the population will 
rise from 14.4% in 2013 to over 30% by 2050110. One side effect, and apparently 
the only positive one, of the shrinking number of people able to work is the 
low unemployment rate compared to the EU, which oscillates between 4% and 
8%. Moreover, in the respondents’ opinion, migration might to a certain extent 
slow down the process of necessary reforms, since the public pressure on the 
government is thus reduced. 
The ‘brain drain’ phenomenon has been apparent in Moldova since the early 
1990s and is directly linked to mass emigration. This phenomenon concerns 
two categories of residents: highly qualified specialists (e.g. doctors, IT spe-
cialists, etc.) and students. According to the Nexus Moldova survey, around 
18,500 Moldovans are currently studying at foreign universities. This number 
is equivalent to approximately 20% of all Moldovan students. Around 90% of 
Moldovan students abroad fall on Romania. A significant proportion of this 
group choose to stay abroad after graduation. Mass emigration of highly quali-
fied specialists hampers the development of some sectors of the economy (e.g. 
the high-technology sector), and doctors’ emigration has adversely affected the 
efficiency and quality of the Moldovan healthcare system. Around 40% of all 
Moldovan physicians had resigned from work since the country proclaimed 
independence; most of them emigrated111. In 2010, the Moldovan government 
in collaboration with the International Organisation for Migration made some 
limited attempts at counteracting this, offering grants to those Moldovan 
109 Online: http://www.businessclass.md/HR/Kadrovii_defitit/
110 Migration has not been taken into account in this calculation due to the methodology ap-
plied. 
111 According to Mihail Ciocanu, Moldova’s deputy minister for health.
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students studying abroad, if they decided to return. However, this programme 
covers a very small number of students and is unable to tangibly reduce the 
scale of the problem. It is worth noting that the share of people with higher ed-
ucation in the total number of emigrants has been visibly decreasing over the 
past few years. In 2006, they accounted for 19.2% of all emigrants (data from 
CBS-AXA), while in 2011 their share was only 10.6% (data from the National 
Statistical Office). 
Figure 33. Positive impacts from future migration from Moldova to the EU by 
relevance (average results)
Mitigating social
and economic
tensions
3.5
5-most important; 4-important; 3-neither important, nor unimportant; 2-unimportant; 1-least important
4.1 4.2
1.6
3.6
1.5
Delivery
of remittances
Departure
of ethnic
minorities
I don’t see
any positive
impacts
Return
of experienced
migrants
and growth
in entrepreneurship
Reducing
poverty
and unemployment
1
2
3
4
5
source: Delphi survey Moldova 2013-2014
Well-managed labour migration might still be used as a base for Moldova’s eco-
nomic growth. It enables money transfers into the economy, thus laying the 
foundations for the development of entrepreneurship, contributes to reduc-
ing unemployment and poverty, allows emigrants to gain the experience and 
know-how necessary to develop their own businesses and others. Remittances 
from labour migrants are one of the pillars of the Moldovan economy. Accord-
ing to data from the National Bank of Moldova, remittances exceeded USD $1.6 
billion in 2013; this being the equivalent of almost one quarter of the country’s 
GDP. It should be noted that these statistics took into account only registered 
operations. According to data from the World Bank, remittances in aggregate 
could reach an equivalent of one third of Moldova’s GDP in the coming years. 
Short-term and circular emigration may be beneficial for Moldovan society. 
However, its direct impact on the condition of the country’s economy is rela-
tively small. In turn, savings accumulated by long-term migrants who have 
settled abroad could potentially offer large benefits to the Moldovan economy. 
According to data for 2013, as much as 37% of income generated by this group of 
emigrants is kept outside the country. According to estimates from the Nexus 
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Moldova survey, this could amount to EUR 1.6 billion. If migrants are success-
fully encouraged to invest at least part of this sum in their home country, this 
would provide a serious stimulus to the Moldovan economy. 
The PARE 1+1 programme, launched in 2010, is the flagship project aimed at 
achieving this goal. Under this programme, if a Moldovan emigrant invests 
a certain sum to launch his/her business in Moldova, the state will match this 
money with an equal sum. However, there are serious restrictions as to the 
kind of business activity launched by emigrants, and a single subsidy cannot 
exceed 200,000 lei, i.e. a little more than EUR 10,000. Even though 313 busi-
nesses were started as part of PARE 1+1 during the first three years of its op-
eration (from late 2010 until early 2014), it cannot be said that this programme 
has fulfilled its role in a satisfactory manner. The ineffectiveness of this pro-
gramme becomes even more obvious, when one considers the fact that within 
the same timeframe Moldovan emigrants, according to Italian migration ser-
vices, started almost four thousand firms without any additional support from 
the local government. In the opinion of the surveyed Delphi experts, attracting 
emigrants’ capital does have a huge development potential, but this should be 
based at the improvement of the Moldovan economy competitiveness and its 
thorough liberalisation, rather than on using subsidies to attract investors. 
However, PARE 1+1 is not the only governmental initiative aimed at attract-
ing investments from migrants. In October 2012, the Moldovan government 
set up a the Bureau for Diaspora Relations subordinated directly to the Prime 
Minister. Its goal is to maintain and develop links between Moldovan migrants 
(particularly long-term) and the home country, help them to preserve their 
identity and encourage them to tie their future to Moldova, for example, by 
launching businesses in the country.
Conclusions 
The EU’s lifting of the visa requirements for Moldovan citizens is unlikely to 
have any tangible impact on EU MS. No major increase in the number of mi-
grants from Moldova should be expected. The Visegrad Group states probably 
will not feel any effects from liberalisation of the visa regime for citizens of 
Moldova at all, although Moldovan migrants could become more interested 
over the long term, particularly in Poland. One of the anticipated positive out-
comes of the visa-free regime being introduced will be a decrease in the num-
ber (which is already small) of irregular Moldovan migrants in the EU. Another 
possible consequence of liberalising the travel rules could be the intensification 
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of the process of family reunification among Moldovan migrants. This may re-
duce the volume of remittances received in Moldova from emigrants and will 
contribute to increasing the scale of long-term settlement emigration. On the 
other hand, visa liberalisation may activate circular and short-term migration. 
Emigrants will no longer have to worry about the next stay visa and will visit 
their home country more often. However, the fact that one third of the Mol-
dovan public are convinced that lifting the visa requirement to the Schengen 
area gives them the right to work in the EU is still a problem. Migration to Rus-
sia is likely to decline to a certain extent, both due to the present Ukrainian-
Russian crisis and a stricter policy on migrants being adopted by the RF. 
In the longer term, further emigration of Moldova’s residents will adversely 
affect the domestic economy. To minimise this negative impact, Moldova must 
create conditions that will genuinely attract foreign capital accumulated by 
emigrants abroad. The experts who took part in the Delphi survey were asked 
what changes should be made to the migration policies of the EU, V4 states and 
Moldova to maximise the benefits of migration for each of the parties con-
cerned. In their opinion, the EU and the V4 should above all take action to pro-
mote circular migration. They also recommended that EU MS should amend 
their respective legislation so that recognition of Moldovan emigrants’ qualifi-
cations and education is possible. This would allow them to find jobs in accord-
ance with their qualifications and prevent them from losing competences. The 
Moldovan experts indicated developing and implementing a policy for sustain-
able economic growth and ensuring adequate investment climate as key issues 
for the Moldovan authorities. Further recommendations concerned developing 
adequate aid programmes targeted at members of those families left at home 
by emigrants and improving contacts with the diaspora. 
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7. MigraTion bETWEEn THE EU, V4 anD EasTErn 
EUroPE: THE PrEsEnT siTUaTion anD THE PossibLE 
FUTUrE. THE PErsPECTiVE oF bELarUs 
andrei Yeliseyeu, Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, Belarus
introduction
Any research on migration issues in Belarus faces the challenge of a lack of 
trustworthy migration data. Meanwhile, although official statistics report that 
Belarus is a positive net migration country alternative research begs to differ. 
This research concludes that Belarus has in fact had a negative net migration 
of up to 150,000 since its independence. The figure of emigration is much larger 
(almost 700,000) if one counts migrants on the basis of their place of birth, 
since many Belarus-born people emigrated from Belarus in Soviet times and 
did not return. 
Since the mid-1990s, migration flows have been modest. However, despite the 
rather low migration propensity of Belarusians, even moderate volumes of 
permanent out-migration (a few thousand people per year), coupled with a con-
stant natural population loss (from 10.2 million in 1993 to 9.5 million in 2013) 
and an increase in the demographic pressure since 2008, pose a significant 
challenge for the country. External migration aggravates age distortions and 
contributes to the loss of human capital, since emigrants from Belarus are, on 
average, younger and better educated, while immigrants are older, with a larg-
er proportion of people past working age and less-skilled. Temporary labour 
migration, which increased after the domestic 2011 macroeconomic crisis, has 
created a deficit of specialists in some economic sectors but has eased unem-
ployment and provides remittances from the migrants to their communities.
While some states such as the US or Germany have preserved their status 
as important destination countries for Belarusians since the country’s inde-
pendence, some others, including neighbouring Russia and Poland, have sig-
nificantly increased their migration attractiveness for Belarusians during the 
last decade. Furthermore, both Poland and in particular Russia have recently 
simplified procedures for obtaining their citizenship for some categories of Be-
larusians. In the case of Poland, the holders of the Card of the Pole are meant 
to acquire a permanent residence permit and Polish citizenship within three 
years. Belarusians whose ancestors used to reside on present-day Russian 
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territory back in Soviet or even Tsarist times are able to apply for Russian citi-
zenship and to acquire it within a few months. Since part of the Belarusian 
population has rather weak national identity and the Belarusian economy is 
no longer able to produce high GDP growth, Belarus risks losing its valuable 
human capital to its neighbours.
This chapter focuses on current and future migration trends between Belarus 
and the European Union as a whole and the Visegrad countries in particular. It 
aims at presenting the current and future role of the EU/V4 in Belarusian mi-
gration plus the impact of possible short-term visa abolition by the EU states. 
Following the introduction, a section describing the profile of Belarus emigra-
tion follows. The third section, “Main determinants of emigration processes”, 
looks into the importance of the attractiveness of EU countries for potential 
Belarusian emigrants. The impact of EU visa policy on out-migration from 
Belarus is also reviewed here. Media and public discourse about emigration 
is briefly presented in the fourth sub-chapter, followed by the analysis of the 
challenges, opportunities and risks of further emigration in the fifth. The au-
thor’s conclusions close the chapter. This chapter makes use of the results from 
the two-round Delphi survey on migration trends between Belarus and the 
EU/V4 carried out by the author in November 2013 - March 2014 among sixteen 
Belarusian and international migration experts representing academic insti-
tutions, NGOs, governmental bodies and international organisations based in 
Belarus.
Emigration profile of belarus – a brief description
During the last decade, Belarus has had negative net migration with the West-
ern European countries, USA and Canada but positive external migration bal-
ance with the post-Soviet states. Temporary labour migration of Belarusians 
to the European Union has remained rather limited, while labour migration 
flows towards Russia have increased.
Official statistics dramatically underestimate the figures for temporary la-
bour migration. They count only those migrants who sign agreements with 
foreign employers via the official employment agencies. The number of Bela-
rus nationals who undertook this procedure in 2013 reached just 5,715 people112. 
112 Е. Прус, Более 5,7 тыс. человек выехали в 2013 году из Беларуси на работу за границу на 
основании договоров и контрактов, БелТА, 04.02.2014 [More than 5.7 thousand individu-
las left Belarus for work based on agreements and contracts], in Russian, online: http://
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In fact, an outright majority of Belarusians seeking employment abroad do so 
without addressing official employment agencies and therefore they are not 
included in these statistics. Belarusian officials themselves have repeatedly 
recognized that the actual figure of Belarus’ labour migrants in Russia stands 
at between 100,000 and 300,000113. Some experts give even larger assessments 
of migrants – up to 500,000-700,000 – on the Russian labour market, which 
is largely believed to accumulate 80-90% of all Belarusian labour migrants. 
Russian official statistics on Belarusian labour migrants are incomplete also, 
since a considerable share of migrants work without proper registration. The 
results of the Quarterly Labour Force Surveys (LFS), which were launched in 
Belarus in early 2012, also considerably underestimate the number of labour 
migrants – surveyed households reported about 56,000 labour migrants in 
2012 and 64,000 in 2013. Half of the labour migrants are aged 20-34, most of 
them have secondary, specialized secondary or vocational education, and the 
share of labour migrants with higher education has a tendency to rise (from 
9.5% of in 2012 to 13% in 2013), the aggregated annual LFS results show114.
The specifics of the migration accounting likewise results in underestimation 
of the volume of permanent out-migration. The National Statistics Committee 
only accounts for those individuals who report their intended departure (i.e. 
with the intention of staying abroad for a period longer than one year) and sub-
sequently register at Belarusian consulates abroad. As long as many migrants 
are reluctant to communicate their intention of moving abroad to relevant of-
ficial bodies, these individuals are not included in the statistics. Distorted of-
ficial statistics on the basis of poor migration accounting have been replicated 
in many publications made under the aegis of state academic institutions. 
Furthermore, dubious conclusions regarding the external migration statistics 
make their way into state policy documents on migration and reinforce an er-
roneous official discourse about the positive net migration that Belarus has al-
legedly enjoyed since its independence in 1991. For instance, the National Pro-
gramme on the Demographic Security of the Republic of Belarus (2011 – 2015) 
www.belta.by/ru/all_news/society/Bolee-57-tys-chelovek-vyexali-v-2013-godu-iz-Belaru-
si-na-rabotu-za-granitsu-na-osnovanii-dogovorov-i-kontraktov_i_658906.html
113 E.g. in 2006 the Head of the Ministry of Interior’s Migration and Citizenship Department 
gave a number of 150,000-300,000 labour migrants, online: http://www.newsru.com/
world/09oct2006/migrant.html
114 The LFS results have not been made public despite the initial promise of the Belarusian au-
thorities. However, partial LFS results for the years 2012/13 were presented by the National 
Statistical Committee to the author’s request for the purposes of this study.
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defines the goal of “improving the net migration rate to 60,000”, which is ab-
solutely unrealistic.
A number of alternative assessments (including by the UN Population Divi-
sion) and estimates refute these claims. One recent study, employing census 
data for 1989, 1999 and 2009 and data on the natural movement of the popula-
tion, shows that Belarus, since its independence up to 2010, has had a nega-
tive net migration of about 130,000 people115. Estimates based on statistical data 
from the main receiving countries116 corroborate this conclusion.
Asked to list the top destination countries, all the experts surveyed in Bela-
rus under the Delphi research on migration trends between the EU/V4 and 
Eastern Europe considered Russia to be in first place. The Delphi experts as-
sessed the current migration stock of Belarusians in Russia at 542,000, with 
a 167,000-strong standard deviation (as of February 2014). Indeed, according 
to the Russia’s Federal Migration Service, as of March 2014, 395,000 Belaru-
sian nationals resided in Russia117. This figure does not include an unknown 
number of temporary labour migrants who work without registration. The 
next most important destinations states were listed in the following order: 
Poland, the USA, Germany, Ukraine and the Baltic states. Interestingly, the 
list of top receiving countries conforms to the results of nationwide polls on 
the migration propensity of Belarusians. Germany, Russia, the USA, and Po-
land were named as the most attractive for either temporary labour migra-
tion or permanent emigration in national surveys measuring migration in-
tentions118.
The experts who took part in the Delphi survey assessed the overall num-
ber of Belarusian migrants in the EU as a whole at around 150,000 with 
a 70,000-strong standard deviation (as of February 2014). At the same time, 
115 V. Zagorets, I. Zagorets, Methodology of Determining the Extent and Results of External Migra-
tion of Population of the Republic of Belarus, Journal of International Law and International Rela-
tions 2011, in Russian.
116 A. Yeliseyeu, Big Statistical Lie, BISS-Blitz, 25.03.2013, in Russian, online: http://belinsti-
tute.eu/ru/node/818; A. Yeliseyeu, In 2013 population of Belarus increased merely on paper, 
11.02.2014, in Russian, online: http://belinstitute.eu/ru/node/1806
117 Statistical data in relation to the foreigners residing on the territory of the Russian Federa-
tion [in Russian], Russia’s Federal Migration Service, in Russian, online: http://www.fms.
gov.ru/about/statistics/foreign/details/54891/
118 V. Zhakevich, Migration intentions of the population of the Republic of Belarus: sociological
analysis, PhD thesis, Minsk 2009, in Russian, pp. 60-64.
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the number of Belarusian migrants in the V4 countries was assessed at 70,000, 
with quite a large deviation in views (37,000). The assessment of the Belaru-
sian migrant stock in the EU given by the Delphi experts seems to be an exag-
geration, as migration data of the receiving countries show.
There is a consensus among the Delphi experts that most migrants of Bela-
rusian origin reside abroad and perform their economic activities legally. On 
average, the Delphi experts surveyed agree that the share of regular migrants 
among the total number of Belarusian residents in the top receiving countries 
exceeds 80%.
At the end of 2013, 11,159 Belarusian nationals were residing under different 
types of status (permanent or temporary residence permits) in Poland (data 
from Polish Office for Foreigners). Under the simplified temporary employ-
ment scheme, which does not require a work permit, 5,194 permissions is-
sued to Belarusians were registered in 2013. As for the work permits, 2,004 
Belarusians were entitled to them in 2013, mostly in the transport and con-
struction sectors (data from Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy). 
Furthermore, about 55,000 of the Cards of the Pole were issued in Belarus by 
the end of 2013. The Card of the Pole, inter alia, authorizes its holder to seek 
employment in Poland without a work permit, to carry out economic activity 
in Poland on the same basis as Polish citizens and, since May 2014, to obtain 
a permanent residence permit easily. Some Belarusian holders of the Card, 
who live permanently or temporarily in Poland on national long-term visas, 
may not be accounted for in the official Polish statistics on employment of 
foreign nationals.
Recently, Poland has also considerably eased access to its higher education sys-
tem for Belarusians (at present, about 3,000 Belarusian students study at Pol-
ish universities). Firstly, the holders of the Card of the Pole are entitled to the 
same rights as Polish nationals when entering a higher education institution 
(including stipends) or applying for a job. Moreover, Poland has a number of 
scholarship programs for students who come from Eastern European states, 
including the Kalinowski program for those Belarusian students who cannot 
enter universities in Belarus or continue their studies because of their pro-
democracy activity. 
According to Eurostat data, the number of Belarusians residing in Hungary 
and Slovakia stands at approximately 200 in each of these two V4 countries. 
Indeed, past research shows that legal immigration of Belarusian nationals, 
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including for temporary jobs, into these two V4 states is negligible. At pre-
sent, about 4,000 Belarusians legally reside in Czechia. As for the rest of the 
EU states outside the V4, they report about 60,000 Belarusians with residence 
permits. According to Eurostat, about 20,000 Belarusians reside in Germany. 
The number of Belarusian nationals residing in Lithuania, Latvia and Esto-
nia are comparatively low and do not exceed 2,000-4,000 for any of three 
Baltic states. However, the numbers of Belarus-born residents in those states 
are rather large and are explained by large emigration flows during Soviet 
times. At present they either have the nationality of a destination state, or at 
least non-citizen passports (as individuals who have not naturalized they are 
given the same rights as Latvian or Estonian citizens except the usual pass-
port entitlement and entitlement to vote or to hold a public office). 
There are some assertions as to the profile of Belarusian residents in the EU 
that most experts surveyed under the Delphi research agree upon: migrants 
are young, many of them work in the service sector but also in construction, 
household and agriculture. Less frequent are responses that Belarusian resi-
dents in the EU work as highly qualified specialists (engineers, IT specialists 
etc.), or are involved in manually demanding jobs. In fact, these experts’ views 
are supported, at least to some extent (since data on the migration profile of 
Belarus are rather scarce), by evidence presented in earlier opinion polls and 
empirical data on the profile of emigrants collected by the National Statistical 
Committee via the Ministry of Interior. The latter shows that most Belarusian 
emigrants are in their most active reproductive and working years. A past re-
search project119 established that Belarusian migrants working in Poland can 
be roughly divided into two categories. The first category consists of those im-
migrants who are highly qualified. Immigrants in the larger second catego-
ry seek jobs which require no specific qualifications, such as agriculture or 
household services120.
Most of the surveyed Delphi experts (12 out of 16) agree that labour migra-
tion increased as a result of the 2011 financial crisis and, to a lesser extent, the 
2009 ruble devaluation. Experts also agree that circular migration increased 
and that Russia remained the dominant destination, while none specified that 
labour migration increased to the EU in the period under review. Demographic 
119 R. Krčmář, O. Ozernaya (eds.), The situation of migrants from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine on 
the Labour Markets of Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic. Final Report, 
European Commission, 2009, pp. 41-42.
120 Ibid.
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patterns of migrants remained untouched, according to most (10) of the ex-
perts.  Money transfers increased inter alia thanks to migrants employed on 
the Russian market.
Experts who took part in the Delphi survey also noted that female migration is 
important, along with male migration. In the emigration outflows captured by 
the official statistics, the share of women is 52-53%. According to Eurostat data, 
in 2009 women constituted 69% of Belarusian residents in Germany and 80% 
of all registered Belarusian migrants in Italy. At the same time, males prevail 
in temporary labour migration, especially to Russia and the Baltic states121. 
Main determinants of emigration processes
There is very strong economic and political cooperation between Belarus 
and Russia. Border controls between those two countries were removed back 
in 1996. The Treaty on Granting Equal Rights to Citizens of 1998 established 
identical rights for the citizens of Belarus and Russia in the labour relations. 
The Eurasian Economic Community agreement adopted in 2010 allows Bela-
rusians to work in Russia or Kazakhstan without work permits. Coupled with 
the geographical proximity of Russia, the ease of travel, the absence of lan-
guage barriers, and significantly higher wages in Russia, all of this makes its 
Eastern neighbour an especially attractive option for many Belarusians. The 
legal framework of Eurasian integration, which aims at establishing a single 
Eurasian labour market, may complicate Belarusian efforts to prevent larger 
temporary labour migration to Russia. Since Russia toughened the access to 
its labour market to certain categories of Ukrainian labour migrants by intro-
ducing a 90 days in 180-day period rule in 2014, Belarusians have found them-
selves in an even more favourable position on the Russian labour market in 
comparison to Ukrainians.
According to the Delphi experts surveyed, the strongest migration pull factors 
are higher wages and generally high living standards in destination countries 
and the presence of migration networks, i.e. residing/employed relatives or 
close friends, or at least the existence of a strong group of compatriots in a des-
tination country. It should be noted that formal organizations created by Bela-
rusian migrants in the EU are either inoperative or are still at an early stage of 
development and are unable to provide lasting support for their compatriots. 
121 A. Bobrova, L. Shakhotska, G. Shymanovich, Social impact of emigration and rural-urban mi-
gration in Central and Eastern Europe. Final country report, Belarus, 2012, pp. 10-11.
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Associations formed by Belarusian diaspora abroad mostly concentrate on the 
promotion of cultural traditions rather than providing recent migrants with 
necessary information or material support122. Informal networks facilitate the 
migration of Belarusians to some extent. However, there is a deficit of research 
in this field.
In addition to higher wages in a foreign country, geographic proximity, low 
travel costs and the easiness of finding work in a destination country were 
determined to be important pull factors. Delphi experts believe that the lin-
guistic and cultural proximity of Belarus to V4 states is important but should 
not be overestimated, since the most attractive factor for labour migrants is 
economic-based (i.e. high wages and ease of finding employment) and some in-
vestment in learning a local language is still needed. Respondents were rather 
skeptical in their assessments regarding the attractiveness of visa and migra-
tion policy of the V4.
A number of previous research studies and polls have shown that economic 
factors dominate in the decision of Belarusian nationals to migrate. According 
to the nationwide opinion poll (conducted in December 2012 – January 2013) 
commissioned by the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, a desire to im-
prove financial status appeared to be the main motivation for leaving Belarus 
permanently (80.6% of those who intended to emigrate). An opportunity to up-
grade qualification/facilitate career growth as a motivation factor was chosen 
by 35% of respondents. Better welfare systems were selected by 24.3%, while 
access to high quality medical services received 14.1% and the opportunity of 
obtaining a good education was chosen by 13.1%. At the same time, the domi-
nant reason why Belarusians are not willing to migrate is reluctance to part 
with family and friends (59.9%). Still, it should be noted that surveys on mi-
gration intentions should be treated with a good degree of caution since they 
primarily indicate the respondents’ assessment of economic/political etc. situ-
ation in a given country, and only partially indicate their real intentions and 
motivations to migrate.
122 P. Kaźmierkiewicz (eds.), The situation of migrants from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine on the 
Labour Markets of Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic. Regional Report, 
European Commission 2009, p. 86.
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Figure 34. Main motivations for leaving Belarus/unwillingness to leave  
the country, according to the results of the 2012/13 national poll
Main motivation
for leaving Belarus permanently
(Question: "If you would like to leave the country,
what would be your reasons?")
Main reasons behind
the unwillingness to leave Belarus, 2012
(Question: "If you are unwilling to migrate,
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source: Belarusian Institute of Strategic Studies 2013
Differences in the economic wellbeing of the population seem to be an im-
portant explanatory factor for why labour migration to the EU has been less 
popular among Belarusians, in comparison to Ukrainians and Moldovans. In 
terms of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP), which reflects 
differences in incomes among the countries, Belarus apparently ranks higher 
than Ukraine or Moldova. According to the World Bank, the GDP per capita in 
Belarus in 2012 was 15,300 international dollars, while the equivalent indicator 
for Ukraine and Moldova stood at 7,300 international dollars and 3,400 inter-
national dollars respectively. As for the average monthly salaries in Poland and 
Russia in the sectors most popular among migrants (construction, transport, 
trade, repairs of motor vehicles, manufacturing, agriculture), they exceed 
those in Belarus by two to three times.
The 2008-2010 world financial crisis did not result in economic stagnation 
in Belarus and the dynamics of GDP growth remained positive. Apart from 
the 20% ruble devaluation in early 2009, no dramatic worsening of the eco-
nomic situation for the general population took place. However, as a result 
of loose macroeconomic policies in previous years when economic growth 
in the country was instigated by domestic demand, at the very same time as 
Belarusian goods found themselves less competitive on foreign markets, Be-
larus was hit by a severe macroeconomic crisis later, in 2011. Then the annual 
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inflation rate reached 109% and the Belarusian ruble devaluated by around 
65% in 2011.
Some peculiarities of Belarusian labour market rigidity which influence mi-
gration trends bear mentioning. Firstly, it has been state policy to ensure the 
highest level of employment possible (the share of employment in the public or 
semi-public sector is almost 70%, comparable to the share of GDP produced by 
the public sector). Sometimes it results in the preservation of outdated and eco-
nomically unjustified jobs. Labour migration is to some extent reduced by the 
availability of employment at home. However, such redistributive economic 
policy contributes to the replacement of highly-qualified workers by the less 
qualified. As a result, it enhances the out-migration of highly-skilled workers. 
Secondly, Belarus operates a mandatory placement scheme for graduates. This 
means that students who graduate from state universities where the tuition for 
their study was paid by the state have to work for an employer assigned by the 
state for two years following graduation. Those who refuse to take an assigned 
job, have to repay a large sum of money for having had their studies subsidized 
by the state. Often graduates are assigned to unsatisfactory low-paid jobs in 
rural areas and small towns. This mechanism, which limits labour mobility 
for young people, discourages some graduates from seeking work abroad, since 
the compensation to the state in this case is too high.
There is great divergence in Delphi experts’ views concerning state emigra-
tion policy over recent years. With two respondents uncertain, the remaining 
respondents were divided equally (seven in each of two groups) over the ques-
tion whether Belarusian emigration policy has changed. We are of the opin-
ion that the group of experts who point to a harshening of emigration policy 
is closer to the truth. Instead of creating the required economic incentives, 
the authorities have resorted to an arguably illegal mechanism of prevent-
ing an outflow of certain labour market professionals abroad. The ordinance 
No. 9 “On additional measures to develop the woodworking industry” adopted 
in December 2012 requires all those employed in the woodworking sector to 
sign fixed-term labour contracts which shall subsequently be prolonged by the 
maximum possible period. Employees cannot quit a job without the employer’s 
consent and those released for performing their duties improperly have to re-
pay all of their monthly bonuses, which may form a significant part of their 
salary. The authorities have also recently voiced the suggestion that families 
of labour migrants should pay the entire cost of housing services (rather than 
a reduced sum subsidized by the state); however, no law has so far been adopt-
ed to address this idea. Additionally, deliberations among state agencies are in 
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progress over a law that would impose tax on the unemployed who are not of-
ficially registered at state employment agencies. The aim of this legal initiative 
is to tax individuals who either work illegally abroad or work informally in the 
domestic sector without paying taxes and social allowances. Such policy aimed 
at discouraging migration by administrative means certainly does not hamper 
emigrants with a genuine desire to leave the country, particularly in the case 
of settlement migration. However, it may reduce temporary labour migration, 
or at least discourage migrants from disclosing their work abroad to the au-
thorities which makes migration statistics even more far from real picture. 
In fact, paltry unemployment benefits in Belarus (about EUR 10 per month, 
which is 15% of the state poverty level) discourage unemployed individuals from 
registering with state employment agencies. As long as the national legisla-
tion considers as “unemployed” those working age citizens who are registered 
with the state employment agency, the authorities can use statistical sleight of 
hand, declaring that the official unemployment rate in Belarus is only about 
0.5%. Meager unemployment benefits in Belarus and higher wages in neigh-
boring Russia lead to a shortfall in some professionals on the Belarusian labour 
market, mostly in construction, transportation, communal services and heat 
and power engineering. Since effective emigration policy requires substantial 
financial means which are beyond the capabilities of the Belarusian budget, 
we expect further attempts from the authorities to erect barriers for potential 
emigrants to the EU, which, nevertheless, will only be marginally successful. 
There is no significantly larger propensity to emigrate among the ethnic mi-
norities, since they are rather well integrated into society. However, liberaliza-
tion of access to the Polish labour market creates incentives for Polish minority 
to undertake temporary or permanent emigration to Poland.
There is no clear link between emigration from Belarus and political and visa 
relationships between the EU and Belarus. It should be emphasized, however, 
that Belarus lags behind all other EaP countries in terms of progress towards 
visa liberalization with the EU. Until 2010, EU institutions linked visa facili-
tation with Belarus with progress in political reforms and human rights and 
therefore the EU considered such negotiations premature. This approach was 
eventually changed and in June 2011 the European Commission sent Belarus an 
invitation to start negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission. However, 
by that stage the situation had changed completely: now it was the Belarusian 
authorities who considered any progress on the visa issue premature, refer-
ring to the EU’s sanctions policy and suspension of top-level contacts. After 
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a two and a half year delay, at the EaP Summit in Vilnius in late November 
2013, the head of the Belarus MFA, Uladzimir Makiej, finally declared Belarus’s 
interest in proceeding with the visa facilitation and readmission negotiations, 
and these officially started in early 2014. There is good reason to believe that 
the agreements will come into force no later than the first half of 2015.
The Belarusian authorities have also been delaying the launch of local border 
traffic agreements with Lithuania and Poland, which could significantly en-
hance the mobility of border residents. This is explained by a combination of 
political and economic considerations. Firstly, Belarus’s relations with Lithu-
ania and Poland cooled as a result of the latter’s proactive position concerning 
the introduction of EU sanctions and the policy of democratization towards 
Belarus. Secondly, increase in purchases of consumer goods in the EU (pri-
marily in Vilnius, Lithuania and Bialystok, Poland) would further aggravate 
the negative balance of payments problem. Finally, a greater awareness among 
Belarusians of their western neighbours’ living standards could enhance pro-
European sentiments within society.
Despite sluggish progress towards visa facilitation with the EU, Belarus has 
been doing rather well in practical terms of visa statistics. Belarus occupies 
fourth place in the world for absolute numbers of uniform Schengen visas re-
ceived, after Russia, Ukraine, and China. Since Serbia and Montenegro were 
designated to the list of countries with visa-free access in 2009, Belarus be-
came the leading country among some 140 states with visa regimes with the EU 
according to Schengen visas issued per capita. In 2013, about 772,000 uniform 
Schengen visas were issued in Belarus, or about 80 visas per 1000 inhabitants. 
Figure 35. Number of short-term visas issued by the consulates of the EU MS 
in Belarus in 2006-2013 (in thousands)
20082006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
626.8 642.9
345.1 371.1
433.8
589.3
703.5
772.1
300
400
500
600
700
800
Visas issued by the consulates of Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Great Britain and Ireland are not included
source: Author’s compilation on the basis of the European Visa Database, http://www.mogenshobolth.
dk/evd/
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Belarus also enjoys in EU consulates one of the lowest refusal rates in the world 
(0.5%). This means that potential irregular migrants do not have difficulties in 
preparing a proper set of supporting documents in order to enter the Schen-
gen area legally on a valid visa with the aim of overstaying it. There are good 
reasons to believe that the existing visa regime between the EU and Belarus 
does not serve as an effective barrier to irregular migration. It is instead more 
of an obstacle for bona fide travelers. Variations in the numbers of issued visas 
in Belarus during the last decade have not resulted in any significant changes 
in permanent or labour migration patterns of Belarusians in the EU per se. The 
increase in temporary labour migrants and permanent settlers in Poland over 
recent years was largely a result of the introduction of changes in Polish na-
tional legislation which facilitate employment of temporary workers and ease 
labour market access for foreign graduates and holders of the Card of the Pole. 
Thus, the visa regime has not had an apparent impact on either permanent or 
labour out-migration trends from Belarus to the EU.
Media and public discourse on migration 
Public discourse on migration is mostly influenced by the official governmen-
tal position. Opposition political parties are not represented in either the leg-
islative or executive branch of power, due to the falsification of elections. No 
genuine debates about migration issues take place in parliament, which is de 
facto nominated by the executive. Driven out from the actual political process 
for more than a decade, alternative political views do not get genuine circu-
lation in the public sphere, as the media are under substantial governmental 
control. This situation makes true political and societal discussion of the emi-
gration issues largely absent.
An important public discourse being pursued by the Belarusian authorities 
and state academic institutions is that Belarus has allegedly enjoyed positive 
net migration since 1991. Despite the fact that state institutions occasionally 
use the figure of 3.5 million Belarusians and descendants living abroad and 
that they formally recognize the large demographic and financial potential 
which the diaspora offers the country, state diaspora policy is fragmented, 
incoherent and contradictory. After a long period of consultations between 
the state institutions, the draft law on the diaspora (“On Belarusians living 
abroad”) was introduced to parliament in August 2013. It is expected to be 
enacted some time in 2014. Although the draft law sets a legal framework 
for cooperation with the diaspora, it does not contain specific commitments 
of the state in this area and does not take into account views expressed by 
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diaspora organizations (e.g. on cheaper or free Belarusian visas for the dias-
pora representatives).
Public attitude towards foreign migrants is somewhat neutral. A recent socio-
logical survey shows that half of the Belarusian youth is indifferent towards im-
migrants, and that 15% and 35% have a negative or positive attitude respectively 
towards migrants123. Increased cooperation of Belarus with China and bilateral 
plans to set-up a joint industrial park in the vicinity of Minsk provoked specula-
tion in sections of the mass media that Belarus intends to issue worker visas to 
tens of thousands of Chinese nationals. Although this provoked some concern 
among the general public, this information was later officially refuted. There are 
no studies that would investigate in detail the attitude of Belarusian society to-
wards the phenomenon of migration as such. Public concern over the specifics of 
the existing visa regime between the EU and Belarus is worth noting. Opinions 
that the visa procedures are excessive, overly expensive and time-consuming 
(and at times even humiliating) are rather wide-spread. Incomprehension as to 
why the EU does not facilitate visa procedures decisively or even remove the visa 
regime unilaterally persists among the general public, which undermines the 
EU’s public image among part of the Belarusian population.
Prognosis of emigration – a brief summary
Most experts surveyed under the Delphi research (13 out of 16) believe that in 
the next ten years emigration flows from Belarus will increase, at least slightly. 
In relative terms (the share of the emigrants to the whole population), this will 
apparently matter in terms of the demographic development of the country. In 
absolute terms, however, this will not represent a sizeable increase. Population 
decline (it fell from 10.2 million in 1993 to 9.5 million in 2013) and population 
ageing mean that even in the case where out-migration increases (in relative 
terms), the absolute numbers of migrants will likely remain unchanged or at 
least they are not likely to increase significantly. As shown in the figure below, 
the share of people under working age in the total population fell from 20.6% in 
2000 to 16.4% in 2013, while the share of those above working age is rising, from 
21.5% to 23.5% for the period under review. It is estimated that between 2011 and 
2020, nearly 1.5 million people will drop out of the working age population. The 
population is ageing so emigration matters over a long-term perspective. 
123 S. Zamogilnyj, N. Dikun, Sociological aspects of attitude towards migrants among Russian and 
Belarusian youth, Sovremennyje problemy nauki i obrazovania, in Russian, №1, 2012, on-
line: http://www.science-education.ru/101-5368, in Russian.
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Figure 36. Share of main age groups in total population of Belarus, 2000-2012 
(beginning of year; %)
2008
2006
2007
2009
2010
2011
2013
2012
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
Under working age Working age Over working age
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
source: Belarusian National Statistical Committee
Most surveyed Delphi experts predict that migrants’ economic performance 
will change, partly as a result of the move towards more productive sectors. 
Although most experts agree that more highly qualified Belarusians would 
leave the country, there is no consensus as to the hypothetical changes in state 
emigration policy. Ten experts believe that it will change, while the remaining 
six respondents tend to disagree. Five specialists surveyed argue that the state 
would more actively promote return migration, another two point to addition-
al artificial barriers that the state would erect to prevent larger emigration. We 
believe that the authorities will try to impose barriers to emigration but they 
will largely be ineffective and will hardly stem the outflow of migrants. Taking 
into account the specifics of the Belarusian labour market (low return on edu-
cation), the out-migration of especially highly-qualified specialists will likely 
keep increasing, while overall out-migration volumes in absolute numbers will 
likely remain as they are at present, or will increase insignificantly. 
Most of the Delphi experts foresee a moderate outflow of labour migrants (14 
experts), regularization of already present irregular migrants (13) and more 
long-term settlement migration (12) after EU short-term visas are abolished. 
Another highly expected outcome is an increase in various forms of tourism 
and business contacts (5). As shown earlier, the existing visa-regime with the 
EU, taking into account a meager refusal rate, does not prevent potential Bela-
rusian irregular migrants from entering the EU. However, visa regime aboli-
tion may indeed be viewed by some as providing a more favourable momentum 
for trying their luck on foreign labour markets. Asked how big the outflow of 
migrants from Belarus would be if the European Union lifted restrictions on 
access to the labour market for the nationals of Belarus (to capture the main 
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determinants of emigration since opening the EU labour market for Belaru-
sians will not likely happen soon), all experts expected either a higher (11), or 
much higher (5) outflow to take place within three years after restrictions are 
abolished.
The experts agree that abolition of the visa regime for short-term stay between 
Belarus and the EU is not a near-term perspective in any case. Asked when 
visa-regime between the EU and Belarus would be removed, most of the Be-
larusian experts surveyed under the Delphi research on migration trends (11) 
believed this may become possible in 7-10 years, while only four respondents 
considered this feasible within a shorter perspective of 4-6 years. At the same 
time, one of the experts is of the view that short-term travel will not be visa-
free even within a ten year period. As for the prospects of visa-free regime 
between the EU and Ukraine Belarusian experts are much more optimistic.
Challenges, opportunities and risks of further emigration
The consequences associated with future migration trends should be viewed in 
the context of demographic tendencies and the particulars of the economics of 
Belarus. Despite the sharp decrease in population since the mid-1990s, the high 
fertility rate of 1984-1988 and a consequent steep drop in births in the early 1990s 
secured a period of demographic dividend in Belarus, associated with the in-
creasing share of population of working age up until 2008. Since 2009, the trend 
reversed and the share of labour resources in total population started declining 
year after year. Currently, the smaller cohorts born in the early 1990s are entering 
childbearing age. Coupled with the negative net migration, population ageing and 
the declining working age population makes labour migration a potentially acute 
problem for Belarusian society and for the Belarusian economy. 
Figure 37. The number of persons in non-working ages per 1000 working-age 
population (age dependency ratio) in Belarus in 1990-2014 (beginning of a year)
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The share of people above working age among immigrants exceeds the share 
among Belarusian emigrants threefold, according to the official data on per-
manent departures/arrivals. Taking into account unregistered emigration 
flows, the ratio is surely even more disadvantageous for Belarus. This aggra-
vates the problem of an ageing Belarusian society and increases the welfare 
support load of the working population. Furthermore, Belarusian emigrants to 
the EU are better educated and more economically active than immigrants ar-
riving to Belarus. Among officially registered permanent emigrants in 2000-
2010, the proportion of people with higher education was 33%124. In the World 
Bank research report, the ‘brain drain’ rate for Belarus is estimated at 3.2% for 
2000 (3.6% for Ukraine, 1.5% for Russia)125. The brain drain will likely increase, 
as long as economic growth is slowing down and small wage returns on educa-
tion persist in Belarus. When asked about the negative effects of migration to 
the EU for Belarus, Delphi experts did indeed specify ‘brain drain’ and deple-
tion of the labour force, and less so – the break-up of families. 
Strong economic growth in Belarus in the 2000s was not a result of increased 
competitiveness in the national economy following the structural reforms. It 
was mainly due to a number of temporal and/or exogenous factors, including 
cheap Russian energy deliveries and an increase in domestic demand stimu-
lated by the growth of incomes. At present, even the remaining external rent 
from Russia (cheap natural gas, highly profitable sales of oil products, benefi-
cial loans) cannot secure any longer the previous strong economic growth of 
the Belarusian economy. In 2013, slowing productivity growth, a widening gap 
between the increase in real wages and labour productivity growth, and lower 
competitiveness of Belarusian goods on external markets all became evident. 
This leaves the national economy facing stagnation, at least for the near future.
Changed economic circumstances and negative demographic trends in Belarus 
necessitate the implementation of effective sweeping reforms to the social se-
curity system, education, the labour market, etc. Without much-needed struc-
tural reforms and liberalisation of the labour market, Belarus risks seeing 
a larger outbound migration of highly-qualified individuals to the EU and even 
larger temporary labour migration of a variety of skills to the Russian market, 
which would support their families by providing money transfers.
124 M. Timoshenko, Improvement of the regulation system of the labour migration in the Republic of 
Belarus, PhD thesis, Homyel 2010, in Russian, p. 56.
125 M. Beine, F. Docquier, H. Rapoport, Measuring International Skilled Migration: New Estimates 
Controlling for Age of Entry, World Bank Research Report, 2006, p. 26.
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Nevertheless, emigration should not only be viewed in a negative light. There 
are some advantages that outbound migration provides for Belarus. As for 
temporary migration, it eases pressure on the domestic labour market, re-
duces poverty through the transfer of remittances by labour migrants to their 
families, and allows migrants to acquire additional skills and experience for 
subsequent use in the home country. Indeed, the Delphi experts see two main 
positive impacts for Belarus arising from future migration to the EU. These 
are delivery of remittances and the return of experienced migrants that would 
contribute to the growth in entrepreneurship. At the same time, almost half of 
respondents hold the view that increasing migration flows to the EU would not 
bring any positive impacts for the country. Obviously, they mean that neither 
remittances nor benefits brought by return migrants would balance the ex-
penses that such outflows bring. 
What measures do the Belarusian migration experts suggest on behalf of the 
V4 countries, the EU as a whole, and the Belarus authorities in order to man-
age migration flows better and to make migration more beneficial for all sides? 
Acknowledging that Belarus loses more than it acquires from emigration, ex-
perts nevertheless do not view restriction of migration as an easy way out. 
On the contrary, they believe that the migration policies of the destination 
countries, the V4 and the EU as a whole should be liberalised, circular migra-
tion facilitated, and that EU countries should assist their Eastern neighbours 
in undertaking economic reforms and developing human capital. Interest-
ingly, experts also point to the need for improved migration statistics for all 
the state actors.
The Delphi experts recommend that V4 states open the educational system 
to foreign students, launch additional programs of cultural and scientific ex-
changes, and demonstrate a friendlier approach towards visa applicants in the 
V4 consulates abroad. Indeed, Hungary, Slovakia and in particular Czechia are 
among the most unfriendly consulates in Belarus in terms of the share of mul-
tiple visas issued and refusal rates. Experts surveyed for the purposes of this 
research recommend that Belarusian authorities, in order to make migration 
more beneficial for all sides, should sign the readmission agreement with the 
EU (such negotiations are indeed in progress), and create more favorable condi-
tions for remittances transfers via official channels. They should furthermore 
develop border cooperation inter alia by launching local border traffic regimes 
and establish better coordination between state institutions dealing with mi-
gration. The implementation of socioeconomic and democratic reforms in or-
der to secure long-term sustainable economic development was also highly 
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recommended by the experts as a measure for the Belarusian authorities to 
undertake.
Conclusions
Since there is a scarcity of migration research in Belarus and migration statis-
tics leave much to be desired, the Delphi-based survey of established migration 
experts is an important tool for verifying the reliability of past studies. Eco-
nomic factors are the most important for Belarusians in making their migra-
tion decisions. Larger disparities in wages with destination countries seem to 
be the main pull factor of migration for Belarus nationals. Significant differ-
ences in GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity in Belarus, Ukraine, 
and Moldova, the larger public sector in Belarus and some specifics of the Bela-
rusian labour market such as mandatory job placement for graduates serve as 
important explanatory factors as to why Belarusian migrant communities in 
the EU are significantly less numerous than the ones formed by the Ukrainians 
or Moldovans.
An important exogenous factor influencing Belarusian migration flows to the 
V4 countries and the EU as a whole is the state of Russia’s economy and political 
relations between Belarus and Russia. At present, Russia is the predominantly 
preferred destination country for Belarusian labour migrants for a number of 
reasons, including institutional (equal rights on Russia’s labour market) and 
economic (wage differentials). Should the Russian economy experience a long 
stagnation period or – very unlikely but hypothetically possible – political 
relations between Belarus and Russia worsen along with a disruption of the 
existing bilateral and Eurasian migration agreements, some of the Belarusian 
migrants will likely reorient towards the West. At present, the cost-benefit 
balance for Belarusian temporary labour migrants is in favour of Russia rather 
than the EU labour market. Difficulties in access to the labour markets of the 
V4 states (with the notable exception of Poland) discourage Belarusian immi-
gration to the respective countries. The lack of developed social networks in 
the EU and language barriers is further explanatory factor.
The most important recent changes in out-migration trends of Belarusians 
to the EU have brought Polish legal initiatives. Poland has liberalized labour 
market admission rules in order to attract temporary labour migration. Fur-
thermore, it implements the system of scholarships to attract Belarusian stu-
dents and increasingly uses the Card of the Pole as an instrument for attracting 
long-term migrants. Taking into account the widening gap in GDP per capita 
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in Poland’s favour, one can expect that permanent and temporary migration 
flows of Belarusians to Poland will continue growing. At the same time, migra-
tion flows between Belarus, from the one side, and Slovakia, the Czechia and 
Hungary, on the other, are marginal and will likely remain so in the absence 
of meaningful liberalisation of migration rules for Belarusians akin to Poland. 
In addition to making access to their labour markets easier, the V4 states could 
conduct a more active recruiting policy in Belarus in order to attract migrant 
workers.
The visa regime between the EU and Belarus seems to be more of an obstacle 
for bona fide travelers rather than a barrier for potential migrants willing to 
reach the EU labour market. This is very well illustrated in the case of Belarus, 
as it has the world largest numbers of Schengen visas per capita issued and one 
of the world lowest EU visas’ refusal rates. A constant increase in the numbers 
of Schengen visas throughout recent years have not resulted in an increase of 
either illegal labour migrants or permanent Belarusian settlers within the EU 
per se. An increase in the numbers of Belarusian immigrants to Poland and 
some other EU countries is mostly associated with the specifics of respective 
national legislative measures, rather than by the consequences of the Schen-
gen acquis. Most of the experts argue that the visa-regime between the EU and 
Belarus is likely to be removed no earlier than 7-10 years time. Although the 
removal of the visa regime does not imply an open labour market, experts be-
lieve that visa regime abolition would likely provoke more attempts by Belaru-
sians to place themselves on the EU labour market.
However, as the Belarus population declines and the share of the working age 
population has been falling constantly since the beginning of 2008, the num-
ber of emigrants in absolute terms will not likely grow significantly. Taking 
into consideration the existence of rather rigid labour market reforms, the low 
return on education and increasing demographic pressure as a result of the 
ageing population, the propensity to emigrate, especially among highly quali-
fied Belarusian specialists, will likely increase.
Further out-migration, even if it is only larger in relative not absolute terms, 
will bring acute challenges for the national economy. Greater emigration 
among highly qualified experts will deplete the human capital of Belarus nec-
essary for facilitating the much-needed modernisation of the country. Endur-
ing labour migration flows, mostly to Russia, will further aggravate the deficit 
of specialists across a number of economic sectors. However, Delphi experts 
do not see a restrictive emigration policy to be an effective countermeasure. 
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In contrast, they recommend that the Belarusian authorities liberalise their 
migration policy and suggest that the EU assist the country in carrying out 
economic reforms and developing human capital, including by opening EU 
countries’ educational systems to Belarusian students and by developing 
trans-border cooperation.
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART III  
 
CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON VISAS  
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introduction
This chapter aims to conclude earlier deliberations and to analyse them 
through the prism of policy and public opinion in the EU. Previous chap-
ters attempted to present a detailed analysis of migration patterns and fore-
casts for future emigration from Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus to the EU/V4 
based on: the Delphi forecast survey (experts panel), the econometric model 
projections as well as analysis of empirical data from previous instances of 
visa abolition between the EU and its neighbours in Central-Eastern Europe 
and the Balkans. Particular attention has been paid to the investigation of 
a possible nexus between visa policy and migration, specifically between the 
functioning of the short-term visas regime and migration. The application 
of these research instruments allowed for the construction of some qualita-
tive and quantitative forecasts. However, possible fulfillment of those sce-
narios is also subject to non-predictable and often subjective factors such as 
the direction of EU policy on visa liberalisation, European attitudes toward 
immigration, especially from EaP states, and the general evolution of EU mi-
gration policy. Moreover, even the best tailored forecast cannot predict how 
political crises, like the recent one in Ukraine, may influence further migra-
tion dynamics. 
The following chapter opens with some critical observations on the results, ob-
tained over the course of the project. By focusing on the short-term dynamics 
of the outflows from Eastern Europe, two types of migratory movements are 
identified: the Moldovan flow, which is not expected to represent a significant 
quantitative change, and the Ukrainian one, which on account of its possible 
volume and impact on several EU MS, could represent a policy challenge. The 
first section concludes with the discussion of the Delphi results for the Viseg-
rad countries on the level of support and rationale for welcoming migration 
from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. The rest of the chapter places the project 
results in the current context of wider societal attitudes and policy directions 
within the EU. It notes the persistent concern over the influx of third-country 
nationals, identifying the paradox that in general the countries on the EU’s 
southern and eastern rim are less preoccupied with immigration than are the 
core Member States. Further, it appears that the EU MS distinguish between 
legal, high-skilled immigration, which is viewed as an opportunity and irreg-
ular, unskilled labour migration, which is regarded as a threat. Consideration 
is then given to attitudes in the new EU MS, where, on the one hand, in line 
with the Delphi research, migrants are still “invisible” to society and evoke 
little concern but, on the other hand, the size of the existing migrant stock 
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is seriously overestimated. The third section considers two aspects of EU visa 
and migration policies, important from the viewpoint of Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova: the link between EU visa policy and security, and the broader po-
litical significance of visa liberalisation as an instrument of conditionality in 
relations with the EU’s neighbors. This is followed by a short section with con-
clusions.
Critical observations on the project’s results
Current migrant stock 
The Delphi results collected in the three countries of migrants’ origin suggest 
that the total stock of labour migrants from Ukraine in the EU (as of Febru-
ary 2014) stands at around 1.1 million people while the figures for Belarusians 
and Moldovans are around 150,000 and 240,000, respectively. These estimates 
are basically in line with earlier research. However, it should be noted that so 
far nobody has attempted to estimate the number of Belarusian migrants in 
the EU and thus the corresponding result obtained from the project cannot be 
confirmed. It should also be emphasized that the Delphi method yields only 
general estimates, not precise numbers.
According to Delphi experts’ estimates, the EU accounts for less than half of 
the labour migrants from Moldova and Ukraine and around one-fifth of the 
stock of Belarusian migrants. The fact that Russia remains the top destination 
reflects not just the absence of a visa-free regime with those three states but 
foremost – facilitated access to the labour market (in particular for the Belaru-
sians), and strong economic, social and cultural ties with the FSU states. Viseg-
rad countries account for nearly half of all the Belarusian labour migrants in 
the EU and a clear majority of Ukrainian migrants working in the EU. In turn, 
none of the Visegrad states attract significant numbers of Moldovans who are 
drawn to southern European countries. 
Future scenarios 
The V4 Delphi experts agree that the inflows from the three neighbouring 
countries to their respective states will either moderately increase or remain 
stable over the next ten years. The same opinions were shared by the experts 
from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. On the one hand, a massive influx of EaP 
migrants flooding EU countries cannot be expected but, on the other hand, no 
decrease is highly likely either. 
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The econometric forecasting model for 2008-2050 considers the impact of eco-
nomic growth in the EU and the three Eastern European countries on future 
migration flows. The results differ by country. Future flows from Moldova are 
expected to be rather moderate. In the case of Ukraine, they are likely to in-
crease more visibly, and, in the case of Belarus, they may even remain stable if 
the economic situation in that country improves. 
The case of Moldova appears to vindicate the argument that the migration po-
tential of the country is indeed largely exhausted. Neither of the model sce-
narios (high, medium and low) forecasts an aggregate rise of over 100,000 peo-
ple in next ten years, and the possible impact of visa abolition is likely to be 
temporary and concentrated on the main country of destination within the EU 
(Italy). The forecast that, under any of the scenarios, the stock of the Moldovan 
migrants in the EU should stabilise for another decade is in line with the ex-
pectations of experts from Visegrad countries who overall predicted a “stable” 
outlook for the inflow of this migrant group. As the long-term outlook is sta-
ble, the impact concentrated and limited, the concern over the impact of visa 
abolition may be expected to be the lowest with regard to the nationals of the 
Republic of Moldova. However, as emphasized in the Moldovan country chap-
ter, the political and security crisis in Eastern Europe has also influenced the 
well-being of Moldovan citizens and may accelerate migration towards the EU. 
Ukraine represents another pole as far as the policy impact of the forecast-
ed migration dynamics is concerned. Two scenarios (low and medium) in the 
econometric model’s forecast of migration into the EU suggest a rather signifi-
cant increase, ranging over a ten-year perspective by between half a million 
to a million immigrants (roughly doubling the current figures). From a policy 
perspective, it is of little consolation that under the medium scenario the stock 
would fall over time to 1.5 million migrants by 2050, due to the depletion of 
Ukrainian demographic potential in the long run. However, it should be borne 
in mind that Eurostat data applied in the model are based on residence permits 
data. Thus, the increase in Ukrainian migrants stock may indicate the trend to 
‘legalisation’ exhibited by Ukrainian migrants, instead of new arrivals and/or 
issuance of residence permits to new migrants. 
The medium forecast for Belarus in the econometric model indicates a possi-
ble doubling of the migrant stock but, considering the low base, the figures 
are not intimidating. The Delphi research in turn suggests moderate increases 
of labour emigration, accompanied by regularisation of the already residing 
migrants and a gradual rise in settlement migration. The top EU destination, 
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Poland, which is an avid supporter of this motion, would most likely receive 
a significant share of the influx. Belarus is, however, in the long run sensitive 
to a range of factors which, in the optimistic scenario, could keep the migrant 
stock stable, but, given a pessimistic turn of events, could produce a steep rise 
in migration to the EU. 
The econometric analyses for Belarus and Ukraine have additional policy sig-
nificance. In the cases of these two countries, changes in the economic and po-
litical environment could dramatically alter the migration flows. While sta-
bilisation could bring about a decline in the volume of migration from these 
countries to the EU in the medium- to long-term, the deterioration of the in-
ternal situation is likely to fuel a steady rise in migratory movements bound 
for the EU. This forecast accords with the assessments made by experts in the 
countries of origin and the V4 destinations of the Belarusian and Ukrainian 
migrants.
Although the project did not consider the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on 
the scale and directions of migrant flows from Eastern Europe, it is possible to 
suppose that the combination of push and pull factors is going to affect the three 
countries of migrants’ origin differently. On the one hand, the assertive poli-
cies promoting acquisition of Russian citizenship may strengthen the domi-
nation of Russia as the unrivalled pole of attraction for Belarusians, residents 
of southeastern regions of Ukraine, and Moldovan Transnistria. On the other 
hand, the citizens of Moldova and residents of western and central Ukraine are 
expected to continue to be drawn to the traditional destinations within the EU.
Two more quantitative aspects of possible future emigration from Eastern 
Europe should be also emphasised. Firstly, long-term political instability 
in Ukraine alongside with the deterioration of the economic situation in the 
whole region may stimulate family reunification processes by migrants’ family 
members. Moreover, the attraction of the EU universities among young people 
in the region may grow. 
Impact of abolition of EU short-term visas on the volume of migration
Delphi research indicates that the current EU visa regime is general-
ly viewed by EaP states as a factor hampering the movement of bona fide 
travelers. Overall, the majority of surveyed EaP experts believe that the 
bulk of those interested in the EU as a destination have already migrated 
for the purpose of employment. The view is relatively similar in V4 states, 
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although experts from those states reiterate that the introduction of a visa-
free regime for Eastern European citizens may result in the growth of un-
declared employment. 
The extrapolation study that analysed the impact of earlier waves of visa lib-
eralisation for migration inflows from Central Europe and the Baltic states, 
Romania and Bulgaria, and finally the Balkans showed that visa liberalisa-
tion had little or no effect on the number of first-time residence permits, or 
on immigration flows to EU member states. In contrast, the overall number of 
residence permits issued to nationals of these countries decreased rather than 
increased. The possible explanation may be that nationals of those states, upon 
obtaining free right to enter the EU, became less keen about asking for a permit 
to stay in the EU. If visa liberalisation did not have any measurable effects on 
long-term migration trends regarding such a diverse range of states, it would 
be rather unlikely for a completely different pattern to emerge in the cases of 
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus.
Desirability of visa abolition for Eastern European citizens in Visegrad states
The Delphi results from Visegrad countries suggest that business circles are 
the group that is most supportive of visa-free movement for the EU’s eastern 
neighbors. This is consistent with the assessment that Ukrainian and Bela-
rusian employees in particular help to address the domestic labour market 
needs. Where Poland diverges from the other countries is the strong elite con-
sensus, which relates the question of visa liberalisation to fundamental objec-
tives of the country’s foreign policy. Politicians and state officials seem to be 
overwhelmingly supportive of visa liberalisation and the level of their support 
exceeds that found in the general public. 
In Czechia and Hungary, while the majority of queried experts also support 
the lifting of visas, a significant minority considers the liberalisation meas-
ures undesirable “from the point of view of the country’s interests”. This may 
be related to the generally negative media portrayal of migrants in the Czech 
media and the recent breakdown of previous liberal migration policy, and to 
the distinction being made in the Hungarian debate between the desirable im-
migrants of ethnic Hungarian origin and the less favoured other categories of 
migrants. Slovak experts are rather supportive towards visa abolition, though 
they also emphasized the risk of irregular migration growth. 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
223
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
14
European public opinion on immigration
General concern over immigration 
According to the Eurobarometer data, as of autumn 2013 one in eight respond-
ents from the EU-28 named immigration as one of the two most important is-
sues facing their country. Significant variation could be observed between the 
level of concern over immigration in different EU countries. Significantly, the 
lowest anxiety is found in a number of countries that are geographically close 
to the areas of migrants’ origin: Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Poland, Ro-
mania, Slovenia, Estonia and Finland have all recorded levels of 5% or fewer re-
spondents concerned about immigration. The states where concern is substan-
tial (exceeding 10%) can be divided into three groups: the states facing a rapid 
and substantial growth in immigration (Malta with a record 63% of concerned 
respondents or the UK with 33%), several traditional destinations in which in-
tegration difficulties and pressure on the welfare system have become a matter 
of public debate (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg 
and Sweden, in which from 11 to 17% of respondents expressed concern), and 
countries where immigration issues are closely linked with the question of 
ethnic minorities (Bulgaria with 23% of respondents and Latvia with 11%)126.
Immigration as an opportunity or threat?
When EU citizens’ attitudes towards immigration are explored in greater de-
tail, it turns out that EU public opinion is split in their views on immigration, 
with slightly more viewing it as a problem while a still significant share consid-
ers it an opportunity. In the 2013 Transatlantic Trends survey, 44% of Europeans 
sided with the view that immigration is more of a problem while 41% looked 
upon it as an opportunity. Again, very substantial differences are observed be-
tween countries, as many as 68% of Swedes and 62% of Germans view immi-
gration as an opportunity, while the skeptics dominate in the United Kingdom 
(64%), Slovakia (50%) and France (50%). 
The concern over immigration is centered on irregular movement, however. 
Europeans are in fact relatively unconcerned about legal immigration. The 
difference is most striking in Southern Europe: whereas only about a quar-
ter of citizens of Italy, Portugal and Spain are anxious about legal movement 
126 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer, Autumn 2013, available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb80/eb80_first_en.pdf
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of migrants, between 70% and 90% are preoccupied with irregular migration. 
The contrast is nearly as high in France, Germany and The Netherlands. While 
the gap is narrower in the new Member States, if 46% of Poles and Romanians 
view irregular migration with concern, this share drops to 27 and 18%, respec-
tively, with regard to legal movement.
Attitudes in new EU Member States 
Seemingly these results are largely in line with the earlier studies insofar as 
they suggest that the societies of new Member States with relatively low im-
migrant populations and smaller welfare systems should be less anxious about 
immigration. When asked whether there are “too many” immigrants in the 
country, only 4% of Slovaks, 6% of Romanians and 9% of Poles answered in the 
affirmative, compared to 24% of Germans, 37% of Dutch, 43% of French and Ital-
ians and as many as 55% of UK respondents. The general lack of preoccupation 
with migration in the new Member States may be explained by the observa-
tion made by Delphi V4 experts that migrants tend to be “invisible” to society. 
Also, the fact that migrants on the whole do not make substantial claims on the 
welfare system eliminates the potency of an argument found in countries with 
more developed social support systems, namely that immigrants constitute 
a burden on social transfers.
Nevertheless, resistance among the societies of the new Member States to anti-
immigrant rhetoric may be more limited than it currently appears. If a broad-
er debate were to be held, the outcome might be surprisingly similar to that 
found in the more established countries of destination, as the results of the lat-
est public opinion polls indicate that Poles or Slovaks tend to overestimate the 
migrant population and its claims on the welfare system. For instance, the Pol-
ish respondents on average estimated the size of the immigrant group at 12%, 
while Slovaks set this indicator at 9%. This in turn translates into concerns 
over the impact of immigration on the welfare system – apart from France 
(57%), Slovaks were the most preoccupied with “immigrants as a burden on 
social services” (71%), with Poles in second place with a result equal to that of 
France (57%)127.
As earlier Visegrad country chapters clearly illustrate, particularly in 
Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia, third-country immigrants, in which category 
127 Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2013, German Marshall Fund 2013, pp. 37-44, available at: 
http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2013/09/TTrends-2013-Key-Findings-Report.pdf
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
225
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
14
Ukrainians, Moldovans and Belarusian are usually placed, are often perceived 
as a threat to society, even if political elites or the expert community are of 
a different opinion. In general, the research has shown that the mass media 
play a particularly negative role when it comes to the shaping of public opinion 
towards immigrants. A different situation can be observed when it comes to 
the repatriation from Eastern Europe of ethnic Poles or Hungarians – here the 
public attitude is much more supportive. 
EU and V4 states’ attitudes towards visa liberalisation
Securitisation of EU visa policy versus conditionality principle
The EU institutions decisions on putting a certain state on ‘white visa list’ are 
adopted with consideration to the third country’s potential for generating ir-
regular migratory flows bound for the EU as well as corresponding threats to 
security. At the same time, regard is made to the state of bilateral relations 
with a given country, and reciprocity of exemption from short-term visas for 
EU nationals is expected in return for EU liberalisation.
The security aspect of EU visa policy is evident also in the multiannual plan-
ning documents, adopted by the EU Council. Security took a central role in 
the EU’s priorities in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Hague 
Programme for 2005-2010, as well the Stockholm Programme for 2010-2014. 
Even in those cases where the EU has embarked on a dialogue concerning visa 
liberalisation, visa abolition was made conditional on third countries meeting 
“extensive policy commitments as regards managing migration and internal 
security”128.
Thus, the EU’s visa policy seeks to ensure security through a parallel set of ac-
tivities. On the one hand, it involves harmonisation of the rules and practices 
for issuing visas and crossing the external border (the Visa and Border Codes). 
On the other hand, it works with third countries by building their capacity to 
manage migratory flows. In the Western Balkans, the European Union adopt-
ed a policy of conditionality, in which the promise of visa waiver served as 
a strong lever to pressure for reforms, encompassing a host of issues, crucial 
from the point of view of the EU’s ability to stem irregular migration, such as 
border management, document security and fighting organised crime. 
128 S. Peers, „EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Non-Civil)”, in: P. Craig, G. de Burca (eds.), Evo-
lution of EU Law, Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 281-282.
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The framework for visa liberalisation with EaP states is substantially differ-
ent from that offered to Western Balkan countries. While the process also 
involves compliance with a range of technical requirements, it does not take 
place within a time-bound and pre-determined accession path, which so far 
had characterized earlier liberalisations of the EU’s visa regime. Moreover, 
unlike the Western Balkan roadmaps, the action plans guiding the progress 
of the EaP states are open-ended. At the insistence of several Member States, 
anxious to see more safeguards in place against the likelihood of a rise in ir-
regular migration in the wake of liberalisation, the process was divided into 
two stages. While the first stage covers the relatively well-defined areas of legal 
and institutional approximation, the second one may be a more difficult hurdle 
to clear, requiring the third country to demonstrate effective implementation 
of migration control mechanisms.
EU Member States’ positions 
It may be argued that in the absence of clear accession prospects and with 
greater opportunities for the Member States to decide on the outcome, the 
visa liberalisation process takes on an even greater political significance, and 
is subject to an even greater conditionality. The visa liberalisation setup with 
those nations which have not been offered clear integration prospects leaves 
the entire process vulnerable to the positions of some EU pivotal states, wheth-
er in favour or opposed to the move. The split between countries supporting 
visa liberalisation to EaP states and those opposing it may reflect the degree 
of cultural proximity and cross-border trade, as well as interest in democratic 
transformation of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. The countries supportive 
of the liberalisation process are the new EU MS that are geographically close 
to the area, such as the Baltic States, the Visegrad Group and Romania. On the 
other end of the continuum one finds France, The Netherlands, Germany and 
Austria129. 
The split among EU MS on visa liberalisation reproduced the divisions over 
other elements of the Freedom, Security and Justice agenda, such as the con-
troversy over the admission of Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen area 
or the debate over reintroduction of border controls in response to migratory 
pressures within the control-free area. As a result, a camp of opponents to rap-
id visa liberalisation formed. These states are willing to extend the scope of 
129 R. Sadowski, Partnership in Times of Crisis. Challenges for the Eastern European Countries’ Inte-
gration with Europe, Point of View, No. 36, July 2013, Center for Eastern Studies: Warsaw, p. 38. 
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verification to include broader aspects of justice and migration management 
and favour more extensive ‘on-the-ground’ missions130. It is worth emphasis-
ing that this group of countries justify the introduction of further safeguards 
not only with reference to their own domestic concerns with immigration, but 
also argue that such reassurances would politically facilitate the process of 
visa liberalisation. 
The other group of countries, notably including the ‘new’ EU MS, has centered 
its arguments on two aspects. Firstly, as states that have recently complet-
ed accession talks with the EU, the proponents of rapid liberalisation stress 
the principle of limiting the scope of conditionality and keeping the process 
transparent and predictable, focusing on technical criteria. Secondly, these 
countries tend to stress the aspect of external relations rather than security 
in the EU’s visa policy, pointing to benefits that the outcome would have for 
a broader agenda of democratisation and promotion of people-to-people con-
tacts. Following the approval of visa liberalisation for citizens of Moldova, 
the Romanian Foreign Minister hailed the decision as “fully reflect[ing] this 
major priority of Romania’s foreign policy”131. Similar in tone were the state-
ments made by foreign ministries of the Baltic States, strongly emphasising 
visa liberalisation as a core component of the EaP initiative, and urging the 
EU to work on making it possible. For instance, the Lithuanian MFA issued 
a statement on 2 March 2014 in the midst of the Crimean crisis, in which it 
exhorted both the EU and Ukraine towards “acceleration of efforts (…) in the 
ongoing implementation of the EU Visa Liberalisation Action Plan”, resulting 
in “speedy progress toward a visa-free regime for Ukrainian citizens’ short-
term travel to the Schengen area”132.
While the Visegrad countries have scored a major success in maintaining the 
momentum of visa liberalisation talks with all the EaP countries ready to 
engage in dialogue, their position is weakened by the lack of coordination of 
their national policies on mobility towards the Eastern Partners. Significant 
130 P. Kazmierkiewicz, N. Dimitrova, No shortcuts on the road to freedom of movement for the EU’s 
Eastern neighbours, PASOS Policy Brief No. 2, Prague 2011, p. 10.
131 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, The Foreign Minister welcomes the European Parlia-
ment’s vote to liberalize the visa regime for Moldovan citizens, Press Release, 27 February 2014.
132 Latvia: Eastern Partnership should focus more on democracy and visa liberalization issues, Baltic 
Course, 23 July 2013, available at: http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/baltic_states_
cis/?doc=78138; Lithuanian MFA statement on Ukraine, 2 March 2014, Permanent Mission of 
the Republic of Lithuania to UN, New York, available at: http://mission-un-ny.mfa.lt/index.
php?1017029739
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differences of interest and of tactics could be observed in V4 states’ visa policies 
and practice133. The Delphi research results for V4 states confirm these findings, 
suggesting that for the foreseeable future, we should not expect convergence 
of positions among Visegrad states on the best way of promoting mobility of 
nationals of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.
Recent developments in the EU visa policy
Recent developments in the dialogue between the EU and EaP states have been 
marked by significant progress. In November 2013 the European Commis-
sion proposed that the holders of Moldovan biometric passports could travel 
to the EU without the need to apply for short-term Schengen visas. The pro-
posal pointed to the low threat of irregular migration from that country as the 
rate of refusal had dropped from 11.4% in 2010 to 6.5% in 2012, while the num-
ber of visa applications had remained stable in that period, slightly exceed-
ing 50,000. Following the endorsement from the European Parliament and the 
Council, Moldovan nationals could travel visa-free effective as of 28 April 2014. 
Soon afterwards, in mid-May 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a crucial 
package of laws necessary for visa liberalisation, expected to take effect in the 
near future.
Visa liberalisation is taking place in the context of some major changes in the 
EU’s position on visa policy in general, which include attempts at perceiving 
visa policy more through the prism of the economy and incentives for en-
hanced mobility and tourism development. A new approach to visa procedures 
was proposed by the EC in November 2012, in which it was argued that facili-
tating the movement of third-country nationals into the EU could stimulate 
economic growth throughout the Union. This was followed by a series of public 
consultations in mid-2013 and an impact study, which concluded that by in-
troducing certain facilitating measures a 30-60% boost in travel from six ma-
jor locations could be expected and corresponding growth of up to 1.3 million 
jobs in tourism. In effect, the Commission presented on 1 April 2014 a set of 
measures as part of the proposed “Smarter Visa Policy for Economic Growth”. 
These include simplification of visa application forms, shortening of process-
ing times, the possibility of applying for short-term tourist visas at EU borders, 
133 M. Jaroszewicz, Kwestie mobilności i migracji w relacjach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej i Ukrainy 
[Mobility and Migration in Relations between V4 and Ukraine] in: A. Gil (ed.), Rocznik Insty-
tutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, Zeszyt 1, Lublin 2013, pp. 35-36, in Polish. 
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and the introduction of a new category of visas enabling tourism between EU 
Member States134. 
Conclusions: migration forecasts and EU policy and public opinion
Through a combination of Delphi survey research in the V4 and the three East-
ern Partnership countries, econometric modeling and the extrapolation of pre-
vious migration trends, we may conclude that visa liberalisation would merely 
be a contributing factor, reinforcing certain existing migratory patterns. Cer-
tain reorientation from Russia towards the EU has been clearly observed in the 
migration flows from Ukraine and Moldova. It must be noted that unlike the 
Western Balkans, the three Eastern European neighbours of the EU lack the 
anchor of Euro-Atlantic integration, and as the events of early 2014 in Ukraine 
show, continue to be vulnerable to regional security developments. The highly 
unstable security and political environment, coupled with the precarious eco-
nomic situation, does not preclude a rapid shift in migratory patterns, and as 
such must be taken into account by EU policy-makers.
Paradoxically, visa-free movement for countries located between the EU and 
Russia could help stabilise the situation by providing a much-needed safety 
guarantee to the populations of these countries. The nexus between visa lib-
eralisation and management of migratory flows is beginning to be acknowl-
edged by Brussels and those Member States that so far had been skeptical 
about the virtue of speedy abolition of short-term visas. The successful com-
pletion of negotiations with Moldova, a clear perspective of liberalisation 
with Ukraine and the commencement of negotiations on visa facilitation with 
Belarus all testify to the shift in EU policy-making, undoubtedly in response 
to larger concerns over the territorial integrity, stability and European orien-
tation of these countries.
What is the V4 countries’ place in this process? Although these countries are 
likely to host a significant share of migrants from Ukraine and Belarus (far less 
in the case of Moldova), it seems they have not elaborated a joint policy position 
on the desirability of visa abolition with the eastern neighbors, and so far they 
have come up with separate national solutions, focusing on different priority 
groups. The provision of legal opportunities for migration and the integration 
of Ukrainian, Moldovan and Belarusian nationals has remained a subject of 
134 COM(2014) 165 final.
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narrow debate among experts, rarely achieving a public or political character. 
As long as labour migrants from Eastern Europe remain “invisible” to the soci-
eties of Visegrad countries, there will be little incentive for politicians to take 
up the issue of coming up with long-term policy solutions.
Public opinion in the ‘old’ EU MS is likely to react differently to the conse-
quences of visa liberalisation, depending on the dynamics and overall volume 
of post-abolition migration and on the concentration and character of the 
flows. To put it bluntly, a relatively small influx that is going to be directed 
at countries with a well-integrated group of migrants of a given nationality 
is unlikely to provoke a strong reaction (as is the case of Moldovans in, for 
instance, Italy). In contrast, a rapid increase in the migration outflows from 
Ukraine, which could reach countries already grappling with integration 
problems and geographically distant from the Eastern European region, could 
turn into a policy challenge.
